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A shift has taken place in the structures of local governance in many 
developing countries. Whereas in the past, the central government provided local 
infrastructure (water and sanitation systems, roads, electricity, schools, and 
healthcare), today communities face these responsibilities themselves. The shift has 
been prompted and accompanied by changing global thoughts on appropriate 
development approaches and forced by difficulties in fiscal affairs. The shift matches a 
belief that more participation and more decentralization result in more democracy and 
better development. To this effect, neoliberal decentralization policies have been 
enacted in various countries to promote this "bottom-up" strategy. The strategy favors 
decision-making at the local level, through an alliance among local governments, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), private 
firms, and citizens to identify, prioritize, implement, and monitor projects.  
This study examines the impact of the participatory approach in two 
communities in Kenya—one of several East African countries to have instituted 
participatory development programs over the last decade. The study assesses the 
physical, socioeconomic, and political impact of the Local Authority Service Delivery 
Action Plan (LASDAP), a national development program. The findings are based on 
interviews conducted with government and local officials, reviews of documents, 
 interviews with local residents, and visits to project sites within the boundaries of two 
local government councils: the Municipal Council of Nakuru (MCN) and Gusii 
County Council (GCC). 
Examination of the LASDAP program in Kenya suggests that despite the 
ideological fervor that often accompanies this development approach, program 
outcomes failed to measure up. Very little of the development funds were spent on the 
implementation of projects, local participation rates were low, and the process did not 
fare well at promoting greater transparency and accountability within local governance 
structures. Furthermore, local power dynamics were simply too strong, too 
complicated, and too intertwined to be inconsequential to the development process. As 
a result of these shortcomings, residents have developed an attitude of resignation 
rather than enthusiasm, with participation. 
In the conclusion, technical solutions are recommended for addressing the key 
problems encountered within these two communities' development processes. 
However, this research finds that achieving long-lasting solutions to these 
communities' social ills will require both a technical and sociopolitical approach to 
development. A sociopolitical approach is required because elite capture of the 
development process has not only resulted in an unequal distribution of new resources, 
but also continues to reinforce the norm of inequality. Prior development programs did 
not fare any better. Thus, addressing the underlying issues of social justice and 
unequal power will demand that the development process be politicized, and not 
simply be conducted as a technical exercise.  
Rather than focusing on the primacy of the individual, this research focuses on 
the state, and finds that the state needs to play a bigger role in the provision of basic 
needs. An interventionist state is proposed, one which enacts socially democratic 
policies to ensure that amongst other things, the basic needs of each community's most 
 vulnerable members are met. Without such, this and future development programs will 
only be trying to eradicate the very inequality that is being recreated by the current 
system of neoliberal policies. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Setting the Context: The Reality of Life in Nakuru, Kenya 
It was July 2006 and I was in Kenya doing some research on a United Nations 
Human Settlements (UN-Habitat) program that had begun in the town of Nakuru a 
decade earlier. In 1994, Nakuru had been chosen as one of four pilot sites for the 
Localizing Agenda 21 (LA21) program.
1
 I had come to examine the results of the 
program after a decade of city-to-city partnership, the purpose of which was for each 
city to share its "best practices." In Nakuru, the emphasis was on development 
planning, including improvements to service delivery mechanisms for water, 
sanitation, healthcare, and affordable housing.
2
 
Each day, along with making inquires, conducting interviews, and compiling 
interview notes, I also had to strategize about where to have lunch. This was not 
because I was a picky eater. I can eat just about anything. I love trying new and 
different cuisines, and lots of places were reasonably priced and had good food. 
Strategizing about where to have lunch had to do with identifying a place that also had 
restroom facilities with water. Most eateries did not have public restrooms with 
running water. The sanitation facilities at the local government offices where I spent 
                                                 
1
 The Localizing Agenda 21 Program (LA21) is a UN Habitat partnership program between local 
authorities in the global North and those in the South. The ideology is that the North-South partnership 
would enable both localities to benefit from mutual sharing of information and practices, improve 
cultural understanding, and most importantly, provide a platform whereby funds are made available 
from the northern partners to those in the South. The program's primary aim is to help local authorities 
in the global South achieve more sustainable development by implementing a participatory 
environmental planning and management process to identify and address priority issues. The LA21 
program has since been implemented in many cities around the world. The program in Nakuru was in 
partnership with the Post Graduate Center for Human Settlements at the Catholic University in Leuven, 
Belgium. The Center formed a partnership with Nakuru and three other sites (Essaouira, Morocco; 
Vinh, Vietnam; and Bayamo, Cuba). The University's involvement was financially supported by the 
Belgian Development Cooperation. The program ran from 1994 to 2004 in Nakuru. For more on the 
LA21, see United Nations Chapter 28 of the Rio Agenda 21 (1992) and Loeckx et al. (2004). 
2
 For more on LA21 in Nakuru, Kenya, see Tuts 1998, Mwangi 2000. 
 2 
most of my time when I was not out conducting interviews lacked water the majority 
of the time. I would later learn of another restroom in the building that had running 
water. However, it was under lock and key. When I got to know the ladies that kept 
the key, they were gracious enough to give me permission to use it. I was their foreign 
guest, and they were very kind to me.  
To many Westerners, this restaurant-selection business might not seem like a 
task that needed to be so calculated. However, I did not have a lot of contacts who 
worked outside the local government offices and since I was staying in a residential 
area of town some distance from the central business district (CBD), my options were 
truly limited. There were no public facilities in the CBD.
3
 Inadequate sanitation was 
not just limited to the CBD where I was working. It extends into many low and 
middle-income residential neighborhoods as well. In the low-income neighborhoods, 
pit latrines are the predominant form of available sanitation. Due to their old age or 
poor construction, the seepage of effluent flow into open trenches is not uncommon, 
since the pathway for flow into septic tanks is often blocked. There is no need to 
elaborate on the impact of such environmental conditions on human health. Such 
conditions have been well documented. In the middle-income neighborhoods, the 
intermittent supply of water often hinders the effectiveness of flush toilets. Water 
supply in the upper-income neighborhoods of Nakuru is more reliable. Individual 
wells are not common in this area, unlike my home-country of Nigeria, where 
seemingly every household has its own well because they are not served by their 
municipality. 
On this initial visit, I also witnessed the fact that access to adequate healthcare 
                                                 
3
 The quasi-good news is that during my stay, a local NGO had just started construction on the only 
soon-to-be public shower and restroom facility within the CBD. However, an inspection of the 
construction plans revealed it was to be on a very small scale, increasing the likeliness of overuse and 
early damage.  
 3 
is not available to many Kenyans.
4
 One of my many examples is a woman I met 
through an acquaintance who runs a small NGO in Nakuru to help the destitute from 
the surrounding areas. He supplies them with small amounts of basics like rice, beans, 
and cornmeal. He often talked about how he is forced to address other issues apart 
from sustenance, such as helping his clients gain access to healthcare. Naturally, he is 
reluctant towards paying hospital or other bills. Yet, he is compelled to do so every 
now and again. He'd often lament that his clients do not have anywhere else to turn—
but him. 
In this instance, he had used his personal vehicle to transport a sick mother to 
the Provincial Hospital of Nakuru, the largest public hospital in the region. When they 
got there, they were told she needed some x-rays but the hospital's x-ray machine was 
out of order. They needed to go back to town and search for a private clinic that 
offered x-ray services, and where, unfortunately, the costs would be higher. It took 
them awhile, but eventually, they were successful in finding a clinic. He reluctantly 
paid the bills and they headed back to the hospital. She was admitted for observation, 
although the doctor on duty could not tell what was wrong with her. She hadn't been 
able to hold down food for a few days and was very weak. However, besides a basic 
health screening no other tests were conducted. 
The following day, four of us accompanied John to the hospital to see her. 
There was a guard at the front gate and only a few people were being allowed in. After 
much cajoling, all four of us were given permission to go in. Despite my varied 
international heritage—having grown up among the middle-class in Nigeria, then in 
Europe, and later, the US – I was struck by the barrenness of the hospital. It was 
supposed to be the best alternative to private healthcare in the region, which only a 
                                                 
4
 Kenya Institute of Economic Affairs 2002 
 4 
minority could afford. Bedside equipment was absent, and there were few doctors, 
nurses, and nurse's aides. The walls were bare, the examination rooms were empty; the 
interior was simply cold. I had expected that for the main public hospital in the 4
th
 
largest city of the country, the conditions would not be as stark. Perhaps it was 
because I had grown accustomed to the high level of healthcare in the US, where I 
resided. Or perhaps I had been fooled by the reassurances of ongoing "development 
activities" in Kenya into thinking that the conditions would be better. Either way, I 
was simply taken aback by what I saw. 
There was only one nurse at the entrance of the general ward. When it came to 
our turn, we told her who we were there to see. She didn‘t know which bed the patient 
was in but gave us permission to look around for her. We found her on the opposite 
end of the large room. She tried to sit up when she saw us but was so weak. She spoke 
softly. There were no intravenous lines or monitors on her. None of the ward's patients 
were hooked up to any machines. There were no doctors in sight and the only nurse 
was the one stationed at the desk where visitors checked in. There must have been at 
least 60 patients in the room, two to a bed. We visited with her awhile. She hadn't 
undergone any further tests or procedures beyond what had been done the day before 
and the doctors still had no idea what was wrong with her. We eventually said our 
good-byes and wished her well. Two days later, we got the news that she had passed 
away. Cause of death unknown. She left behind a young daughter.
5
 
                                                 
5
 Gilligan (1996) attributes such "non-natural" deaths to the "structural violence" inflicted upon those at 
the lower rungs of society. Structural violence—the term used to describe the systematic ways by which 
certain social and institutional structures prevent the poor from meeting their basic needs—is also cited 
in Farmer's (2003) account of the social and economic injustices he witnessed while working as a 
physician with the poor in Haiti, Peru, and Russia. Scheper-Hughes (1992) uses the term "normal 
violence" to describe the plight of the poor in Northeastern Brazil, where, as she observed, the marginal 
existence of the sugar cane cutters is defined by hunger, disease, and ignorance—all because of 
economic exploitation. Many readers are shocked at Scheper-Hughes's accounts, which detail the 
economic, social, and historical context of this violence, including vivid accounts of how many mothers 
hasten the deaths of their infants by refusing to nurture babies who are sickly and appear likely to die. I 
wasn't so much shocked as appalled by the conditions of the poor in Kenya; that in such a plentiful 
 5 
For this mother and so many others in Kenya, access to basic needs such as 
good sanitation facilities, potable water, affordable housing, as well as adequate and 
affordable healthcare is restricted. Amongst other factors, institutionalized elitism, 
poverty, and racism have helped fuel a social structure that effectively locks out a 
large proportion of the country's population from gaining access to these everyday 
needs. It was the promise of heading off such crises through the LA21 program—
whether it is healthcare, water, or otherwise, by making them more readily available 
and affordable— that I had come to investigate in Nakuru. The Program was about 
forming local and international partnerships with secondary cities in the South to help 
manage everyday issues such as the lack of water, adequate solid waste disposal, and 
provision of adequate healthcare.  
In Nakuru, one of LA21's pilot projects was the construction of flush toilets at 
the Flamingo Phase I complex, a low-income housing estate just outside the CBD. On 
one occasion, I visited the estate in the company of an officer from the municipal 
council.
6
 As we walked into the estate, we came upon a large group of women and 
children huddled around a fixture. It was hard to see where the water was coming 
from, but the long lines of large jerry cans and basins indicated that they were all there 
to fetch water. Water was scarce here. Serviced by the municipal council, residents 
here typically get water twice a week—during the early hours of Saturday and Sunday. 
They were lucky that day because it was a weekday but there was water. The word had 
gotten around and everyone was out to fill up their containers. We listened as the 
women talked about their hardship of not having adequate water, then bid them 
farewell. As we walked away, the council officer said it was difficult to supply water 
to this estate regularly because the rents they pay per room is so small it is not enough 
                                                                                                                                            
world, many have to endure and make do with so little which others waste so much of their excesses. 
6
 In this study, the terms local authority; local government; and local, municipal, town, or county 
council are used interchangeably, as they often are in Kenyan society. 
 6 
to fund all the utilities. When they try to raise rates, they are often met with opposition 
by the Councilor (local politician) serving that area. The water stations are communal 
so individual billing is not feasible. "So, Sade, what do we do?" she asks.
7
  
We walked further into the estate to inspect the sanitation upgrading project 
undertaken through the LA21 program. It was a combination shower and flush toilet, 
which replaced some of the old outdoor bathhouses and pit latrines. Each of the twelve 
new facilities was located in the gap between two buildings and was shared by those 
eight or more households.
8
 A water tap was also included in the design. The only 
problem was that most of the time, there was no water to operate the new showers and 
toilets. When they can afford it, some residents resort to buying water from local 
vendors to meet their needs.  
In the subsequent days, I had several conversations with residents and former 
and current local government officials about different approaches to social 
development in Africa. We also talked about the meaning of commonly used terms in 
the field of planning, such as "development," "partnerships," and "sustainable 
development." As I left Nakuru that summer, one of the comments from those 
conversations that stuck with me was that posed by one of the local government staff. 
He was disappointed at how the LA21 partnership program with Leuven, Belgium had 
                                                 
7
 The houses on the estate consist of several one-story stand-alone buildings, each divided into four 
quadrants. Each quadrant consists of one room and each is usually occupied by a different family, 
although some families rent two rooms. Each room serves as a combined living, cooking, and sleeping 
quarter. Cooking takes place on small kerosene or charcoal stoves inside the rooms. Ablution blocks are 
located adjacent to the living quarters.
 
They include six small wooden enclosures with dirt floors for 
bathing on one side and six pit latrines on the opposite side. These quarters were originally built in the 
early 1900s to house men who came to work on the railroad that passes through town. Then, each room 
housed one man. For those who had families, their families stayed in the rural area while the men 
commuted between the villages and Nakuru town on a weekly basis (Kenya Municipal Council of 
Nakuru, 1999, Strategic Structure Plan, Volume I). Thus the rooms—now family homes—were never 
meant to house a large permanent population like they do today. This is also the reason why there is 
limited water supply here. The population has over-exceeded the original design. 
8
 The local municipal council was supposed to have built more showers and toilets to cover all the 
households in the estate but other legal issues are said to have kept those plans on hold. 
 7 
gone sour, and how many of the projects that were started under the program had not 
moved beyond the pilot phase. He said,  
"partnerships are good enough but for the sake that we get to know one 
another…we do a few things together; it's not enough…the issue of 
partnership and networking should be included into the Council in 
terms of administration, networking, and financing, because often, we 
talk about partnerships [but] we leave everything to the donor." 
The scenario this staff member was proposing was exactly what the Local 
Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP) was set up to realize. Unlike the 
externally proposed, donor-funded, and donor-directed LA21 program, the LASDAP 
was a national program, instituted at each of Kenya's 175 local authorities in 1999. 
The goal of the LASDAP program is very similar to that of the UN's LA21, having 
been conceived from the same ideology—that decentralized community participation 
methods result in better development. Under the LASDAP framework, each local 
government is to work in partnership with its community organizations, private 
business firms, and some residents to identify, assign priorities, implement, and 
monitor community infrastructure projects to meet their needs. By working this way, 
the government invested heavily, hoping it could positively influence its people's 
struggle to meet basis needs such as water, sanitation, and adequate healthcare.
9
 
Combined, these personal experiences provide the context for why I decided to 
focus my doctoral research on this idea of democratic decentralization. This is the 
term used by Olowu and Wunsch (2004) to describe the transfer of fiscal resources 
and local governance responsibilities from the central government to the local 
governments, who in turn then pass on that responsibility to local citizens by calling 
for the civil (as well as the private) sector to play a greater role in the management of 
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 Since 1999, more than Ksh 47 billion (Kenyan Schillings, USD 677 million) has been allocated to 
Kenya's 175 local governments to manage local operations and develop local infrastructure (using an 
exchange rate of I USD = Ksh 69.4). 
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urban and rural centers. To use Hirschman‘s (1958) phrase, it‘s a development model 
―in the small.‖ Doing so would enable me to evaluate this dominant "mainstreaming of 
the 'participation in development' approach," by assessing its impact in two Kenyan 
cities. Focusing on one country would also allow me to concentrate on exactly how 
Kenya's sociopolitical context affects the program's impact. 
Good Governance as Democratic Decentralization 
Since the 1990s much positive attention has been paid to participatory forms of 
governance; so much so that it has come to signify what it means to practice "good 
governance." Small-scale, grassroots, community development practices have been in 
place for decades. However, the participatory model escalated to a dominant 
development model in the late 1980s following an explicit drive to turn the once 
organic community development practice into a manufactured top-down practice. This 
change in global practice was caused by several factors, including rising global 
poverty, rising national debts, increasing domestic and international demand for 
democratic governments, reduced government spending, poor urban management, and 
the failure of several government and donor-led large-scale projects that sought little 
or no community input. To combat these problematic shortcomings, leading 
development agencies such as the World Bank and United Nations advocated more 
participation and decentralization, which they felt would lead to greater democracy 
and better development.
10
 
For example, in 1989, the World Bank suggested that inept governance was the 
single most important factor, if not the sole cause of Africa‘s underdevelopment,11 and 
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whose standards and prescribed by whom? The measure of development (or underdevelopment) is 
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as a solution, presented its principles for participatory governance at workshops and 
seminars. Accompanied by plenty of ideological fervor, those principles included 
instructions on community participation; the building of consensus; promoting 
accountability; enabling transparency; fostering responsive, efficient, and effective 
institutions; enforcing the rule of law; and promoting equity and the inclusion of all 
people in resource management.12 Today, more than 80 percent of African countries 
have enacted such participatory good governance policies in one form or another with 
mixed results.
13
 
Besides the claims of greater equity in the distribution of resources and greater 
democracy in decision-making and all matters of governance at the local level by 
increasing ordinary people's participation in it, there are also broader claims of what 
participation can do as a process for development. They include: reduction in poverty 
levels, enhanced human dignity, use of ―underutilized‖ human resources, increased 
social awareness, increased use of local knowledge and initiatives, increased 
grassroots democracy through popular participation in social, economic, and political 
issues, accelerated social and economic progress, strengthened individual and 
community bonds, and greater empowerment of individuals or groups.
14
 Accordingly, 
participatory development has evolved in the minds of its many proponents from 
merely being a good development practice to a prerequisite for positive social 
change.
15
 
Indeed, in Kenya, active community participation in local governance matters 
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was passed into law in 1998 as a means of engineering both physical and structural 
social change. The passage of the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) Act came 
one year after the successful campaign and election of a significant number of non-
KANU (Kenya African National Union) party members into Parliament. KANU was 
one of the first major political parties in Kenya, and its leaders had assumed the 
Presidency since independence in 1963. Between 1982 and 1992, it was declared the 
only official political party, ensuring KANU's continued control of government for 
another decade.
16
  
Following the 1997 elections, almost half of the new members of Parliament 
(MPs) were from opposition parties. The political victory of these MPs was viewed as 
a positive step towards an end to ethnic dominance in government. For many years, 
accusations of corruption and ethnic bias in the distribution of resources had been an 
issue of contention.
17
 Consequently, the 1998 legislation to decentralize development 
funds to each community (using local government boundaries), where decisions could 
be made locally by residents, was widely embraced.
18
 
Although not negating the benefits of decentralization itself, in recent years, 
many scholars have challenged the pervasive belief that democratic decentralization is 
unequivocally good. In 2001, Cooke and Kothari (eds.), along with other academics 
and practitioners, asserted through different analyses that in practice, participatory 
development reaches nowhere near the bottom-up, open, transformative development 
approach that it is commonly thought to be. Labeling their book Participation: The 
New Tyranny, the authors asserted that participatory governance does not function as a 
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tool for empowerment and the redistribution of power like its rhetoric might suggest. 
Rather, this development approach largely maintains existing power relationships, 
masking them behind the rhetoric and techniques of participation. The failure to 
acknowledge and address uneven power structures makes the practice of participation 
tyrannical. Cooke and Kothari identify three types of tyranny. One is the dominance of 
multilateral agencies in decision-making. Another is the obscuring of the limitations of 
participation and the manipulations that suppress local power differentials. The third is 
the limited discussion or consideration of alternative methods for cultivating 
development due to the immutable dominance of prescribed participatory methods. In 
all, Cooke and Kothari identify issues related to the agency of local actors, the 
exercise of power, individual rights, conceptions of community trust and social 
capital, the existence of an enabling structure for social change, and limitations within 
the widening of policy spaces—all of which are assumptions that underpin the 
ideology of participation. Devas and Grant (2003) also identify the tension between 
representative forms of democracy and popular participation as an issue that needs to 
be addressed. 
Previously, Moore (1995) had also cautioned that one must not confuse the 
ideology of equity that is at the core of today's dominant participatory development 
model (advocated in multilateral and national policies) with state or socially regulated 
distribution of resources. For the most part, states have moved from an earlier 
ideological era of state-led growth, industrial planning, and social welfarism that 
characterized the post-colonial period and the emergence of the concepts of developed 
and underdeveloped, to a new era of neoliberalism. This ideology (era) is based on the 
notion of an impartial economic market for the distribution of assets, a market to 
which individuals have equal access. Thus now, equity is framed in terms of giving 
the poor access to assets and alleviating poverty but not in terms of redistributing 
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wealth. Moore points out that this manner of providing access to productive resources 
is inevitably accompanied by control. Furthermore, he asserts that international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank have sought to promote this means of 
production and reproduction by taking assets away from the state and placing it within 
the economy of the market. He goes further to state that the notion of democratic 
participation is promoted because of the need to include civil society in the 
―renovation‖ of the state towards a new version that serves the interest of capital. This 
involves the transformation of states from being focused on organizing and 
maintaining employment, welfare, and protection of the national economy from 
external forces, to ones focused on the demands of capital. If such "renovation" were 
not the case, the state would be more accessible to the poor than it is now. Moore 
argues that the discourse continues to be framed by the dominant social class in such a 
way that it benefits capitalist notions of unlimited accumulation, but in a manner that 
seems quite ―natural‖ and ―immutable.‖ Several other development scholars—
Cammack, Mitchell, Ferguson, Frank, Leys—concur with Moore's analysis. 
In response to Cooke et al., Hickey and Mohan (eds., 2005) countered that 
despite those timely and important observations about participatory development, it 
would be wrong to dismiss participatory development altogether because there are 
some success stories of participation that have led to transformative outcomes, mostly 
as participatory governance strategies initiated by leftist political parties with strong 
social movements.
19
 They argue that what is needed is a broader view of 
participation—one that reengages with radicalism and goes deeper to understand how 
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underlying processes of development can strip away people's agency. This necessitates 
the political, claim-making practice of "substantive citizenship," where the claim is 
"from below" through organized struggles, as opposed to "procedural citizenship," 
which is bestowed "from above." In other words, participation needs to be more than 
just an end in itself; it needs to be a means to an end that is social justice. Rather than 
dismiss the practice of development, Hickey and Mohan contend that there needs to be 
a rethinking of development along the lines of Peet and Hartwick's (1999) notion of 
critical modernism, whereby there is an acknowledgment that the tenets of 
modernism—democracy, emancipation, development, and progress—are subject to 
the best and worst of human practices because they can be engaged in multiple ways. 
The challenge, Cleaver (2004) contends, is to use the field's understanding of the 
dynamic nature of such duality to identify opportunities for change.  
Different Forms of People's Participation 
Before discussing the Kenyan case, it is important to make a distinction 
between community participation for development efficiency and its counterpart, 
community participation for social change.
20
 The approach that is often employed 
when executing these two forms of participation is different. Table 1.1 outlines those 
differences. Based on the different approaches to executing each form of people's 
participation, the potential outcomes vary. However, the two forms of participation are 
often conflated, and usually with the expectation that exercising one approach—
usually participation for development efficiency—will result in both the efficient use 
of limited resources, as well as positive social change. In this manner however, the 
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expectations do not match the approach that was exercised. 
Table 1.1: Differentiating the Two Forms of Community Participation 
Community participation 
for development efficiency 
Community participation 
for social change 
mobilization from 'above,' and unpaid 'internal' mobilization 
those in power calling for collective 
action to meet social needs 
use of confrontational tactics to make 
demands known to authoritative powers 
focus on social needs focus on social, economic, or political 
needs 
advocates not concerned with structural 
changes per se. Burden is on the people 
themselves to make any structural 
changes 
participants challenge authority to make 
structural changes in societal system 
rhetoric of people being empowered 
through external influence 
people empowered because of their own 
actions 
people's participation is instrumental, a 
means to an end for achieving specific 
needs 
people's participation is to force a 
transformation or reordering of society's 
current value system 
non-participation of people in decision-
making considered an operational 
barrier, requiring financial, 
educational, technical, or administrative 
solutions 
non-participation of people in decision-
making considered a structural barrier, 
requiring changes to the system's 
structure in order to move forward 
Source: Table compiled from text within Midgley 1986 and Chinsinga 2003 
When communities are mobilized as they are today to assist with setting 
priorities and implementing community projects, the mobilization is often from above. 
That is, it is initiated by the central or local government. Reliance on unpaid local 
input such as the donation of time, money, or labor towards the construction of 
infrastructure projects has dominated the development paradigm in the last couple of 
decades. Unlike its counterpart, this form of community mobilization is simply to 
meet a community's social needs, not to articulate structural changes to the ways in 
which a society's infrastructure needs are determined or met. It is, if you wish, helping 
the community to supply itself with fish, rather than assisting the community to learn 
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how to fish. If the people want structural changes, it is up to them, not those currently 
in power, to devise a means for enabling the desired changes. Those in power merely 
open the door to allow ordinary people the means of gaining the possibility to 
advocate for or actively implement methods for bringing about desired changes. Thus 
the rhetoric from advocates of community-led development is that the masses are 
"empowered" to actively participate in their own governance. 
Here people's participation is instrumental: participation which is invited in 
order to fulfill a specific purpose. It is a means to an end. If people choose not to 
participate, the operation of community-led development hits a snag. Yet, people are 
not generally consulted to identify reasons behind their non-participation. Rather, 
financial, educational, technical, or administrative solutions are usually sought to 
correct people's non-participation.21 This response suggests that there is no alternative 
to this development paradigm, which is perhaps most evident through the prevalent 
use of the approach during the last two decades.  
It is important to distinguish between this and other instances, where 
communities self-mobilize in order to use confrontational tactics to make demands on 
those with authoritative power. This form of mobilization is usually referred to as 
community participation for social change. The change demanded can be social, 
economic, or political. Socially driven confrontation seeks to reduce the impact of 
poverty by calling upon government organizations and commercial interests to provide 
better neighborhood services in working class districts and industrial zones. Saul 
Alinsky is often cited in the American literature for his efforts in organizing meat-
packaging workers from the Back of the Yard neighborhood in Chicago to protest 
against poor working conditions at the Union Stock Yard in the 1930s.  
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Economic and politically driven confrontations often go hand-in-hand. These 
protests usually seek to draw attention to unequal land rights, the need for economic 
reform, recognition of ethnic minority or indigenous groups, or political participation 
of marginalized groups. Social movements—such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement in 
South Africa, the Zapatistas of Mexico, and the MSTs of Brazil—all employ 
politically driven protests to further their cause. Politically driven protests are also 
used to contest election results, as witnessed in the aftermath of the 2007 Presidential 
elections in Kenya. 
All of these groups were formed and operate on the basis that individuals gain 
more power through mass organizing with others. Participants seek fundamental 
structural changes in the way their respective societies operate, whether it regards land 
ownership or the provision of better neighborhood services. They do not believe that 
they will gain equal access to goods and services within the current system. Thus, they 
use their protests and actions as a way to forcefully bring about a dialogue with 
authorities about those structural inequalities in the hope that those discussions will 
help bring about positive change. For them, the issue of the have and have-nots 
(resulting in poverty for some) cannot be corrected on an individual basis. It must be 
corrected by changing the structure of the system that propagates it. Thus, such 
protests seek to increase the political consciousness of everyone about the uneven 
distribution of resources. Non-participation of affected persons is considered a 
structural barrier to decision-making, an issue which must be resolved.
22
 As might be 
expected, Peattie (1990), Abers (1995), and Hyatt (2001) all note that people with 
greater needs and problems are most likely to participate in such confrontations, 
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Libya to negotiate peace in Darfur, Sudan (BBC News 10/29/2007). 
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particularly when the mobilization addresses their needs or concerns.
23
  
Given the frequent and persistent use of the term ―participation‖ in the 
development literature, identifying this delineation is important because it illustrates 
two very different sets of intentions, expectations, and possibilities that are invariably 
tied to the same term. Consequently, participatory processes need to be examined to 
identify what form they take, as doing so provides a clearer understanding of the 
intentions, expectations, and possibilities behind people's participation. 
Addressing Social Service Needs 
At the heart of this dissertation is the assessment of participatory development 
as a prerequisite for social change. For proponents, it fulfils two areas of great need in 
developing countries like Kenya: improvement in social services and improvement in 
governance capabilities. Thus, sociopolitical transformation of society is the 
articulated end goal. For Kenya, improvement in social services is a major task 
because in the forty plus years since Independence, Kenya has yet to make significant 
progress in the provision of core services for most of its population. Specifically: 
access to health care, education, clean drinking water, electricity, and housing.
24
 Only 
43 percent have access to improved sanitation, while 61 percent of the population has 
access to an improved water source. On the healthcare front, there are 14 physicians 
for every 100,000 people, and 65 percent of Kenyans have poor access to qualified 
doctors.
25
 
These statistics are not surprising when coupled with the fact that over the last 
30 years, public expenditure on basic social services has declined, dropping from 20 
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percent of the government's budget in 1980 to 13 percent by 1995. The bulk (84 
percent) of social services expenditures by 1995 were on primary education. 
Expenditures on healthcare, water, and sanitation were much more limited, at 10 
percent, 2 percent, and 2 percent respectively.
26
 By the turn of the new millennium, 
overall public expenditure on social services had further declined to 9 percent of total 
expenditures. Nevertheless, they were projected to increase back up to 25 percent of 
overall expenditures by 2007.
27
 However, by the government's own estimates, the 
number of stalled government-led development projects was on the rise, numbering in 
the hundreds by the mid-2000s,
28
 and the average underutilization rate of development 
expenditure was 14 percent.
29
 It should be noted that the expenditures quoted here do 
not include those from the LASDAP program. 
Social services aside, proponents of participatory development also cite 
decentralization of governance as the best way of overcoming poor urban management 
and other shortcomings of central government. While often regarded as one of the 
most stable democratic countries in East Africa, Kenya has nonetheless had its share 
of international calls to address blatant corruption and extreme tribalism within 
government structures, and has been forced to adopt various economic and political 
reforms that advocated for the decentralization and liberalization of its economy.
30
 
Calls for decentralization gained more prominence in the wake of the 2007 post-
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election violence that turned from protest against disputed election results to ethnic 
violence caused by long-held grievances against land distribution, uneven 
development, and the like. The argument for more decentralization has also been 
extended with the recent passing of a new Constitution, which would further 
decentralize political systems, limit Presidential powers, and replace corrupt provincial 
governments with local counties.
31
 
Research Questions 
Given this background, the study was initiated to conduct an on-the-ground 
assessment of Kenya's participatory LASDAP development planning approach, 
detailing its impact on service delivery mechanisms and local governance processes. 
The study will also document what impact, if any, the participatory approach has had 
on effecting grassroots social change—change which includes less inequality, greater 
transparency and accountability, and more inclusive decision-making processes. What 
types of projects have been implemented and what types of socioeconomic impact 
have they had? Furthermore, what kinds of impact has the program had politically, in 
terms of enabling greater community voice in decision-making and oversight? How 
have these communities embraced the program to effect lasting structural change, an 
inherent byproduct of the participatory process according to the theory of 
participation? The study builds on previous studies, by not only examining the nature 
of participation, but by also examining how who participates impacts the nature of the 
outcome and how community power dynamics and interpersonal relationships serve to 
include or exclude people from the participatory development process. By examining 
the community participation process, including its governing regulations and program 
structure at the national and local level, I will be in a better position to articulate 
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whether a better process to participation is what is needed or whether the approach 
itself is plagued with enough shortcomings that an alternative should be considered. 
To answer these questions, I examine the physical, socioeconomic, and political 
impact of the LASDAP program in two types of local authorities: the Municipal 
Council of Nakuru and Gusii County Council. More specifically, I sought answers to 
the following questions: 
1. What are the physical, socioeconomic, and political impacts of the LASDAP 
program? 
a. How has the program influenced local spending and other council 
undertakings?  
b. What types of socioeconomic changes have occurred, if any? 
c. What is the relationship between the various local actors? 
2. What factors shape the setting of priorities and construction of projects?  
a. Who participates in the development process and in what capacity?  
b. How does the program‘s organizational structure influence program 
outcomes? 
c. How do the interests and incentives of local politicians influence the 
program‘s outcomes?  
3. How has the program reorganized access to infrastructure? 
a. Where have the construction projects occurred? 
b. What is the type, quantity, level of sophistication and breadth of 
coverage?  
c. What sorts of benefits have been derived from the projects? 
 
As the dissertation weaves together the global and national context under 
which the program was designed, its impact locally, and how those findings relate to 
the theoretical claims and critiques of participatory development, the day-to-day 
reality of life for many Kenyans must be kept in mind. Lose track of those realities, 
and one's lost track of the fact that behind the rhetoric, debates, and statistics, there are 
real people with vast needs yearning for a better life.  
According to the 2006 Human Development Report, 52 percent of Kenyans 
live below the national poverty line. Fifty-eight percent live on less than US$2 a day. 
Accordingly, Kenya ranked among the bottom quartile on the 2006 Human 
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Development Index.
32
 In order to improve these statistics, there needs to be significant 
investment in infrastructure and other areas of development which contribute to 
economic development. The challenge during the coming decades is to determine 
how.
 
The Structure of the Study 
Chapter Two of this thesis summarizes the history of social infrastructure 
development in Kenya, focusing on key government-led programs for the provision of 
basic services such as water and sanitation systems, as well as education and 
healthcare facilities. The chapter starts off by summarizing the core aspects of the 
Kenyan government's multiple administrative systems, knowledge of which is deemed 
necessary for understanding the nuances related to the LASDAP program as a local 
government-led program. Next, the key strategies that have been used to promote 
social development in Kenya are discussed, grouped into three eras: Independence to 
the 1970s, the 1980s to the 1990s, and the 1990s to the present. For each of these 
periods, the global-local connection, and center-local interplay surrounding the 
implementation and practice of the dominant development programs of the time is 
discussed. The history reveals that the national approach to development during these 
periods corresponds with the international development ideology of their times. 
Furthermore, this narrative shows that despite the country's current development 
ideology of local government-led development, the central government has 
historically been disinterested in embracing local governance structures. Nonetheless, 
a local government-led approach to development is currently being practiced because, 
as usual, the national practice is based on global prescriptions. This global-local 
connection underscores the point that overall evaluation of the LASDAP program 
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must also include the international political economy. In conclusion, the narrative in 
this Chapter reveals that the center-local struggle has resulted in a cycling back and 
forth between the loosening and tightening of centralized political control, while 
intermittently allowing for the marginal inclusion of community voice and popular 
participation.  
Chapter Three focuses on the structural details related to the Local Authority 
Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP). The chapter is divided into four sections. 
The first provides the background on how the LASDAP program came into fruition. 
The narrative starts in 1992, when the World Bank initiated a municipal reform 
program to improve the finances of seven municipal local governments in Kenya. That 
program would later expand into the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) and 
include all 175 local governments. The LASDAP development process—which is the 
focus of this thesis—is one of the main components of the LATF. The second section 
discusses the effect of this intergovernmental transfer grant on local governments' 
revenue and expenditure, focusing on the financial data for FY 2004/2005 to FY 
2007/2008. On average, the LATF grants represent approximately one-third of all 
local governments' revenue. However, the total amount of each LATF grant is 
significantly smaller than what the central government estimated it would be. The 
original plan called for the central government to transfer five percent of the national 
income tax receipts to the local governments. During the four years under review in 
this study, the total amount of tax receipts transferred each year has been two percent 
or less. The data also reveals that whereas the combined capital expenditure for all 
councils increased by a total of 123 percent during the four years under review, the 
annual proportion of capital expenditures remained the same, at around 10-15 percent 
of total expenditures. Furthermore, the proportion of money spent on maintenance 
remained constant, at around 4 percent of total expenditures. The third section of the 
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chapter describes the details of the ideal LASDAP development process, as outlined in 
the guidelines developed by the central government. The fourth section introduces the 
study's two case studies. 
Chapter Four and Five of this thesis provide the details about the impact of the 
LASDAP development planning process in each of the two case studies: the 
Municipal Council of Nakuru (Chapter Four) and Gusii County Council (Chapter 
Five). Both chapters are formatted in the same manner and are thus summarized here 
together. Each begins with a description of the site, including the current state of basic 
services, as well as a summary of the characteristics of the council. Next, the planning 
process at the council is evaluated against the stated ideal. The third and main section 
of each chapter is devoted to the findings of the physical, socioeconomic, and political 
impact of the development planning process in each respective council. Overall the 
findings reveal that so far, neither council has been able to achieve the vision behind 
the LASDAP program. That is, neither has been able to develop the process into one 
that serves as an avenue for deliberate sociopolitical transformation within their 
respective communities. In relation to need, very few community-identified projects 
are implemented each year. Furthermore, the distribution of benefits still depends on 
the social and political status of the individual, and the ability to exercise individual 
agency is hindered by unequal power structures. As such, residents have developed an 
attitude of resignation rather than of participation. 
Chapter Six is the concluding chapter. It begins by summarizing the research 
findings. This is followed by recommendations for both technical and structural 
changes to improve the development planning process and the availability of basic 
services in Kenya.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Social Infrastructure Development in Kenya: from Independence to the Present 
For more than a decade now, Kenya has followed the call of the United 
Nations (UN) to focus on local governments as the engines of development because 
they are the "level of governance closest to the people" and because they "play a vital 
role in educating, mobilizing, and responding to the public to promote sustainable 
development."
33
 Since 1998, the Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan 
(LASDAP) has been ongoing in all 175 of Kenya's local authorities.  
When viewed in historical context, this supposed widening of political spaces
34
 
at the local level presents a conundrum for Kenya. Kenya's social infrastructure 
development history shows that the central government has been resistant to the type 
of grassroots, local government-led system advocated by the UN. Furthermore, history 
reveals that this center-local struggle has resulted in a cycling back and forth between 
the loosening and tightening of centralized political control, while intermittently 
allowing for the inclusion of community voice and popular participation.  
This chapter presents a summary of that social development history—by which 
I am referring to the provision of social amenities such as water and sanitation 
systems, as well as education and healthcare facilities—because the current attempt 
and achievements at fostering social development must be understood within a 
historical context. This history was shaped by the national and international political 
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 Cornwall (2004) writes that when analyzed through the concept of "space," the political ambiguities 
of participation become all the more apparent, even though participatory development is often referred 
to as a "widening" of "political spaces," despite the imbalance in power relations that is often present 
amongst most groups of stakeholders. However the Habermassian assumption that the creation of 
public spaces outside the domain of the state is a precondition for citizen engagement that does not 
simply serve to legitimize the existing political system (Habermas 1984) underpins many forms of 
participation. Kohn (2000) and others have criticized this core assumption, arguing that "deliberative 
spaces are discursively constituted in ways that permit only particular voices and versions to enter into 
debate."  
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economy of different periods, as well as ethnic and class struggles. Without this 
historical political-economic dimension, this research would lack the necessary 
foundation for determining whether Kenya's LASDAP development process can lead 
to the type of transformative sociopolitical change that is envisioned by its proponents. 
Furthermore, such framing is of utmost importance in understanding what is possible, 
and the probable reasons behind the observed obstacles to social transformation and 
increased levels of social inclusion.
35
 
The narrative is divided into three eras, representing the political economy of 
the time, and includes the period's approach to social development, the institutions and 
intellectuals who influenced the nature of development theories and methods of 
practice, as well as the period's approach to participation and the level of society's 
engagement. Since the ensuing discussion makes several references to them, a brief 
overview of Kenya's administrative systems is first reviewed.
36
  
Kenya's Administrative Systems 
There are four main administrative systems in Kenya. They include the sector- 
or function-based government ministries, the Provincial Administration, the 
Constituency, and the Local Government. Each of these systems is managed by 
different funding streams, including central and local government resources, as well as 
international- and domestic-donor resources. However, while all of these systems have 
been set up to work alongside one another, they do not necessarily work in tandem, as 
the ensuing discussion will illustrate.  
1. Sector-Based Ministries 
At the national level, Kenya's government has various ministries, each 
representing a different sector. In all, there are 40 Ministries, devoted to an assortment 
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 Here, as well as in other sections of this chapter, more detail has been provided on the local 
government system, since this is the system that is most relevant to this study. 
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of sectors, including the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry 
of Planning, National Development and Vision 2030. In addition to offices in the 
capital city of Nairobi, several ministries operate field offices at the provincial, 
district, and local government levels. In the rural areas, a large proportion of services 
and infrastructure development activities are managed through these field offices.
37
  
2. The Provincial Administration 
There are 8 provinces in Kenya, shown in Figure 2.1. Each of these is further 
subdivided into districts, divisions, locations, and sub-locations.
38
 The Provincial 
Administration dates back to Kenya's colonial era, when it was the main form of 
administration under colonial rule. After independence, oversight of the 
Administration was transferred to the Office of the President, with its structure 
remaining intact.  
Essentially an outpost of the central government, the Provincial Administration 
consists of field offices at the provincial and district level, whose duty is to coordinate 
the central government's activities in the Provinces. Those activities are coordinated 
through sector-based departments at each of these two levels. The departments are 
funded by yearly allocations from each department's Ministry headquarters in Nairobi. 
The departments include but are not limited to education, health, and social services. 
Civil servants are appointed to staff these offices while Provincial and District  
                                                 
37
 Certain ministries, such as education and health, are also responsible for staffing their respective 
service centers around the country. Thus public schools and central or local government run health 
centers are staffed by government employees. It is however the responsibility of each local government 
to make provisions for the construction of educational and healthcare centers as they see fit, in addition 
to maintaining an adequate supply of books or drugs at those centers. 
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level, despite any constitutional debate over greater decentralization or democracy at the grassroots. 
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Figure 2.1: Map of Kenya's Provincial Administration 
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Commissioners are appointed to head each respective level. Chiefs and Assistant 
Chiefs are appointed to oversee matters at the location and sub-location. 
3. The Constituency 
The main purpose of the Constituency system is to elect Members of 
Parliament. Thus more than anything else, it is a political administrative unit. There 
are 210 constituencies in Kenya and one Member of Parliament (MP) is elected from 
each. Constituencies are further subdivided into wards. A representative is elected 
from each ward to serve in their local government's council, exemplifying the overlap 
between the local government system and the constituency system.  
4. The Local Government System 
Kenya's current local government system has been in existence since its 
independence in 1963. Administratively, Kenya's local governments are 
semiautonomous bodies. While they are free to make internal decisions—such as how 
to control the spread of development or the regulation of social services within their 
boundaries—they are also controlled by the central government through mandates 
from the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG). Each local government's functions 
and responsibilities are controlled by the Local Government Act (LGA), which spells 
out how they should be structured, their regulating powers, and their duties.  
There are 175 local governments (also referred to as local authorities or local 
councils); comprised of 1 city, 44 municipal, 63 town and 67 county councils. 
Municipal councils cover large urban centers and provide a wide range of services, 
albeit in limited proportions to need. Town councils cover smaller urban centers. 
County councils cover those areas not covered by municipal or town councils (rural 
areas) and offer a more limited amount of services. The capital city of Nairobi 
currently has the only city council, although proposals have been written to upgrade 
the municipal councils of Mombasa and Kisumu (the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 largest cities) to city 
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councils.
39
 
The decision-making body within the local government is made up of:  
 the policy arm—comprised of locally elected and nominated politicians 
(known as Councilors
40
). They are responsible for making policies. 
 the administrative arm—comprised of appointed civil service 
personnel.
41
 They are responsible for working within their respective 
departments to implement the policies created by the Councilors.  
While Councilors are elected locally, upper-level civil service personnel are 
appointed by the central government via the Public Service Commission (PSC) in 
Nairobi and posted to various local government offices around the country. These 
include planners, architects, engineers, treasurers, and Town Clerks. The Town Clerk 
is the most senior civil service officer at each local government. He or she acts as its 
"Chief Executive," with all departments reporting to him or her. While most technical 
staff tend to be assigned to a particular local government for extended periods of time, 
the terms for Town Clerks and treasurers are usually shorter, sometimes as little as one 
or two years. Junior civil service personnel, such as those who collect market fees or 
perform cleaning services are hired directly by each local authority.  
After each voting cycle, Councilors convene at their respective local councils 
and take a vote amongst themselves to determine who will serve as the town's Mayor 
and Deputy Mayor.
42
 Each Mayor serves for a maximum of two years. Since 
Councilors are elected every five years (during the presidential elections), the first two 
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Besides the locally elected councilors, approximately 3-5 councilors are nominated by the central 
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 The Mayoral post is only applicable to Municipal and Town councils. County councils appoint a 
'Chairperson' to serve as leader of the Councilors. Unlike some other municipal systems around the 
world, Kenya's Mayoral post does not make the Mayor the highest ranking municipal officer. Neither 
does the Mayor possess any special legislative powers. Rather, the Mayor is the head of the Councilors 
while the Town Clerk is head of the civil servants.  
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Mayors serve 2-year terms while the third Mayor in that election cycle serves for 
about 9 months (councils are dissolved approximately 3 months before new elections 
take place). Of importance here is that Mayors are not elected by the general public. 
This makes them only accountability to their colleagues and the constituents from the 
neighborhood that they represent.
43
  
Day-to-day administration is guided by resolutions that are set in council 
committees. These committees are common across most local governments
44
 and 
include: 
1. Finance, Staff, and General Purposes Committee (Town Clerk's 
Department, Municipal Treasurer's Department)  
2. Internal Audit Committee (Municipal Treasurer's Department) 
3. Town Planning and Works Committee (Town Engineer's Department) 
4. Social Services and Housing Committee (Social Services and Housing 
Department) 
5. Environment Committee (Department of Environment) 
6. Education Committee (Education Department) and  
7. Public Health Committee (Public Health Department) 
Each committee is comprised of a handful of Councilors and senior civil service 
personnel, who work together to draft resolutions.
45
 Resolutions formed in committees 
are then ratified by all the Councilors and senior civil service personnel during a full 
council meeting
46
 and slated for implementation by the relevant departments 
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(italicized in brackets above) when applicable.  
Under the current Local Government Act, local governments are only 
mandated to provide burial sites and bury the destitute.
47
 They are not mandated to 
provide basic utilities such as water, sanitation, or electricity. Instead, local 
governments are "permitted" to provide these and other services, including housing, 
transportation, education, public health, recreation, and open space.
48
 This structure 
creates problems of oversight since the general public cannot hold their local 
government accountable for inadequate service provision. Local governments are 
legally protected to choose what types of services they offer and the extent to which 
they do so. While no other authority is tasked with ensuring the adequacy of basic 
services at the local level, both the central and local governments have operated under 
this ambiguous definition of responsibilities since the Act came into being in 1963.  
Local governments may raise revenue from various predetermined sources, 
although the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) must approve the bases and rates 
for each local government. The full council must then pass local bylaws legitimizing 
these sources. The Attorney General must also sanction any new bylaws. 
The Trajectory of Social Infrastructure Development in Kenya: 1963-2010 
Much of the discussion on decentralization in developing countries lacks the 
historical context in which decentralization takes place.
49
 The narrative of this chapter 
seeks to fulfill some of that gap by analyzing Kenya's sociopolitical history of 
community participation in local development and governance, and how today's 
LASDAP decentralization model is shaped by it. 
                                                                                                                                            
civil service personnel. A quorum must be set in order to pass any resolution. As a group, the 
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influence decision-making. 
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Table 2.1 summarizes the key strategies that have been used to promote social 
infrastructure development in Kenya. This history has been divided into three eras: 
Independence to the 1970s, the 1980s to the 1990s, and the 1990s to the present. These 
three periods correspond to three distinct, yet overlapping and intertwined approaches 
to development over the last half century: (i) an era of state-initiated development and 
welfarist tendencies in the 1960s and 70s (the 1970s also included the promotion of 
local participation to meet basic needs, such as harambee and site-and-service 
schemes), (ii) an era of economic transformation by means of structural adjustment 
programs in the 1980s, and (iii) an era of political transformation through "good 
governance," the cornerstone of which is popular participation in all aspects of local 
governance, including the setting of priorities, implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation. These three approaches correspond with the distinct international 
development ideologies of their times. Thus, it seems that Kenya's approach to 
national development has been largely defined by international prescriptions and 
expectations. This global-local connection is crucial, because not only does it create a 
means of understanding why certain local actions were taken, it also helps understand 
why the actions were taken despite the locally recognized limitations. Kenya's actions 
were not taken in isolation; they were part of a larger global political process. As such, 
the overall evaluation of the LASDAP program must also include the international 
political economy. 
Along with the approach taken towards social development, Table 2.1 also 
states the national programs that defined each era. Primary institutional and 
intellectual sources that influenced the adopted development theory are also listed. 
Since the focus of this study is on participatory development, the approach taken 
towards popular participation, as well as the level at which society is engaged is noted.  
Table 2.1 has been adapted and then applied to Kenya from the work of Hickey 
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and Mohan (2004), where they assessed a selective global history of popular 
participation in development theory and practice. Here, I have added the term 
"participation through representation" as a third term to define the approach taken 
towards popular participation in Kenya, in addition to "participation as a right" and 
"participation as an obligation of citizenship," the two terms used by Hickey and 
Mohan. Categorizing these different forms of participation is essential to gaining an 
understanding of how popular participation was regarded, which reveals the 
expectations of an individual, or community's involvement in the development 
process. It also reveals the depth of responsibility that was placed on each individual 
or on the community as a whole. 
 
  
Table 2.1: The Trajectory of Social Infrastructure Development in Kenya: from Independence to the Present 
Era Approach to 
Social 
Development  
Institutional & 
Intellectual 
Influences 
Development Theory  
        & Methods 
Approach to 
Participation 
Level of 
Engagement 
Indep. – 1970s 
 
State-Initiated 
Development  
 
Popular 
Participation 
Rural community 
development  
 
Cost-sharing  
 
Programs include 
harambee, SRDP, 
RWP, DDG, RDF 
Sessional Paper 
10 on "African 
Socialism" 
Kericho 
Conference 
Ndegwa 
Commission 
Harris Mule, 
MoPND 
Objective 
Post-independence unity through centralized 
administration. Area- and multi-sector based 
development. Focus on rural development. 
Modernization. 
Method 
Emphasis on improving social services and agricultural 
production. Cost-sharing approach towards rural 
community infrastructure. Site-and-service schemes 
Participation as 
a right;  
 
Participation as 
an obligation of 
citizenship 
Individual; 
civil society 
1980s 
 
Economic 
Reform – 
Structural 
Adjustment 
Programs 
 
 
Alleviating poverty 
through rural 
development 
 
Urban-regional 
development 
 
Programs include 
RDF, ASAL, DFRD 
Robert 
Chambers, John 
Turner 
 
United Nations, 
World Bank, 
International 
Monetary Fund 
Objective 
Increase overall economic activity by continuing to 
develop rural areas. Control growth of Nairobi and 
Mombasa by stimulating growth of other "principal 
towns." Alleviate poverty and widen areas of economic 
activity into arid and semi-arid lands. Mobilize 
domestic resources for equitable development. 
"[Popular] planning for progress" Control/reduce 
government budget on public expenditures.  
Method 
Investment in services, facilities, and infrastructure to 
serve areas in and around growth centers. Build 
education, health, sanitation facilities. Help NGOs 
define interventions. Stir away from sector- and 
project-based plans by strengthening the District as a 
core unit of planning. Increase representative 
participation in decision making. Institute structural 
adjustment programs. Provide grants and loans for self-
help and income generating activities.  
Participation as 
an obligation of 
citizenship;  
 
Participation by 
representation;  
 
Participation as 
a right 
Individual; 
civil society; 
NGOs 
 
Government 
institutions 
3
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Table 2.1: The Trajectory of Social Infrastructure Development in Kenya: from Independence to the Present 
Era Approach to 
Social 
Development  
Institutional & 
Intellectual 
Influences 
Development Theory  
        & Methods 
Approach to 
Participation 
Level of 
Engagement 
1990s – present  
 
Political 
Reform –  
"Good 
Governance" 
 
Popular  
Participation/ 
Participatory 
Development  
Devolution of 
poverty reduction 
strategies 
 
Participatory 
governance/ Social 
capital 
 
Programs include 
SDD, NPEP, 
KRDS, LATF/ 
LASDAP, RMLF, 
CDF 
World Bank, 
International 
Monetary Fund, 
UN Agencies 
Objective 
Devolve funds from central to local government. 
Promote local decision-making. Emphasis on poverty 
alleviation. Maintain a philosophy of balanced growth 
in all sectors. Limited direct government participation 
in many sectors. Reform role of government as 
"enabler" in order to emphasize role of private sector 
and civil society. 
Method 
Participatory and consultative approach to decision-
making (to include the private sector and civil society). 
Investment in community projects, roads, and 
electricity; investment in youth through education 
bursaries; AIDS/HIV education and control, self-
employment 
Participation as 
a right;  
 
Participation as 
an obligation of 
citizenship 
 
Participation as 
necessary for 
development 
 
 
Individual; 
civil society; 
local 
government, 
CBOs; 
constituency 
Adapted from the work of Hickey and Mohan (2004) for the Kenyan context  
 
 
 
 
3
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(Continued) 
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Independence – 1970s: State-Initiated Development 
Kenya's independence from British rule in 1963 marked a significant 
crossroads in Kenyan development. Prior to independence, major development efforts 
outside the two primary cities of Nairobi and Mombasa were concentrated in the 
"white highlands," an area in the central highlands of Kenya where the white 
immigrants had settled. Widespread development was also limited because the 
movement of Africans was regulated in several of the towns, including the 
establishment of racially segregated residential quarters.
50
  
With limited financial reserves like many newly independent countries of the 
time, the state embarked on a mission of economic growth, while seeking to meet 
basic needs. However, despite a seminal paper—penned by members of the 
government in 1965—that had declared a path of African Socialism, by the mid-1970s, 
the Government's embrace of unregulated individual accumulation had created a 
capitalist social structure.
51
 As a result, the provision of basic needs has never been 
guaranteed for Kenya's population. 
To meet basic needs, right after independence, the citizenry was called upon in 
a project of harambee, a cost-sharing program. Popular participation in this 
development program was not only deemed a political right in light of the country's 
newly attained independence from colonial rule, but was also regarded as an 
obligation of citizenship. Alongside the practice of harambee, the state also invested 
in infrastructure and industrial development of urban centers. Small-scale consumer 
goods and agriculture formed the base of this industrial growth. To boost worker 
productivity, urban welfare measures such as educational facilities and roads were 
constructed, but less investment was directed towards public housing, health, or water 
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and sanitation facilities.
52
 A number of rural development programs were also initiated 
with the assistance of external donors.
53
 Bilateral donor assistance was used to finance 
upwards of 80 percent of the development financing in the years right after 
independence. By the 1970s, the proportion had fallen to 45 percent.  
Organizing for post-independence development was facilitated through a 
highly centralized mode of governance. Thus, although the players changed, the 
political economy of centralized governance that had defined colonial rule continued, 
simply replaced by Kenyan-led rulers, who advocated political and social unity as they 
continued to centralize governance. A centralized form of governance was 
commonplace among many of the newly independent states during this time, and this 
pattern of governance was strongly supported by both domestic and external actors 
until the late 1980s.
54
  
Harambee 
The first step towards "modernization" as an independent nation was a call for 
collective participation towards developing the country. President Jomo Kenyatta 
called upon the country to unite as one and work together in harambee (Kiswahili for 
pulling together) to fight sickness, poverty, and ignorance. This involves working 
together at the community level to raise funds and implement self-identified, place-
based projects that meet the community's collective needs and goals. Speaking at the 
opening of the First Parliament, he said, 
"Our motto harambee was conceived in the realization of the challenge 
of national building that now lies ahead of us. It was conceived in the 
knowledge that to meet this challenge, the government and the people 
of Kenya must pull together. We know only out of our efforts and toil 
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1969). 
54
 Olowu 2002 
 38 
can we build a new and better Kenya."
55
  
While the concept of harambee had been in practice long before 
independence,
56
 the President's challenge sought to have each community (and by 
inference, each individual) make a deliberate effort at prioritizing, fundraising, and 
implementing community projects, rather than taking a laissez-faire attitude towards 
the social development of their communities. This approach to people's participation 
displays that not only had people gained the right to social, economic, and political 
participation in the country's development following independence, but that each 
individual, community, and community organization had an obligation to help build a 
new and better Kenya. Furthermore, if people wanted a better Kenya, not only would 
they have to actively participate in developing it; they would also have to share the 
cost. 
A detailed study on harambee projects by Mbithi and Rasmusson (1977) 
shows that between 1967 and 1973, the harambee strategy accounted for 11.4 percent 
of Kenya's national expenditure on development.
57
 Although harambee contributions 
were recorded across many sectors, the strategy had a particularly significant impact 
on education and the building of community recreation centers. Close to 40 percent of 
the total expenditure on education and 50 percent of the total expenditure on recreation 
between 1967 and 1973 came from harambee contributions. Similarly, community 
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contributions towards health projects in 1967 were almost as high as those made by 
the government.
58
  
Defining a Way Forward 
In 1965, the Government of Kenya (GoK) published a seminal paper which 
was said to outline Kenya's development problems and strategies for solving them, 
including measures for promoting economic development, social progress, and 
cultural growth.
59
 While pegged as a planning document, much of the paper was 
devoted to economic regulations related to the flow of capital; it emphasized rapid 
economic growth, land registration, and the importance of a skilled human resource 
base. Little was articulated regarding a strategy for addressing the nation's social 
development needs. In retrospect, this was a missed opportunity for defining the 
development of the country's basic infrastructure needs, because the Paper went on to 
gain much prominence in Kenyan politics over the years.  
While the 1
st
 National Development Plan (1966-1970) had stated the 
importance of developing Kenya's basic infrastructure needs in order to enhance its 
social and economic welfare, those plans did not have the type of collective political 
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 Harambee drives are typically coordinated by community development groups. While participation is 
typically open to everyone, the act of donating has been a proven method for gaining legitimacy as a 
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attention that surrounded Sessional Paper 10. One of the strategies outlined in the 
National Development Plan relied on local governments to get loans to finance and 
operate basic needs such as water. The government expected to construct and operate 
systems in smaller towns and rural areas, where it was expected that residents would 
only be able to fund part of the costs. This ideology of central control reflected the 
government's nationalist ideology; that national development required "effective 
control and directing by the central government."
60
 However, with limited financial 
resources and the tightening of global financial markets following the first oil crises of 
1973, the government was limited in their ability to make great strides on social 
development in the early years. Some donor resources were however available. 
The main approach to development during the 1960s and 70s was to focus on 
rural community development, as outlined in the 1
st
 National Development Plan. This 
led to a conference on rural development—the Kericho Conference of 1966.61 Here, 
the plan for rural development was further defined, resulting in the creation of the 
Special Rural Development Program (SRDP).
62
 Funded by six external donors,
63
 the 
program's goal was to address rural education, unemployment, and underdevelopment 
by establishing more social services and increasing rural incomes through self-help 
activities.
64
 Six Provincial administrative divisions were chosen as pilot locations and 
the donors invested in projects such as agriculture and livestock management, rural 
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access roads, and water systems.
65
 The SRDP was Kenya's first "development" 
program, a phenomenon that began as an explicit activity in the post-World War II 
era, following decolonialization in Africa and Asia, and the rebuilding of cities in 
Europe after the war. As such, the SRDP took a low-key approach, working within the 
existing administrative structures of the time, although each donor insisted on 
managing their financial contributions personally instead of putting money into a 
common pool.  
While 123 projects and small programs were initiated over a five year span,
66
 
the SRDP didn‘t go beyond its pilot phase. In 1971, the government made the decision 
to not extend its funding.
67
 Some praised the program's efforts, while other reviews 
viewed it as a failure.
68
 Its demise was a result of at least two things. One was that it 
attracted political opposition and jealousy because it only took place in six sites. 
Another was that its expenditures were not justified by its modest outputs. Regardless, 
the SRDP left an indelible mark on Kenya's development strategy because it ignited a 
series of similar rural development programs in the years following its termination. 
After Parliament pulled its funding from the SRDP, it set up a District 
Development Grant (DDG) program whereby all districts could have access to 
government-provided development funds. Set up as open-ended matching grant 
program administered by the districts, residents were urged to mobilize their own 
resources to maximize government contributions. As SRDP activities were phased out 
at the six pilot sites by the mid 1970s, donors were urged to continue their support by 
contributing to the DDG program. Mule Harris, the chief economist and Deputy 
Permanent Secretary for Planning is largely credited with securing the continued 
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donor support. 
(Un)Defining the Role of Local Governments in Development 
The early National Development Plans devoted little space to local 
governments in terms of their role in leading local development efforts. While they 
were considered "junior partners" in development, many within the Kenyatta 
administration considered local governments a remnant of colonial rule; a machine for 
the creation of local autonomy, which had to be disbanded in order to promote the 
national unity deemed necessary following independence. The Plans only stated the 
need for government policies that would help develop the efficiency of local 
governments in order for them to play a more effective role in national development.
69
  
However, rather than developing the efficiency of local governments, two key 
events occurred that did just the opposite. First, in 1970, all county councils were 
relieved of their duties in overseeing three major functions: primary education, 
healthcare, and the maintenance of secondary roads. The central government stated 
that county councils had failed to solve their management and financial problems in 
these areas. Those duties—along with the funding that supported them—were 
transferred back to the central government.
70
 This action also meant that these councils 
lost the autonomy to make their own decisions regarding these three services. Second, 
the Graduated Personal Tax (GPT)—a local tax that had provided local governments 
with a source of revenue for administering services and funding local development 
activities—was terminated.71  
Rationalized by stating that despite their collection of the tax, local 
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governments were not keeping up with the rising demands for services, the central 
government took over collection of the tax. It then returned some of the revenue back 
to each local government in the form of a grant. However, several local governments 
complained that the grants were substantially less than the revenue they collected from 
the GPT. Nairobi City Council reported that their grant amount was less than a third of 
what they had collected in taxes. County councils were especially left vulnerable, as 
their expenditures fell by 85 percent after 1970 due to reduced revenue amounts.
72
 The 
reason the grants were much less than the former GPT revenue is because the 
government also subtracted the funding for it to oversee the three functions it had 
relieved local governments of—primary schools, healthcare centers, and secondary 
roads.
73
  
There was also discussion of placing local government finance committees 
under the control of the District Commissioner, in addition to shifting policy-making 
power from the elected Councilors to appointed local government officers. This would 
have allowed the Ministry of Local Government to have greater control over council 
affairs. In the end however, this recommendation was never acted upon.  
In 1971, a government panel was commissioned to look into the setbacks 
experienced with rural development in Kenya. Amongst other things, the report 
(referred to as the Ndegwa report, after the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of 
Planning that chaired it) spelled out the problems internal to local governments, as 
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well as its ideals. It did not however, address larger structural problems—such as the 
overlap in function between the local government and Provincial administration or the 
weakening of the financial base of local governments. It also did not call for greater 
autonomy of local governments or provide specific reforms for strengthening them. 
Rather, the report stated that the local government was to act as an agent for central 
government by carrying out the central government's responsibilities at the local level, 
in addition to serving as the link between citizens in the rural areas and the central 
government. The Ministry of Local Government did not take kindly to the report, 
labeling Mr. Ndegwa as anti-local government, for the Commission's failure to 
address the larger structural problems, debates which continue today with the drafting 
of a new Constitution. These events marked the beginning of local governments' woes 
in Kenya. They have semi-structural autonomy but weak financial and autonomous 
decision-making power. As a result of these and other internal problems, today many 
local governments have fared even worse than they did before the 1970s, and are 
unable to provide or maintain adequate service delivery levels for their residents.
74
  
Since it is difficult to get precise data on service levels at each locality, Table 
2.2 provides a summary of available socioeconomic data on the average national 
service delivery levels in 1989 and 1999.
75
 While the data reveals that generally, there 
were slight improvements in access to key services during the 1990s, there were still a 
large proportion of people without access to potable water, sanitary sewer, and 
electrical power. These inadequacies—consequences of the fiscal diversions that were 
discussed earlier, as well as the large number of unemployed rural-urban migrants—
are very visible during a visit to any of the municipal, town, or county councils. 
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Table 2.2: Change in Service Delivery Levels between 1989 and 1999, Kenya 
Water Source 1989 1999 % Change
Piped 32% 31% -1%
Stream / River 40% 27% -13%
Well 14% 13% -1%
Other* 14% 29% 15%
Waste Disposal 1989 1999 % Change
Main sewer / Tank 7% 10% 3%
Pit latrine 68% 73% 5%
Bucket / Bush / Other 25% 17% -8%
Type of Lighting 1989 1999 % Change
Electricity 9% 14% 5%
Lantern / Paraffin lamp 81% 79% -2%
Fuel wood / Other 10% 7% -3%  
Source: Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics, 1989 Census, Vol. 
X, 1999 Census, Vol. XI  
* "Other" includes spring water, boreholes, ponds, lakes, and 
water tanks. 
Defining Districts as the Unit of Planning 
Up until the mid-1970s, there were no comprehensive short or long-term plans 
to guide planning in many of Kenya's towns and rural areas. Various Ministries 
selected their development activities based on their target population or location. 
Donor activities through the SRDP had been based on a mix of donor priorities and 
local preferences that had been articulated as the need arose.  
While the early set of National Development Plans talked about decentralizing 
planning efforts, focusing on the Provincial Administration as the coordinator of those 
efforts, the status quo consisted of a deconcentration of officers and activities from 
Nairobi to the Provinces. Even the Provincial and District Development Committees 
(P/DDCs) that had been formed to coordinate local development plans in their 
respective areas were part of that deconcentration system. The PDCs and DDCs were 
made up of all the heads of department at the Provincial or District level offices—
offices which reported to the Office of the President. Commissioners, Municipal and 
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Town Council Town Clerks, County Council Chairpersons, each area's Member of 
Parliament (MP), and political grassroots officials (namely from the KANU party) of 
the respective province or district were also members of the Committees. Furthermore, 
during the first 10 years after independence, reports indicate that there was poor 
attendance, and that both Committees met infrequently and were unproductive.
76
 Thus, 
there was not much of development planning activity occurring locally, and what was 
occurring was largely directed from the center.  
Although PDCs and DDCs were formed with the intention of having them 
articulate and coordinate comprehensive long- and short-term planning activities, 
much of their activity was focused on addressing immediate needs. Local residents 
seeking to make use of District Development Grants (DDGs) were also largely 
focused on addressing immediate community needs. Such fire-brigade approaches to 
development planning needs were to change in 1974, when the government called for 
the creation of a District Development Plan for each district, after formally stating that 
districts were to be the basic unit of planning in the 3
rd
 National Development Plan 
(1974-1978). This was the first time that the government had really directed its 
attention towards activating its goals for a long-term national agenda for social 
development—goals which had been outlined in previous National Development 
Plans, but lacked the means by which to achieve them.  
The task of completing the District Development Plans was to be coordinated 
and led by District Development Officers (DDOs), who were prepped with a one-
month course on planning and set up to receive technical assistance from bilateral 
advisors. The DDO post had been established a few years earlier, following 
recommendations from the Ndegwa report, which stated that part of the problems 
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experienced with district level planning in the 1960s was due to the lack of planners at 
the provincial and district levels. The report had also recommended the establishment 
of Planning Officers at the district and provincial levels. DDOs were posted from 
Nairobi to the districts, but despite the training they received. There was a lack of data 
to work with and the procedures set up to guide local level planning within the 
Provincial Administration were inadequate. By 1974, 13 District Development 
Officers (DDOs) and seven Provincial Planning Officers (PPOs) were left in their 
respective posts.
77
  
The call for the creation of the first set of locally identified plans and projects 
was a major accomplishment for those pushing for true decentralized planning. 
However, the jubilation was short-lived. When the 40 District Development Plans 
were unveiled, they were criticized as having been completed by PPOs, expatriate 
advisors, and staff at the Planning Ministry's headquarters in Nairobi, devoid of local 
knowledge or input. Moreover, the plans were merely a laundry list of projects, 
without the necessary details needed to conduct feasibility assessments for project 
implementation. The poor quality of the Plans did not allow for the creation of any 
synergies with ongoing development activities locally, or attract a huge financial 
commitment from an already financially cash-strapped government. All of this meant 
that implementing many of the projects listed in the District Plans was "nearly 
impossible." As of 1976, less than 50 percent of approved projects had been 
completed, further hindered by the lack of qualified personnel to manage project 
development and implementation. It is no surprise then that reviews indicated that 
even with introduction of District Development Plans, "the district planning process 
was still unable to make a major contribution to improved development planning and 
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implementation."
78
 
Even as the DDOs would have been hard-pressed to be acutely aware of local 
planning issues within their district, administratively, their positions were also unclear. 
Hook and Cohen (1986) note that DDOs acted as secretaries to the DDCs and as 
administrative staff to other integrated rural development programs going on at the 
time.
79
 As they described it, 
"[The Ndegwa report] had failed to recommend any DDO authority 
over the staff or resources of the operating ministries. Nor did it clarify 
the relationship between the DDO and the DC or between the Office of 
the President's provincial administration cadre and the planning 
ministry. Hence, even if the [Ndegwa] Commission's recommendations 
[had] led to improved local level planning, there was still no clear or 
reliable mechanism to translate district plans into effective, integrated 
ministry programs and projects."
80
 
Donor-led District Development  
Despite the mediocre effect of the initial District Development Plans, small-
scale development activities continued in various localities around the country, 
partially supported by external donors. Aside from those supporting the DDG 
program, the International Labor Organization (ILO) also donated funds towards 
labor-intensive works projects, set up as the Rural Works Program (RWP). In 1975, 
the DDG and RWP were combined, and renamed the Rural Development Fund (RDF).  
Administered by the DDCs and designed to give them more oversight of local 
planning and development initiatives, the RDF was responsible for the implementation 
of over 6,000 projects between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s.
81
 Donor funds covered 
80 percent of the implementation costs, while the GoK financed 20 percent. The 
projects included social and economic infrastructure such as schools, polytechnics, 
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health centers, roads, bridges, water systems, and cattle dips. Production-oriented 
projects such as handicrafts, bee-keeping, fish farming, dairy operations, and small-
scale irrigation systems were also funded. 
Due to the structure and nature of the program, local residents were usually 
very involved in the RDF program. NGOs also collaborated with residents to define 
the nature of interventions. However, while donors and beneficiaries worked locally to 
define interventions, their efforts could not replace the need for more prominent short- 
and long-term planning practices at the local and regional level. The Danish 
International Development Agency (DANIDA), one of the program donors, admitted 
that the RDF program would have benefited from "macro-planning" to make better 
use of available resources. Furthermore, management by "small scattered groups of 
beneficiaries cannot in itself ensure this."
82
 This was especially true of the early years, 
when funds were underutilized.
83
 One of the lessons learned here then, must be that 
despite the value of having high social capital within any community, the existence of 
social capital cannot replace the need for a functioning planning practice. 
While donors sought resident input on infrastructure projects and engaged 
residents to develop production-oriented interventions to create income earning 
opportunities, popular participation on the DDCs itself was limited to "prominent local 
citizens" or "political leaders." Non-government members made up less than 25 
percent of the committee membership.
84
 While the DDC membership structure did 
allow for minimal local participation, it was not the type of democratic 
decentralization of local governance affairs expressed by Wunsch and Olowu (2004) 
in terms of empowering all local citizens to be a part of the decision-making structure. 
In government documents however, the DDCs were referred to as local decision-
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making bodies and avenues for grassroots participation in development efforts. 
Arnstein (1969) labels this type of local participation in decision making as 
manipulation, the most disingenuous form of participation levels. Furthermore, 
whereas the politicians on the Committees are supposed to represent the interest of 
their constituencies, politicians' actions are usually more motivated by the ways in 
which they can best gain political favor with their allies.  
As illustrated by the preceding narrative, Kenya's government was unable to 
develop any sustained efforts to create widespread improvements to the local 
infrastructure base between the 1960s and 1970s. Self-help programs alone could not 
carry the burden. Donor-funded programs were limited in geographic reach and 
criticized for being modest in production. The financial resources of local 
governments were largely inadequate to undertake any construction projects. And 
government-led efforts at decentralization were limited to deconcentration of 
governance structures, inhibited by a lack of financial commitment needed to make 
long-lasting differences in the infrastructure landscape of the country. 
1980s: Economic Reform by means of Structural Adjustment Programs 
In 1978, President Kenyatta died in office. He was succeeded by then Vice-
President Arap Moi. President Moi embraced the philosophy of nyayo, which means 
to follow in the footsteps [of Kenyatta], an act he saw as embracing the African 
tradition of respect for ones elder. As such, in the late 1970s Moi continued to favor 
the decentralization approach (à la deconcentration) started under Kenyatta's 
administration.
85
 This included continued support for rural economic development 
                                                 
85
 While President Kenyatta had conceded slightly to decentralists in his administration by allowing 
some level of decentralization, it was only in the form of deconcentration. Deconcentration would not 
pose any threat to ethnic disintegration, or concede enough power to districts such that they could later 
challenge the government (Murunga 1999, Asingo 2003). Moi's decision was probably also due to the 
political alliances that had previously been negotiated. In the past, Moi had been a leader in the Kenya 
African Democratic Union (KADU), a political party that represented members of the smaller ethnic 
groups in the early 1960s. However KADU would later merge with the Kenya African National Union 
 51 
programs, many of which were supported by bilateral donor funds.  
By the early 1980s however, Kenya shifted from engaging mainly in bilateral 
development relationships to engaging in multilateral development agreements 
spearheaded by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such a shift 
was not uniquely Kenyan however, as these organizations began to form increased 
multilateral relationships with many developing countries as a means of tackling 
extreme global poverty.
86
 As a result of these new relationships, Kenya's official 
development assistance (ODA) jumped from just over USD 2 billion during the 1970s 
to almost USD 7 billion during the 1980s.
87
  
As a condition for receiving the assistance, Moi's government also had to adopt 
several of these agencies' development programs, including Sub-Saharan Africa's first 
structural adjustment program, which required amongst other measures, an 
improvement in the management of the public sector.
88
 While Moi's government 
would go on to implement public investment programs as required under the 
conditionalities attached to the first structural adjustment loan, critics argued that the 
period's main program—the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD)—did not 
foster a participatory approach, nor did it promote decentralized decision-making. 
Rather, the political economy following Kenyatta's death turned from one that had 
advocated harambee unity to one that repressed political opposition and recentralized 
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power in the hands of the political elite. As a result, the approach to popular 
participation was often by hand-picked representation.  
Economic reform through the implementation of SAPs, which included 
deregulation of the economy by reduction of state control, reduction in public 
expenditures, privatization of state enterprises, trade liberalization, democratization, 
and strict fiscal control, was repeated in more than 180 countries at varying levels, 
often affecting them negatively. For Kenya, restructuring of the public sector would 
result in more than a 20 percent decline in wages between 1982 and 1990.
89
  
Aside from the DFRD program, other notable development programs during 
this era included the Principal Towns concept and the Integrated Rural Development 
program.  
Principal Towns 
One of the highlights of the 4
th
 National Development Plan (1979-1983) was 
the selection of nine more "principal towns"—places that would serve as growth 
centers for different regions of the country.
90
 These nine towns were in addition to 
eleven other towns that had been identified in prior National Development Plans. 
Principal towns were to receive priority investment of services, facilities, and 
infrastructure in order to 1) stimulate the agglomeration of economies necessary for 
rapid industrialization and by extension, rapid national development and 2) boost rural 
development while also slowing the growth of Nairobi and Mombasa, the two primary 
cities.  
While the implementation rate was "patchy" and the concept "failed to 
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generate the developmental waves expected," Kenya was among many African 
countries that employed the use of the central place and growth pole theories in the 
1970s. Like Kenya, many of those African countries had gained independence during 
the prior decade and were searching for ways to promote social and economic growth. 
Prominent scholars like Friedmann (1968) also propounded the use of the growth pole 
theory by arguing that urbanization was an important tool for advancing national 
development; thus employing a strategy for deliberate urbanization is an important 
development tool.
91
 
Several factors contributed to the failed advancement of the principal town 
concept in Kenya. Chief among them was the lack of financial resources to support the 
concept, a weakness that was pointed out even before the publication of the 4
th
 
National Development Plan announcing new sites in 1979.
92
 The government's 
financial contribution was set up in the form of industrial location incentives and 
included direct investment in new firms or in the provision of land or physical 
infrastructure such as water and roads. These contributions were to be coordinated 
through the respective ministries, who were asked to direct their resources towards 
development in each of these sites. Ministries were also advised on where projects 
should be sited and what kinds of services and infrastructure to locate in each town.  
With limited budgets and differences in the location of their target population, 
the ministries involved did not adhere to these suggestions. Rather, their investments 
were directed at activities that met their internal goals, needs, and resources.
93
 
Furthermore, ministries did not coordinate well with each other, or with the 
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municipalities they worked in. Each executed its own goals and priorities. Yet, the 
Department of Physical Planning (under the Ministry of Lands and Settlement), which 
formulated the framework for the principal town model, did not have the powers to 
shape the behavior of other ministries because they were only an advisory body with 
no executive powers over their counterparts in other ministries. Nonetheless, the 
number and size of Kenya's urban centers has grown, as shown in Table 2.3. 
Unfortunately, many lack basic services.
94
  
Table 2.3: Growth in Size of Urban Centers, 1962 – 1999 
 Size of Urban 
Center 
1962 1969 1979 1989 1999  
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %  
  100,000+  2 5.9 2 4.3 3 3.3 6 4.3 5 2.8  
  20,000 - 99,999  2 5.9 2 4.3 13 14.3 21 15.1 33 18.4  
  10,000 - 19,999 3 8.8 7 14.9 11 12.1 19 13.7 34 19  
  5,000 - 9,999 11 32.4 11 23.4 22 24.2 32 23 33 18.4  
  2,000 - 4999 16 47 25 53.1 42 46.1 61 43.9 74 41.4  
  Total 34 100 47 100 91 100 139 100 179 100  
Source: Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics, 1999 Census, Vol. VI, Table 4.4 
Integrated Rural Development  
As Kenya's economic management declined in the late 1970s,
95
 financial 
investment in local development activities came in the form of renewed donor 
commitments towards a new program focused on Kenya's arid and semi-arid lands 
(ASAL).
96
 The decision to focus on Kenya's arid lands was the result of renewed 
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global interest in the improvement of arid lands as an avenue for reducing extreme 
poverty rates. Asia, South Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa recorded extreme poverty rates 
of 50 percent or higher.
97
 As a response, international research centers such as the 
International Center for Agricultural Research in Dryland Agriculture were established 
to focus on dryland development since it was home to many of the poorest 
populations. The UN also held a conference on desertification in 1977 addressing the 
same issue. For Kenya, the shift in global focus towards dryland development also 
presented it with the opportunity to seek economic growth outside its wet highlands, 
where tea and coffee cultivation had been largely exhausted.
98
  
More than three quarters of Kenya's land cover is denoted as arid or semi-arid 
land, as shown in Figure 2.2. However, due to the concentration of people along the 
southeast to southwest diagonal of the country, ASAL districts only account for 
approximately one-fifth of the total population, the vast majority of who are 
pastoralists. In comparison to other districts, Kenya's ASAL districts are less 
developed and its population is among the poorest. 
Kenya's ASAL Integrated Rural Development Program (ASAL-IRDP) was 
established in 1979. Fourteen of the country's 22 ASAL districts received funding 
from donors and the government to structure bottom-up strategies that addressed 1) 
the development of productive potential 2) income-earning opportunities and 3) the 
provision of basic needs. Thus, like its predecessors, the ASAL-IRDP sought to offer a 
mix of human- and project-oriented interventions.  
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Figure 2.2: Map of Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid Districts, including overall 
Population Density 
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Although categorized as a program for improving socioeconomic planning and 
the coordination of development activities in the districts, the ASAL programs' ability 
to advance socioeconomic development was more tied to political will from Nairobi 
than management capabilities in the district. There are several reasons for this: 
(1) While each of the initial donors structured its own activities and managed 
its own funds (approximately US$86 million);
99
 each program site still had to apply 
for collaborative funds from the government, a duty which fell on the program 
Technical Advisors (TAs). To get those financial commitments, the mostly expatriate 
advisors had to form alliances with senior officials in the various ministries involved 
with coordinating activities in the districts. However, the TAs expatriate status led 
some ministry officials to regard the ASAL program as a foreign intervention, and one 
that they were not particularly obliged to prioritize.  
(2) At the same time, ministries were experiencing cutbacks and delays in the 
release of funds for approved expenditures, as the government instigated a structural 
adjustment program (in line with World Bank and IMF strictures) that would later be 
characterized as being "possibly too abrupt macro/fiscal stabilization," even by World 
Bank officials.
100
 As a result, the supply of funds to programs was "deficient and 
erratic."
101
 When funds were eventually disbursed to the districts, they were often 
redirected to cover everyday operating costs. These included travel allowances, 
stationery, and transport for routine work on other developmental services. For donors, 
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it made little sense to finance separate programs when many of the ongoing activities 
were functioning at low levels of effectiveness due to inadequate government support. 
For example, in one district, only 200 Ksh (US$20) was available to meet non-wage 
expenditures per professional officer.
102
 
(3) The ASAL program did not have many indigenous supporters in Nairobi. 
Few of the senior civil servants in Nairobi were from the ASAL regions, leaving few 
to rally support for the program. The further a region is located from the center, the 
less attention it typically gets, unless perhaps, it is the hometown of a high ranking 
official.
103
 It is not surprising then that Kenya's most chronic and underdeveloped 
ASAL districts are on the northern and eastern bounders of the country, miles away 
from the capital city of Nairobi.
104
  
Leonard (1991) notes that it was no mistake that the first ASAL project, the 
Machakos Integrated Development Project (MIDP) was located in the hometown of 
Harris Mule, the former Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Planning and National 
Development (MPND). He had also been responsible for getting continued donor 
support for development activities since the 1960s. Other accounts indicate that while 
it was two prominent politicians from the district that lobbied the President and donor 
delegates for the project, Mule was influential in ensuring the project was promptly 
financed and implemented once awarded.
105
 Wiggins (1985) also notes that the budget 
for the MIDP was not reduced as much as budgets for other districts were reduced. 
Mule and the two politicians were from a minority ethnic group whose support was 
important to President Moi. A few other ASAL programs were also criticized for 
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being awarded to areas that had political coalitions that supported the President.
106
  
These practices did not help institutionalize effective planning practices at the 
district level, nor did they help improve districts' management capabilities. This was 
especially so when planners and other civil servants in Nairobi selected the projects to 
implement in the districts, which usually occurred when rural leaders presented a long 
list of desired projects without setting priorities for them. It takes time, money, and 
energy to educate, coordinate, and debate the setting of project priorities (especially 
when working in large, sparsely populated areas which characterized several swaths of 
the ASAL districts). As a result, neither the donor agencies nor the Government of 
Kenya always ensured that a process of deliberative decision-making took place for 
the setting of priorities.  
The two main development programs in the early 1980s—the ASAL-IRDP 
(mostly in the north and east) and RDF (mostly in the west and south)—operated 
under these circumstances. Both resulted in the implementation of several small 
community projects all around the country, but they were donor led, did not offer any 
form of uniform development approach for the whole country, and only resulted in 
modest changes to the social infrastructure landscape.  
Such integrated rural development programs that focused on improving 
incomes, livelihoods, and job opportunities, in addition to agricultural production, 
were not unique to Kenya. They were in vogue in many other countries during the 
1970s and 1980s. 
The District Focus for Rural Development Program  
In 1983, the government expanded the ASAL-IRDP program to all of Kenya's 
40 districts by implementing the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) 
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program. Continuing with the idea that the coordination of development initiatives at 
the district level would improve service delivery, increase the number and level of 
local participation, as well as promote greater equity and efficiency in resource 
allocation, the government required each DDC to initiate proposals for development 
projects. The Committees were also tasked with taking the lead in the planning and 
designing of all projects, as well as coordinating the activities of all the line Ministries 
involved with getting projects implemented.  
While the DDCs involved in district planning through the donor led RDF and 
ASAL-IRDP programs were already operating under this type of framework, for 
others, the DFRD program was the first to hold them accountable to performing those 
duties. Under the old strategy, the government had relied on the Ministry of Lands and 
Settlement's department of Physical Planning to create physical land use plans and 
guide the siting of new projects—which were then slated for implementation by the 
appropriate ministries at the various subnational levels. Under the DFRD program, 
decision-making responsibilities for local plans were transferred to the DDC. DDCs 
now faced the challenge of directing local planning affairs, instead of being directed 
by the line ministries.
107
 
Amid other criticism, critics were most vocal about the timing of the DFRD 
program, nothing that it only reinforced the President's ability to control local affairs 
through the Provincial administration which answers to the Office of the President.
108
 
These criticisms were plausible because in May of 1982, Parliament had amended the 
Constitution to make Kenya a de jure one-party state.
109
 Seeing this change as an act 
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of centralizing power and strengthening the presidency, a group of soldiers staged a 
coup d'état three months later to remove President Moi from power. While the coup 
only lasted six hours before forces loyal to Moi's government regained control, the 
incident prompted Moi to replace political opponents in his government with those 
supportive of his administration.
110
  
Given these events, the institutionalization of the DFRD was seen as a 
deliberate move to restrict local governments' autonomy and prevent local political 
hegemony from being used to take over control at the center. One of those accused of 
treason during the coup attempt, Charles Njonjo, then Minister of Constitutional 
Affairs, was said to have been seeking alliances with politicians at the local level and 
with the Ministry of Local Government to further his case against the President.
111
 
Thus, the strengthening of governance capabilities at the district level, while not 
addressing the struggles of local governments to maintain, let alone expand service 
levels, was viewed by many as a way of implicitly controlling the capabilities of local 
governments. The government addressed these views by later stating that 
"Local authorities…have a special relationship with the DDCs. They 
are to vet their development projects through the DDC before 
forwarding them to the Ministry of Local Government for funding. This 
process enables the DDC to coordinate these projects with other 
development activities in the district. DDC endorsement of a project 
assures the Ministry of Local Government that the proposal has been 
reviewed and is in accordance with district development priorities. The 
methods which a local authority intends to use for raising revenue from 
within the district should have the concurrence of the DDC since such 
methods may have a significant effect on the development process in 
the district."
112
  
Given that 1) the DDCs had been criticized as being unproductive, poorly 
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organized, and ineffective at setting local priorities or making decisions about 
competing claims, 2) the government was undergoing fiscal reforms that tightened 
spending, 3) there was a hiatus in donor balance of payment support and 4) there was 
no significant boost in the number of DDOs or other technical staff in the districts to 
augment the weak ministerial staff representation in the districts,
113
 the timing of the 
DFRD program does indeed subject it to accusations of masking a politically driven 
motive.  
While the actual numbers regarding the infrastructural impact of the DFRD 
program remain unclear, several sources note that the DDCs' tasks were hampered by 
their inability to control how much each line ministry committed (financially or 
otherwise) to the DDC's plans.
114
 The allocations for capital expenditure came from 
individual ministries engaged in such work, with neither the Committees nor local 
residents having a say in how much funds were allocated.
115
 Thus while these newly 
invigorated Committees now had a legal basis for making recommendations, they 
were still unable to control development funds from the line ministries, greatly 
limiting their capabilities.
116
  
Tostensen and Scott (1987) label the DFRD program as a political rather than 
developmental tool because the same politicians who were involved in resource 
allocation at the central level were also the ones involved at the district level.  
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One thing the DFRD program did do was enhance the districts' capacity to 
prepare district plans. These were now published on the same 4-year cycle as the 
national development plans.
117
 While the process elevated the need for regional plans 
and promoted the ideals of urban and rural planning practices, the continued poor 
quality of the district plans—which still largely lacked many of the details from which 
short- and long-term feasibility plans can be developed—limited their usefulness. 
External and internal crises such as the drop in global oil prices from the high 
rates of the 1970s, severe drought, and the increasing cost of imports did not help to 
reduce cutbacks in the amount of financial resources available to the DDCs. By the 
mid 1980s, Kenya, along with several other countries that had borrowed large loan 
amounts during the oil boom of the 1970s had become increasingly unable to repay its 
balance of loan payments. Donor support for paying the balances had halted in 1984, 
due to dissatisfaction with externally imposed reforms. Loan commitments from the 
Bank resumed in 1986, but with conditionalities that included a reduction in social 
spending—which had a direct impact on the government's ability to fund basic needs. 
The loan conditionalities of the 1980s had a daunting impact on the Kenyan 
economy. Subsidies were removed from agriculture, the main driver of the Kenyan 
economy. Interest rates increased, destabilizing economic growth. Civil service 
workers were retrenched, with no social services to fall back on. Those unable to pay 
private rates for basic services such as health, water, and education all experienced the 
effects of government cutbacks. Economic focus shifted to liberalization and 
privatization of activities in "areas of greatest benefit for all Kenyans."
118
  
Along with advocating for the implementation of neoliberal policies such as 
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privatization and liberalization of the economy, the Bank and IMF also called on 
governments to explore new ways for improving and preserving the social welfare of 
their vulnerable populations. With the realization that many development countries 
could no longer make adequate welfare provisions for their populations, the agencies 
proposed that governments focus on creating partnerships between the public, private, 
and civil sector. This would involved forming legal and fiscal frameworks that would 
allow NGOs, CBOs, the private sector, and local governments to pursue their 
comparative advantage in social development. Residents would also be involved. This 
model would reduce government spending by drawing in civil society to help cover 
the costs. Rather than play the role of financer like before, governments would shift to 
playing the role of 'enabler.' For example, governments could legalize land on 
informal settlements while NGOs, CBOs, and the private sector worked with 
communities to improve housing standards. Governments could also provide trucks 
and equipment for installing basic infrastructure such as water kiosks, while 
communities sorted out the details of project design, location, and maintenance. This 
model exemplified the site and service schemes advocated by John Turner in the 
1970s.
119
  
Accordingly, loan contracts were negotiated so that governments were only 
encouraged to spend money on trunk infrastructure such as airports and roads, 
facilities which would attract foreign investment. The role of civil society within 
different development agendas widened, leading to various theories about social 
capital and civil society in development. In practice however, Kenyan communities 
generally had a difficult time keeping up with local needs. The removal of government 
subsidies from staple foods such as maize and rice corresponded to a rise in poverty 
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levels. Some even argued that a regression occurred in the level of development. 
Consequently, many communities were unable to garner enough finance and time to 
implement significant community-led projects. Furthermore, there was no change in 
the DDC's membership structure, which only called for the participation of prominent 
local leaders and politicians alongside other local government officers on the 
committee. Thus, resident participation in the DFRD program was limited. 
1990s – present: Popular Participation in Local Governance  
By the early 1990s, decentralization of decision making was at the front and 
center of global development discourse. Kenya, along with other African countries, 
was under pressure from the international community to put more democratic 
governance measures in place.
120
 For Kenya, this meant pressure to return to a 
multiparty state, having operated as a single-party state since 1982. The government 
resisted, outlawing the opposition party that was formed in August of 1991 in 
preparation for the following year's Presidential and local elections. Its members were 
arrested and detained, prompting the suspension of international aid to Kenya in 
1991.
121
 When the ruling KANU party finally decided to reverse the Constitution in 
1992 and once again allow for a multiparty system, aid agencies pledged to resume 
financial grants and loans, and international financial aid began to flow back into 
Kenya in 1993. 
Decentralized Decision-Making: Globally Redefining the Role of Local 
Governments in Development 
Following the neoliberal structural adjustment programs of the 1980s, the 
prevailing global theory for social development in the 1990s was to limit government 
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participation in many sectors. The World Bank, IMF, United Nations, and other 
leading development agencies advocated for greater levels of democracy through 
localized decision-making, which would place civil society at the forefront of social 
development. Along with the conviction that such a model would lead to greater 
political transformations within society to benefit ordinary persons, such a model is 
also believed to be a significant factor in the fight against increasing poverty levels.  
Accordingly, the 1992 UN conference on Environment and Development 
(Earth Summit) sought to convince governments to focus on local governments as the 
engine of development because they were the "level of governance closest to the 
people" and because they "play a vital role in educating, mobilizing, and responding to 
the public to promote sustainable development." Working with their local 
governments, each government was urged to create a local "Agenda 21" for each of 
their cities—a blueprint for management in the 21st century. To achieve this, each 
government was encouraged to ensure that their local governments (i) undertake 
consultative processes with their populations and achieved a consensus on a local 
"Agenda 21" for the community (ii) implement and monitor programs which aim at 
ensuring that women and youth are represented in decision-making, planning, and 
implementation processes. By the close of the conference, 172 governments had voted 
to focus on local governments as the engine of development.
122
 
If communities were able to make decisions regarding their own development 
priorities, the belief was that the implemented projects would be ones that directly 
addressed each community's greatest need. Assuming that the greatest needs equated 
to the needs of the most vulnerable populations, then the rising levels of poverty could 
be halted and eventually reduced.
123
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Although Kenya pledged its commitment to adopt this local government-led 
development framework, it did not follow through, at least not initially. Instead, the 
government continued working at the district level, concentrating on the DFRD 
program. Given the government's history of sidelining local governments in favor of 
central control through the districts, this was no surprise.
124
  
In 1994, funds were earmarked for a new program, the Social Dimensions of 
Development (SDD). The program provided financial support to specific communities 
in six pilot districts. Its main purpose was to address poverty by implementing various 
programs and projects that offered employment opportunities. Independent 
committees were set up to generate local priorities, which targeted labor intensive 
infrastructure projects such as the construction of dams, rural water systems, and rural 
access roads. However, without being able to secure substantial donor support, fewer 
than 100 projects were implemented around the country.
125
  
Towards the end of the decade, better financed devolved funding programs 
were eventually established. They include the Rural Electrification Program Levy 
Fund (REPLF) of 1998, the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) of 1998, the Road 
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Maintenance Levy Fund (RMLF) of 1999 (Act passed in 1993 but actualized in 1999), 
the Constituency AIDS Control Committee fund (CACC) of 1999, the Constituency 
Development Fund (CDF) of 2003, and the Constituency Bursary Fund (CBF) of 2003 
(formerly known as the Secondary School Education Bursary; restructured in 2003 as 
a localized program).
126
 
Unlike previous programs such as the SRDP and DFRD, these programs 
operate as financially devolved programs—involving intergovernmental financial 
transfers from the central government to local governments or committees at the 
district or constituency subnational level. Each local governments or respective 
committee then makes decisions about how the money will be spent. Since the funds 
come from specific set-asides, localities are not dependent upon line ministries or 
international donors like in the past.  
As noted in the opening chapter, it is no coincidence that several of these 
devolved funds were established after 1997. Following the 1997 elections, almost half 
of the new members of Parliament (MPs) were from opposition parties. In a country 
where political affiliation runs along ethnic lines, the political victory of opposition 
MPs was viewed as a positive step towards ending ethnic bias in development 
allocations.
127
 These devolved funding programs allow each locality to make 
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personalized financial, design, and implementation decisions, albeit still not in a fully 
autonomous manner, as subsequent discussion will illustrate.  
In terms of localized decision-making, the LATF stands out. It is structured to 
embrace the concept of participatory governance as articulated during the Earth 
Summit—for the development of local Agenda 21s.128 Admittedly, civil society's 
participation in community development was nothing new. For decades, CBOs and 
NGOs had filled the gap between government provision and public need, and residents 
had self-organized to prioritize and implement their collective needs. The difference is 
that in this new model, community organizing is directed from above. It was no longer 
an act initiated at the grassroots. Rather, it is orchestrated from above by the 
government. As such, the negotiation of roles and distribution of costs is no longer 
dictated by residents and the organizations that serve them. The development process 
now involved collaboration with central and local governments, along with all the 
nuances that such collaboration entails.  
This approach to development was a reversal from the approach taken in the 
prior decade, which had been based upon the idea that only certain people should be 
assigned to local development responsibilities. Those people—often government 
bureaucrats, along with a smattering, if any, of local leaders—would make decisions 
regarding each community's development needs. Thus, the concept of 'participation by 
representation' that had been prominent since the mid-1980s when the DFRD program 
was instituted as the main avenue for local development once again gave way to 
regarding community participation as not only "a right," but "an obligation" of 
citizenship. I use the term "once again" because as the narrative in Chapter 2 revealed, 
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community participation in local development had been approached as a right and an 
obligation of citizenship right after Independence. President Kenyatta had called upon 
the country to unite in harambee and contribute time, money, and labor towards 
building their communities. Yet, while we see the same approach to participation in 
the late 1990s as was witnessed more than 30 years prior, with the same expectations 
and intentions—to foster economic, urban, and rural development through the creation 
of an adequate infrastructure base—the structure of the current approach to 
participation as a right and obligation is different. It is required and directed, rather 
than treated as an organic process. On the flip side, prior to Independence, 
participation was also by representation, as colonial rule barred much of the 
indigenous population from taking part in any decision-making. When all viewed 
together as shown in Figure 2.3, the chronological rendering of the state of the 
political economy and the government's approach to participation reveals a cyclical 
pattern that alternates between periods of direct and democratic rule, both in terms of 
political control and people's participation in local governance. 
• Political economy: 
Colonial Rule
• Approach to 
participation: by 
representation
Pre-1963
• Political economy: 
harambee unity
• Approach to 
participation: as a 
right & obligation 
of citizenship
1963-1982
• Political economy: 
one-party rule
• Approach to 
participation: by 
representation 
1982-1997
• Political economy: 
participatory good 
governance
• Approach to 
participation: as a 
right & obligation 
of citizenship
1997-2010
?
 
Figure 2.3: The (Re)Cycling of Participation and Political Control 
This interplay of community participation and the loosening and tightening of 
political control is not unique to Kenya. In her research on land rights struggle in 
Lima, Peru, Peattie (1990) shows that controlled advocacy of community participation 
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is also a mechanism for controlling power at the top. By selecting when and how 
communities are given the leeway to individually determine their development path, 
the government is also able to use participation as a means of garnering political 
support. This is because greater community participation in local governance will be 
perceived as a desire for more inclusiveness, and the desire of government to listen 
and adhere to the wishes of the masses. The masses are then more eager to offer 
support for those in power because they have relinquished a small proportion of their 
power to the masses.  
For Kenya, this cycling back and forth has occurred every fifteen to twenty 
years, with the current phase being one of participatory development, both politically 
and socially, as shown in Figure 2.3. However, there are big responsibilities attached 
to this participatory decision-making power; bigger, one might speculate, than the 
government itself strived to accomplish under periods of direct rule. The rhetoric 
however, is not only that each and every Kenyan now has a legal right to have their 
voices heard in the decision-making process—including those typically excluded: the 
poor, women, and other vulnerable groups—but that he or she also has a duty—an 
obligation—to participate meaningfully within their community in order to facilitate 
rapid social development. 
The next chapter begins to methodically assess this participatory approach to 
social development in order to provide an analytical base upon which to continue the 
discussion of the reality of the approach 'on the ground.' 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP) 
Formulating the LASDAP 
The evolution of Kenya's Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan 
(LASDAP) dates back to 1992, when the World Bank initiated funding for a 
municipal reform program that was to concentrate on improving Kenya's local 
government finances. Seven municipalities were initially chosen for participation in 
the reform efforts, known as the Kenya Municipal Reform Program (KMRP). Led by a 
team of consultants from Harvard's then Institute for International Development 
(HIID)
129
 and coordinated by Kenya's Ministry of Local Government, the initial 
reform efforts concentrated on municipal roads and infrastructure development.
130
 
Local consultants included individuals from both the private and public, including the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Lands and Settlement, the Ministry of Planning 
and Development, and the Bureau of Statistics. The international consultants included 
those who had worked on similar local government reform efforts in other 
countries.
131
 Following a review of community and local government profiles as well 
as other studies commissioned to help define the program, the span and scope of the 
KMRP was broadened to include more comprehensive reforms in all 175 local 
governments. These include service delivery and poverty alleviation, in addition to the 
original focus on financial management.  
To reflect the change in focus, the KMRP was renamed the Kenya Local 
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 Since the KMRP was originally conceived as a municipal finance program, the initial program 
organizers were all finance personnel. The Ministry of Finance was particularly vested in improving 
local governments' finances since it was obligated to financially assist Councils with repaying unpaid 
donor loans. 
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 Per interviews, international consultants were brought on as needed, with only one full-time and one 
part-time consultant living in Kenya. 
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Government Reform Program (KLGRP) in 1995 and a small secretariat consisting of a 
handful of civil service personnel was created to coordinate the reform activities. 
President Moi also initiated a commission to detail elements that should be included in 
local government reforms. This was viewed as a significant move, as many of the 
previous recommendations to strengthen local government since the 1970s had been 
largely ignored. However, the Commission's report (referred to as the Omamo Report) 
was not as influential as expected because as Smoke (2004) notes, it failed to tackle 
the worst problems of local government. While the Report identified local 
governments' insufficient taxing authority, shortfalls in revenue collection, and 
inability to exercise the power afforded them under the Local Government Act 
because of control by the Ministry of Local Government; it did not recommend 
legislative amendments to other Acts and documents that affect the effective 
functioning of the local government.
132
 Like the 1971 Ndegwa Report, the Omamo 
Report focused on the objectives of local government—to respond to local community 
demands—by amongst other things, 
"provid[ing] opportunities for local communities to exercise their 
democratic right to self-governance and determination at the local 
levels of society, and to encourage and develop initiatives and 
leadership potential; and mobiliz[ing] human and material resources 
through the involvement of the public in their local development." 
Notwithstanding, the local government reform advisory board went on to 
design an intergovernmental fund that would transfer a portion of the national income 
tax receipts from the central government to the local governments,
133
 with the goal of 
"improv[ing] efficiency and accountability in the operations of local authorities," 
including debt repayment.
134
 The international consultants who served as technical 
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 The total transfer amount has hovered around 2.5 percent of income revenue since 1999. 
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 Many local governments have accrued a lot of debt over the years. Part of the financial assistance 
from the government was to help local governments device a debt repayment plan, utilizing a portion of 
 74 
advisors were instrumental in designing the fund, known as the Local Authority 
Transfer Fund (LATF), and facilitating its discussion through Parliament.
135
 Those 
efforts resulted in the passage of the LATF Act in 1998. 
When established, the LATF was Kenya's first intergovernmental grant system 
in 25 years. It is structured to transfer five percent of the national income tax receipts 
from the central government to the local governments. The amount transferred to each 
of the 175 local governments is based on an allocation formula, including the 
population size and whether the local government is categorized as rural or urban.
136
 
The LATF money is separated into two components. The performance component 
(40%) is aimed at helping local governments with their administrative costs and debt 
repayment. The service component (60%) is aimed at helping local governments 
improve service delivery systems within their respective boundaries.
137
  
While these grants are unconditional—local governments can allocate the 
monies within each component as they see fit—local governments are mandated to 
include a broad range of community perspectives in the decision-making process 
surrounding how the service component of the LATF is spent. This includes input 
from community-based organizations (CBOs), non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), the private sector, and local citizens. As a group, they are to jointly identify, 
prioritize, implement, and monitor proposed community projects. The government 
also mandates that the proposed projects reflect a pro-poor emphasis, such as 
                                                                                                                                            
the LATF funds.  
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 As per interviews in 2008. 
136
 For FY 2001/02, allocations were based on the following formula: a lump sum of Ksh 1.5 million to 
all councils (9 percent), 60 percent allocated on the basis of relative population, and the remaining 31 
percent on the basis of relative urban population 
137
 There was, however, a clause that it was only mandatory to spend at least 50 percent of the service 
component (i.e. 30 percent of total LATF funds) on projects dedicated to improving service delivery. 
Furthermore, up to 60 percent of total LATF funds may be spent on the performance component. Thus, 
while the primary function of the LATF program is to improve service delivery mechanisms locally, 
those infrastructure improvement expenditures can still legally account for as little as 30 percent of the 
overall LATF funds. 
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improved water and sanitation systems in low-income areas in order to help alleviate 
poverty. This collection of prioritized projects forms the basis of each local 
government's local development plan, funded by the service component. Referred to as 
the Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP), the prioritized projects 
are supposed to reflect what each community deems important and have become the 
roadmap for local development planning at each local government.  
From the government's point of view, outlining the two components was meant 
to help local governments see the broader goal behind the grants. Not only was the 
central government providing financial assistance to help local governments with their 
general expenditures such as salaries, utilities, or debt repayment; they were also 
providing the money as a source for financing local infrastructure development. Thus, 
there was an expectation that local governments would "step up," and be more 
proactive in their local development efforts. Moreover, the participatory format of this 
development program embodies what the government envisions for the future of local 
governance structures in Kenya.
138
 
Effect of LASDAP Grants on Local Governments' Revenue and Expenditure 
Overall, considerable resources have been directed towards the program, both 
financially and administratively. Table 3.1 shows the total amount of LATF funds 
disbursed between FY 2004/2005 and FY 2007/2008 (60 percent of which should go 
towards LASDAP projects). As a share of total local government revenue, LATF 
allocations reached a high of 36 percent during FY 2006/2007. Other central 
government transfers, namely the Road Maintenance Levy Fund (RMLF), raised the 
proportion of total central government transfers to 40 percent for the same fiscal year. 
However, if the analysis is redefined to examine each local government's budget 
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individually, LATF allocations can account for as much as 91 percent (Malakisi Town 
Council) and as little as 7 percent (Narok County Council) of a local government's 
total revenue.
139
  
Table 3.1: Comparison of LATF Disbursements as a Proportion of National and 
Local Government Revenue, FY 2004/2005 -FY 2007/2008 
FY 2004/2005 FY 2005/2006 FY 2006/2007 FY 2007/2008
Revenue Source
LATF 3,930 4,986 7,461 8,232
Subtotal CG Transfers* 4,453 5,492 8,329 9,716
Subtotal LG Revenues 8,495 10,112 12,289 13,716
Total LG Revenue 12,948 15,604 20,619 23,432
Annual Increase in CG Transfers 10.2% 23.3% 51.7% 16.7%
Annual Increase in LG Revenues -10.6% 19.0% 21.5% 11.6%
Annual Increase in Total LG Revenue -4.4% 20.5% 32.1% 13.6%
Total GoK Recurrent Revenue 285,823 313,448 376,039 432,219
LATF as % of GoK Recurrent Revenue 1.4% 1.6% 2.0% 1.9%
Inflation Rate 10.3% 12.1% 11.1% 29.3%
LATF as % of Total LG Revenue 30% 32% 36% 35%
All CG Transfers as % of LG Revenue 34% 35% 40% 41%
(in millions Ksh)
 
Source: Compiled from data in the annual LATF reports. 
* The LATF is one of two intergovernmental transfers to the local governments. The other is a roads 
maintenance fund (RMLF). 
While LATF transfers have increased annually by 10 to 50 percent and 
generally kept up with the rate of inflation during the last several years, they are yet to 
meet the 5 percent target envisioned during the program's formulation. Between FY 
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 There are several reasons for this variance. One is that for councils that have a wildlife game reserve 
within its boundaries, the reserve's entrance fees belong to the council. The world renowned Maasai 
Mara Game Reserve is located within the boundaries of Narok County Council. Thus, for this council, 
the bulk of its revenue comes from the reserve's entrance fees (fees from national parks however, go to 
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disbursements as their main source of revenue. For Gusii County Council, one of the case studies in this 
study, 74 percent of its revenue came from LATF money during FY 2007/2008. Urban councils on the 
other hand are generally able to raise higher amounts of revenue from sources such as property tax, 
business permits, and vehicle parking. LATF money only accounted for 28 percent of total revenue for 
the Municipal Council of Nakuru, the second case study in this research. This trend is not unique to 
Kenya. Analysis of local government revenue in both Bolivia and the US shows that cities with a 
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1998, Kohl 1999). 
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2004/2005 and FY 2007/2008, between 1.4 percent and 2 percent of national revenue 
was transferred from the central government to all local governments. 
While there was a dip in local governments' own revenue stream during FY 
2004/2005, those amounts have increased between 11.6 and 21.5 percent during each 
of the subsequent three years. On paper, these increases in revenue seem to have 
translated to an increase in capital expenditure. Table 3.2 shows that during the span 
of the four years under review, capital expenditure more than doubled, increasing by a 
total of 123 percent, although its proportion in terms of overall local government 
expenditure has remained fairly constant, at around 10-15 percent. In reality however, 
the number and scope of projects have largely remained the same, as will be illustrated 
in the case study analyses.  
Table 3.2: Structure of Local Governments' Expenditure,  
FY 2004/2005 - FY 2007/2008 
Expenditure Classification
% Change         
FY 04/05 - 07/08
Civic Expenditure* 833 (6%) 1,102 (7%) 1,315 (7%) 1,236 (5%) 48.4%
LA Personnel 5,770 (43%) 6,138 (41%) 7,830 (39%) 9,047 (40%) 56.8%
LA Operations 2,203 (17%) 3,233 (21%) 3,899 (19%) 4,008 (18%) 81.9%
LA Maintenance 563 (4%) 628 (4%) 723 (4%) 807 (4%) 43.3%
TOTAL RECURRENT 9,369 (70%) 11,100 (74%) 13,767 (68%) 15,098 (66%) 61.1%
Capital Expenditure 1,559 (12%) 1,511 (10%) 3,073 (15%) 3,469 (15%) 122.5%
Debt Resolution 2,202 (16%) 2,268 (15%) 3,317 (16%) 4,229 (19%) 92.1%
Loan Repayments 217 (2%) 174 (1%) 23 (0%) 13 (0%) -94.0%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 13,347 (100%) 15,054 (100%) 20,180 (100%) 22,809 (100%) 70.9%
FY 2004/2005 FY 2005/2006 FY 2006/2007 FY 2007/2008
 
* Civic expenditure refers to the cost of paying Councilors' salaries and other travel, honorarium or 
related expenses. 
Unarguably, one of critical issues faced by many developing countries is the 
lack of maintenance of the existing infrastructure base. Kenya is no different in this 
regard. Besides recognizing the undersupply of basic infrastructure needs, the push to 
adequately maintain its existing supply was one of the factors that led to the creation 
of the LASDAP program in Kenya. The guidelines specifically stress the need to 
incorporate 3 years of maintenance and operating costs into the total cost of each 
project proposal. A template to calculate the budget for each project is provided 
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accordingly. However, many councils still do not factor in yearly maintenance costs 
into any of their new project costs. Thus, over the four year period under review, 
annual expenditures on maintenance are reported to have stayed constant at 4 percent 
of recurrent expenditures, although there was an increase in the actual amount 
spent.
140
 Even as the central government lays emphasis on the maintenance of existing 
infrastructure, a corresponding rise in the proportion of revenue allocated for 
maintenance has failed to materialize.  
Unlike revenue-sharing programs in some other countries, Kenya's LATF 
revenue-sharing program was not structured to be an evenly distributed share of 
revenue per capita. Thus the formula that defines the sharing of revenue favors urban 
councils over rural ones. Municipal councils are allotted roughly one and a half times 
or more their per capita share of the funds. Town councils are allotted roughly seven-
tenths to one and a half times their per capita share of funds, while most county 
councils are allotted only six- to seven-tenths their per capita share of funds.  
Table 3.3: Per Capita Distribution of LASDAP Development Funds 
 Local Authority Name
1999 
Population
% Urban 
Population
 2007/2008 
LASDAP 
Allocations 
(Ksh)
2007/2008 
Per Capita     
(Ksh)
2007/2008 
Per Capita 
Share
# 1 Karatina Municipal Council 6,852 100% 3,835,426 560 3.24
# 2 Meru Municipal Council 42,677 100% 19,183,012 449 2.60
# 3 Mombasa Municipal Council 665,018 100% 285,796,591 430 2.49
# 4 Nairobi City Council 2,143,254 100% 919,079,295 429 2.49
# 5 Kajiado Town Council 12,204 74.8% 5,128,941 420 2.44
# 6 Thika Municipal Council 88,265 93.7% 36,893,827 418 2.42
# 7 Nakuru Municipal Council 230,515 95.2% 96,031,630 417 2.41
# 8 Eldoret Municipal Council 193,830 86.2% 75,226,502 388 2.25
# 9 Nanyuki Municipal Council 39,838 79.3% 15,283,007 384 2.22
# 10 Nyahururu Municipal Council 32,120 77.1% 12,266,368 382 2.21
# 167 Gusii County Council 303,551 0% 32,327,435 106 0.62
 National 28,686,607 18.7% 4,938,934,157 172 1.00  
Table 3.3 shows the per capita share of allocated LASDAP funds (service 
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component of LATF) for FY 2007/2008. That year's hierarchy of local governments 
receiving the most funds per capita is almost identical to all the other four years 
included in this study. Thus conclusions reached from FY 2007/2008 pattern of 
allocations can be assumed to equally apply to the other three years in this study.  
If the LASDAP program were based on an equal revenue-sharing formula, 
each council would have received 172 Ksh (approximately US$2.50)
141
 per capita. 
However, councils with higher proportions of urban populations are favored to receive 
more money. Thus, the top 10 councils with the highest per capita share of 
development funds are all urban councils. Gusii County Council received only 0.62 
percent of the funds, placing it 167
th
 out of 175 councils.  
A Description of the Ideal LASDAP Planning and Implementation Process 
Before going on to review the impact of the LASDAP program locally, the 
decision-making process as outlined in the government's guidelines is summarized 
below. The summary is provided to help explain how the process of decision-making 
shapes the outcome. This process has come to represent what it means to undertake 
comprehensive development planning at the community level in Kenya. It involves a 
number of steps, which are summarized into four stages.
142
 
1. Initial Preparations 
The first stage of the LASDAP planning process is for each local government 
to compute their respective resource envelopes. The resource envelope is the 
difference between total revenue—Council revenue plus other grants and allocations 
such as the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) and the Roads Maintenance Levy 
Fund (RMLF)—and recurrent expenditures. This amount represents the amount 
available for implementing each respective year's community improvement projects. 
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Public notices must also be prepared. These notices should indicate the time 
and place of upcoming community meetings to determine residents' needs. Personal 
invitations should also be sent to CBOs in the area. Templates for these and other 
tasks are included in the LASDAP Guidelines manual.  
Ideally, local governments should also communicate with other planning 
agencies such as the District planning staff and Constituency development committees 
in order to coordinate their resources and activities, and avoid duplication of effort.  
2. Identifying and Prioritizing Projects 
Community consultation meetings form the core of the LASDAP program. 
During these meetings, communities are to identify and prioritize their needs. 
Emphasis should be placed on identifying needs, which can then be combined where 
appropriate and translated into specific projects. This is to ensure that prioritized 
projects actually address the root cause of specific problems in the community. 
Prioritization of projects should take into consideration how well the local authority is 
equipped to handle that need. Issues of safety might have to be diverted to the local 
police, for example. Other needs may be better addressed if directed to entities already 
set up to address those issues. The guidelines recommend voting as the simplest 
method of prioritizing projects. Two representatives must then be nominated to 
represent the respective community during the next phase in which the community is 
involved—the council-wide consensus meeting. 
Prior to the consensus meeting, the local government's technical team (made 
up of senior local government officials such as the Town Clerk, Treasurer, and 
Engineer) are to review the list of prioritized projects from each community meeting 
within its boundaries. They also identify projects to fulfill Council needs, which 
should be in line with the Council's long-term strategic plan, if one exists. Combined, 
these projects should build a picture of the Council's overall needs, allowing the team 
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to map out short- and long-term goals. Projects may be consolidated if there is a way 
to satisfy multiple communities' needs with one project. Cost estimates for each 
project are then analyzed to determine which top priorities from each community will 
be selected for implementation, based on the amount of the resource envelope. 
Another public meeting—the consensus meeting—is then to be held. The 
purpose of the consensus meeting is for the technical team to discuss which projects 
should be chosen for implementation and how much should be allocated towards each 
one. The selection criteria for those projects should then also be reviewed, along with 
the status of previously prioritized projects, and issues raised during the current year's 
consultation meetings. All of the community representatives that were nominated 
during the consultation meetings should attend this meeting, along with other invited 
persons who are considered to be knowledgeable about the community.  
If there is no consensus on the projects as outlined by the Council for 
implementation, then participants may vote to decide which projects are implemented. 
If a monitoring group is not in place from the previous year, volunteers should be 
sought from the audience. 
The implementation list agreed upon during the consensus meeting, along with 
more detailed cost estimates for each project must then be internally ratified in a full 
council meeting. That is, formally approved by a Council's senior officers and its 
Councilors. Any changes to the implementation list must be based on a review process 
where at least 95 percent of the attendees from the earlier process are present.  
Since 2001, local governments have been required to submit a copy of their 
LASDAP report to the Ministry of Local Government in order to receive up to 100 
percent of their yearly grants. The report contains details regarding who participated in 
the meetings, the decisions that were made, how much funding was allocated to each 
project, and the status of ongoing projects. Templates for reporting all of this 
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information is provided to all councils.
143
 
3. Implementing Projects 
Local authorities can hire private contractors or use "community contracting" 
to implement the projects that are prioritized through the LASDAP process. When 
private contractors are used, procurement and payment procedures as outline by the 
Ministry of Finance must be followed. This includes an open bidding process, where 
contractors must be pre-qualified to bid on such projects. The local authority must also 
specify the criteria for winning a given contract. Any conflict of interest must be 
avoided.  
The government advises that community contracting be used whenever 
possible, especially for simple and small works that require skills available in the 
community. Community contracting can be in the form of having residents contribute 
labor and materials, or having residents assist in the project's design and construction 
phase. Employing the use of community contracting during the implementation phase 
requires that the council pay the residents who are constructing the project. Ideally, 
projects should be contracted to registered community organizations with proven track 
records. 
While guidelines state that community input should be sought during the 
design phase of any project that is to be implemented, it is up to the local government 
on how they chose to achieve this. Construction guidelines are available for a limited 
number of projects, but local authorities are urged to "recruit and build [the] capacity 
of their technical staff" if necessary in order to adequately design and carry out all 
construction projects. While some construction projects may be completed within a 
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year, local authorities are encouraged to divide projects into different phases, and can 
design projects that require up to a 3 year implementation period. 
4. Monitoring and Evaluating Projects 
Monitoring and evaluation of projects should ideally take place at three 
levels—by the citizens, by the local government, and by the Ministry of Local 
Government. The guidelines suggest that a citizen-led monitoring committee should 
be formed during each year's consensus meeting. If one already exists, members of the 
committee can be changed or volunteers re-nominated for another year. This 
committee is then expected to monitor the implementation status of all ongoing and 
upcoming LASDAP projects. The local authority is responsible for ensuring that it 
provides the monitoring group with adequate information, including the financial 
reports on each project.  
Internally, each council's Public Works or Engineering department is 
responsible for ensuring that projects are implemented according to the stated design 
and standards. Each council's technical team is also expected to provide quarterly 
updates that capture the details of each project that is slated for implementation. This 
includes the status of implementation, the expected date of completion, the contracting 
group, and so forth. This report is to be made available to all Councilors, Council staff, 
the citizen monitoring committee, and other interested individuals. 
The Ministry of Local Government, in collaboration with the secretariat of the 
Kenya Local Government Reform Program (KLGRP) is responsible for conducting 
regular monitoring and evaluation exercises to review each council's financial and 
project implementation record.  
The Case Studies 
In the next two chapters, I move from the broad context upon which the 
LASDAP program was developed, to a more detailed narrative of the reality of this  
 84 
Figure 3.1: Map of Kenya showing the major towns, population density, and the 
two case study sites 
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participatory process in two localities. The findings are based on interviews I 
conducted with central and local government officials, a review of documents 
pertaining to the LASDAP process, interviews with local residents, and visits to 
project sites within the boundaries of two local government councils: the Municipal 
Council of Nakuru (an urban council) and Gusii County Council (a rural council). 
The study of project outcomes focused on projects for four years, those which 
were set as priorities between FY 2004/2005 and FY 2007/2008. The reasons for 
selecting these years are that 1) it wasn't until about 2003 that most local governments 
began involving their citizens in the participatory development process that had been 
prescribed by the central government. Prior to this time, many local governments had 
employed the services of a consultant to develop the yearly Local Authority Service 
Delivery Action Plan. Thus, the reports did not reflect priorities expressed by the 
community. And 2) since I was going to be interviewing residents on issues related to 
prioritized/implemented projects, it was better to limit the study to projects slated for 
development within the last 5 years so that respondents would not have too much 
difficulty remembering the events surrounding each project.
144
  
For each case, a description of the Council's characteristics, geographic 
location, level of service provision, LASDAP planning process, and project outcomes 
is discussed. Figure 3.1 above provides a schematic representation of the location of 
each case study site. Both sites are located along the south-east to south-west diagonal 
that is home of most of Kenya's population, as indicated by the dot density pattern on 
the map.
145
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Case Study I: The Municipal Council of Nakuru 
Site Description 
1. Location Description 
The Municipal Council of Nakuru (MCN) oversees the administration of 
Nakuru town. Nakuru (meaning dusty place) is located 160km (100 miles) northwest 
of the capital city of Nairobi. Nakuru is located in Kenya's fertile Rift Valley region 
(Rift Valley Province), at an altitude of 1859 meters (6,100 feet) above sea level. 
Although nestled between Menengai Crater to the north and Lake Nakuru National 
Park in the south, Nakuru has struggled to become a popular tourist destination. While 
Lake Nakuru National Park is home to more than 250,000 flamingos and other big 
game animals, during recent years the number of flamingos has diminished drastically 
at times due to environmental pollution around the lake.
146
 Currently, tourists are more 
attracted to Kenya's larger National Parks and Reserves to see the big five—lions, 
leopards, elephants, buffalos, and rhinos. Nonetheless, the town does host some 
visitors, including those visiting nearby archeological sites such as the Hyrax Hills.  
The Nakuru area was first home to Kenya's Maasai pastoralists, but they were 
displaced by British and other European settlers who came to Kenya in the early 
1900s.
147
 Colonial settlement transformed the area into an urban center. Attracted by 
the area's rich agricultural lands and cool, high altitude, the area soon became known 
as the "white highlands," located around the Mau Escarpment. The construction of the 
Kenya-Uganda railroad, which passes through Nakuru, increased the town's early 
prominence as a service center for the colonial administration. Following construction 
of the Nairobi-Eldoret Highway in the 1930's, the town grew even further, and was 
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organized into distinct functional zones based on a 1929 colonial plan. These zones 
included racially segregated residential quarters for Africans, Asians, and Europeans, 
as well as industrial and recreational zones.
148
 
After independence in 1963, the population of Nakuru continued to expand, as 
people from various parts of the country migrated there. The demand for cheap living 
quarters spurred high density informal settlements along the south and southwestern 
edges of town. The early European settlers remained in the north and northeastern 
quadrants. By the 1970s, the town's growth had spread further eastwards, where cheap, 
easily transferable freehold land was available. Westward expansion has been limited 
by distinct fault lines.
149
 The area overseen by the Council now covers 292 square km 
(113 square miles), although the town itself is only 102 square km (39 square miles). 
Lake Nakuru National Park takes up the rest of the area, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
In 1999, the town's population was recorded at just over 231,000 people, 
placing it as Kenya's fourth largest town.
150 
However, other estimates list Nakuru's 
population as high as 400,000.
151
 This higher estimate includes the population of the 
peripheral areas, whose inhabitants commute daily to Nakuru for economic 
transactions, increasing the town's daytime population.
152
 According to the 1999 
Census, the Nakuru region is also a popular migrant destination. The district of 
Nakuru (within which the town of Nakuru is the largest) has one of the highest 
numbers of migrants from other parts of the country. Eight to 10 percent of the current 
population is made up of recent migrants.
153
 With a growth rate of 5.7 percent, it is 
one of the country's fastest growing towns.
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Figure 4.1: Map of Nakuru and Surrounding Area Governed by the Municipality 
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Today, Nakuru serves as the capital of the Rift Valley Province and is also the 
headquarters of Nakuru District, the district in which the town is located. These 
features, as well as its rich agricultural soils and accompanying agro-based industries 
have elevated it as the regional agricultural trading and service center for the Greater 
Rift Valley region.  
2. Social Profile of Nakuru Town 
It is easy to mistake the fascinating scenery provided by the many large oak 
trees that line the main arterial roads for a high level of material and financial well-
being amongst the town's residents. In reality, a significant number of residents live 
below the poverty line despite the town's diverse and growing economy. A recent 
survey on the incidence of poverty in Kenya estimated Nakuru's poverty rate to be 
between 37 and 50 percent.
154
 Despite these high levels of poverty, the district as a 
whole is still ranked as the 14
th
 least poor district in Kenya.
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The urban core area, the Central Business District (CBD), located in Biashara 
ward, is home to the council's offices, as well as to several businesses, service centers, 
and community-based organizations. A schematic illustration of the ward locations is 
shown in Figure 4.2. The development of the town's core dates back to the colonial 
era, and for the most part, is marked by tree-lined streets and paved roadways. Outside 
the CBD however, development patterns can be quite irregular, varying widely from 
place to place. Besides the variance in the socioeconomic status between wards, there 
is great socioeconomic variance within wards as well. This observation is important 
because wards are identified as the unit of planning within the LASDAP program. However, 
community needs vary greatly depending on spatial location.
156
 For example, Hospital ward 
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can be partitioned into three areas: the salvagers who live next to the city's dumpsite, the low 
to middle income households next to them and, the middle to upper income households at the 
far east of the ward. High-income areas—marked by large bungalows, manicured 
lawns, and wide, paved roadways—are located in the north and east quadrants; in 
various sections of Hospital, Viwanda, Menengai, and Kivumbini wards. The town's 
low-income neighborhoods are mostly located in the south and southwest quadrants—
particularly Rhonda and Kaptembwa wards. A large proportion of these households 
live in highly dense informal settlements. Figure 4.2 highlights some of the areas with 
very high incidents of poverty.
157
 Middle income areas are scattered throughout, 
including the south and northeast quadrants of the town. Barut East and West wards 
were recently added to the municipality's jurisdiction but are more rural in nature. 
 
Figure 4.2: Ward Locations and Areas of High Poverty in Nakuru Town 
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 As determined by a 2008 survey conducted by the Council's GIS Information Center. 
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Kaptembwa location (a Constituency administrative unit), which is comprised 
of Kaptembwa, Rhonda, Shabab, Viwanda, and the west side of Hospital ward is home 
to approximately half of Nakuru's inhabitants.
158
 Housing formerly used to house 
railroad and other workers during the colonial era now operates as public housing 
estates run by the municipality. These fourplex single-level houses were built as single 
room residential quarters to house individual men who traveled weekly from the rural 
areas to lay out the railway lines. Today, those single rooms house entire families. 
While the average household size in Nakuru is 3.4, the close proximity of these low-
income households results in low-income neighborhoods with high population 
densities.
159
 This is despite the fact that many of the low-income public housing 
estates feature amble open spaces. Generally, the estates are located along paved roads 
and are well located within the town structure. However, they lack adequate utility 
services. Signs of deterioration from the lack of general maintenance are also evident. 
The majority of the land within the municipal boundary is used for residential 
purposes. Eighty-seven percent of residents are tenants while 13 percent own their 
housing unit. Approximately 16 percent of the land is used for industrial purposes, 2 
percent is used for commercial purposes, and 6 percent is used to support public 
services such as hospitals, government offices, and schools.
160
 Government-held land 
parcels which houses the Town Hall and other municipal offices are held on 99 year 
leases. The center-local agreement is for the central government to pay Contribution-
in-lieu-of-Rates (CILOR) for these properties. However, local governments generally 
complain that the central government fails to pay or does not pay in full.  
Much of the private land in the region surrounding the town is held by 
descendants of Kenya's early European settlers. For example, Delamere Farms—one 
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 1999 Population and Housing Census, Vol. I, Table 1, p178 
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 ibid 
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 MCN Strategic Structure Plan 1999, Vol. I 
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of the largest farmland holdings in Kenya—is operated by the grandson of Hugh 
Cholmondeley, the 3rd "Baron Delamere" of England,
161
 who immigrated to Kenya at 
the turn of the 20th Century, where he went on to become the unofficial leader of 
Kenya's European community.  
The private sector is the largest provider of housing, both formal and informal. 
However, due to "financial and institutional limitations and staffing constraints," the 
Council does not support private development with the necessary infrastructure and 
planning services. Furthermore, the council does not have much control over the 
subdivision of large settler farms (owned by land buying companies and cooperatives) 
into smaller plots for formal and informal private housing development.
162
 Besides ill-
controlled land use, some residents have also registered their grievances to a 
Commission of Inquiry in Nairobi over the alleged allocation of public land and 
housing to former Councilors and high-ranking officers within the local 
government.
163
 However, such inquiries do not seem to have yielded any local action.  
Such unresolved disputes, which challenge the transfer of public land and 
housing into the hands of community elites, are further exacerbated by the low number 
of people with paid employment, which unlike self-employment, comes with a 
somewhat guaranteed pay schedule and amount.
164
 Based on 1999 census data, 
approximately 61 percent of the district's economically active population are paid 
workers. This is right in line with the national ratio of paid urban workers, which is 64 
percent.
165
 Approximately 27 percent of those employed are self-employed in the 
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 "Baron Delamere" is a Royal English title, dating back to 18
th
 Century England.  
162
 Ng'ethe and Ndua 1984, MCN Strategic Structure Plan 1999, Vol. I 
163
 Based on a letter dated November 2003 that was sent to the Commission of Inquiry. 
164
 I use the phrase "somewhat guaranteed" because monthly pay, especially in the public sector, is not 
always guaranteed. There have been periods of time when local government workers in Nakuru and 
elsewhere around the country went without (or only received partial) pay for several months. 
165
 1999 Population and Housing Census, Vol. VI, Table 6.4. When both the urban and rural 
employment rates are combined, only 25 percent of the employed population are paid employees. These 
figures were calculated from the stated proportions of the economically active population of paid urban 
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informal market while 12 percent work on family farms.  
In Nakuru, one-third of the formal workforce is based in the community, 
social, and personal services industry, while another third work in the manufacturing 
or retail industry.
166
 The concentration of employment in the manufacturing and 
service industry reflects the concentration of agribusiness factories in Nakuru. It also 
reflects the average educational attainment level. Among those 25-29 years of age 
during the polling of the 1999 census, a little less than 4 percent had university 
degrees and 57 percent had high school diplomas.
167
 The average monthly district 
household income is approximately Ksh 6,826 (USD 105).
168
 The average income for 
Nakuru town is presumably higher since 70 percent of the district is rural;
169
 where 
wages are typically lower. 
3. Service Provision 
The Local Government Act only mandates local authorities to provide social 
welfare programs such as establishing sites for burials and cremations, and providing 
support to bury destitute people. The provision of other local services is not 
"mandatory." These include water and sanitation, fire protection, public housing, 
healthcare, refuse collection and disposal, electricity, markets, and bus parks. This 
law, in addition to the claim that they do not collect enough revenue, has resulted in 
grave underinvestment in the provision of utility services that typically require prior 
                                                                                                                                            
workers in each district and the country as a whole. The census computations defined those ages 5 and 
above as economically active, and included the proportion of full-time students, retirees, homemakers, 
the incapacitated, as well as a "not specified" category. In order to provide a more simplified 
interpretation, the stated proportion of paid urban employment was recalculated using a baseline that 
only included those that were paid or self-employed. 
166
 Government of Kenya 2009 – Statistical Abstracts, Table 189a 
167
 1999 Population and Housing Census, Vol. VI, Table 6.3. These statistics compare relatively well to 
the national averages.  
168
 1999 Population and Housing Census, Vol. II, Table 2; Kenya Institute of Economic Affairs (2002). 
Since there were no readily available statistics at the city level, the data presented here is the aggregated 
data for Nakuru district as a whole. Monetary conversion based on the rate of 64.9 Ksh to 1 USD. 
169
 1999 Population and Housing Census, Vol. VI, Table 5.1 
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investment in infrastructure before costs can be partially or wholly reclaimed.
170
 
Most of Nakuru's population lack adequate services.
171
 The MCN states that its 
capacity to provide services have been overstretched during the last 20 years, due to 
the tremendous rise in population and the accompanying increase in demand for basic 
services such as water, sanitation, and housing. While many of the council's 
publications still reminisce about Nakuru's previous label as "the cleanest town in East 
Africa," a quick survey of the markets and many of the low-income neighborhoods 
now tells a different story.  
Outside of the high and upper-middle class neighborhoods, there is great 
demand for basic services. Potable water, regular refuse collection, covered and 
serviced sewer systems, schools that are not grossly overcrowded, and adequately 
staffed and stocked healthcare facilities are lacking in many neighborhoods. Those 
who can afford it pay for private services. For example, many residential areas pay for 
private weekly refuse collection services. In other areas, community-based 
organizations are formed to take over the provision of these services by using it as a 
form of employment for some of their members. This is especially true in the case of 
refuse collection. 
When feasible, residents dig boreholes or wells on their properties to avoid 
having to pay for water on a daily basis. Many people in the informal settlements have 
to rely on a handful of water kiosks where water is sold by the liter. In many of the 
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 While the Local Government Act (Cap 265) of 1977 perpetuates chronic underinvestment in the 
provision of services, it is simply a reflection of the economic and political reality of the "structure" that 
produced the law. By 1977, this governance structure consisted of a state that sought to recentralize its 
power and resource allocation in order to ensure political stability, national unity, and the containment 
(or simply as a response to allegations) of corruption (Olowu 2002). In Kenya, evidence of this can be 
found in the central government's withdrawal of local governments' autonomy and financial support for 
overseeing primary education, healthcare centers, and secondary roads by the early 1970s. The 
Graduated Personal Tax, a local tax that had provided local governments with a source of revenue for 
administering services and funding local development activities was also terminated.  
171
 ITDG Environmental Sanitation Field Update 2005 
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council-owned estates, water is rationed and thus only available during certain times 
of the day or week. The MCN states that the monthly rent it is able to collect is not 
enough to cover all the utilities and thus it is unable to provide more in terms of 
improved services to its low-income renters. Census data states that 91.6 percent of 
Nakuru's population has access to piped water.
172
 However, this data conceals the 
reality of "access," as it does not translate into "readily available access to piped 
water." The data on the distribution of households by human waste disposal facilities 
is more revealing of the water shortages. It indicates that only 30 percent of Nakuru's 
population is connected to the town's main sewer lines. The majority (64 percent) 
utilize pit latrines.
173
 
For healthcare, the MCN manages five general clinics and one maternity clinic. 
While the government provides the medical personnel and some of the medications, 
the council is in charge of the clinics' maintenance and operations, as well as buying 
some of the medications dispensed at the clinic. However, due to cost constraints, the 
MCN is unable to keep up with purchasing many of the basic medical supplies. The 
supply of doctors and nurses is also limited. Since Nakuru is the provincial capital, the 
Provincial General Hospital is located in Nakuru. This hospital handles many of the 
medical emergencies in Nakuru and the surrounding area. There are also a number of 
private and church run clinics. 
Nakuru is one of the seven municipalities in the nation that is mandated to run 
its own basic educational services.
174
 While Nakuru has a relatively high number of 
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 1999 Population and Housing Census, Vol. X, Table 5.2 
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 1999 Population and Housing Census, Vol. X, Table 5.4 
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 While the responsibility for three primary functions—primary education, healthcare, and the 
maintenance of secondary roads—was transferred from each local government to the central 
government in 1969, seven municipal local authorities (the only seven municipalities at the time; others 
were county, urban, or area councils) retained their authority to manage these services. They include 
Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru, Eldoret, Thika, and Kitale (Stamp 1986, Smoke 2004, 
Commonwealth Secretariat 2004, 1970-1974 Kenya National Development Plan). Today, other local 
authorities have the discretion of deciding whether or not they offer pre-school, primary, secondary, or 
 96 
public and private schools, many cannot adequately serve the needs of their pupils. In 
public schools, classrooms are usually overcrowded. Amenities such as adequately 
stocked libraries, science laboratories, computer labs, and music facilities are few and 
far between. The free primary education policy (up to standard 8 of 12) established in 
2003 has put more strains on the education system. 
4. Characteristics of the Council 
The administrative arm of the Municipal Council of Nakuru includes seven 
departments: Town Clerk, Municipal Treasurer, Town Engineer, Housing and Social 
Services, Environment, Education, and Public Health.
175
 In terms of urban planning 
technical expertise, the Council operates with one engineer, two architects, a senior 
Public Works officer, and several junior officers who work under the senior 
leadership. Notably however, the Council does not have any town planners on staff. 
The last planner left the Council in 2006. As such, there are very few medium- or 
long-term interdepartmentally coordinated town planning activities going on. Day-to-
day management activities are typically based on a "fire brigade" mode of operation, 
whereby the most pressing needs are resolved first.
176
 Depending on the problem at 
hand, those immediate management activities are coordinated by the department 
which has direct oversight on the matter. For example, problems with sewer overflow 
at council-owned estates are coordinated by the Housing department.  
The policy arm of the Council includes 20 Councilors, 15 of whom are locally 
elected representatives of Nakuru's 15 administrative wards. The remaining five are 
nominated Councilors.
177
 Nakuru's administrative wards (neighborhoods) include 
                                                                                                                                            
adult education facilities. Teachers are appointed to each school by the central government. 
175
 These departments are common across most of Kenya's local governments. 
176
 Smoke 2004 
177
 Kenya's local governance system includes the nomination of hundreds of individuals to serve as 
"nominated councilors." These individuals are nominated by the central government (Ministry of Local 
Government) and serve as part of each council's decision-making body.  
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Nakuru East (Lanet), Kivumbini, Shauri Yako, Bondeni, Langalanga, Lakeview, 
Viwanda (Industrial Area), Shabab, Menengai, Biashara, Hospital, Rhonda, 
Kaptembwa, Barut West, and Barut East. Both the administrative and policy arms of 
the Council are responsible for the overall administration of the Council. The Council 
has a workforce of 1,153 employees, the fourth largest amongst Kenya's 175 
councils.
178
 
Evaluating the Planning Process 
In Nakuru, the LASDAP planning process has been marred by repeated 
accusations and claims of corruption and non-implementation of community-identified 
projects. The consultation, implementation, and monitoring process have all been 
criticized. Even the Minister of Local Government has been quoted in the newspaper 
over concern about misappropriation of funds.
179
  
For the most part, the Municipal Council of Nakuru (MCN) conducts the 
LASDAP planning process as outlined in the central government guidelines. However, 
there are a few issues worth noting. First, meeting notices are often untimely. In 2007, 
the newspaper announcement was published three days before the scheduled 
consultation meetings, which elicited a written objection from the citizen monitoring 
group to no avail. While letters of invitation are also posted in public places, the 
posters are often small and sometimes placed in inconspicuous places.  
Typically, one community consultation meetings is held for a multiple number 
of wards.
180
 For example, residents of four wards—Rhonda, Kaptembwa, Barut West, 
and Barut East—were all scheduled to have one meeting in September 2007 to 
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 While the Council has over 1000 employees, only a fraction of them have physical offices at the 
Town Hall. The large majority, such as cleaners and fee collectors, work outside of the office buildings, 
and only report to the Town Hall as needed. This is true of many other councils, including Gusii County 
Council, the focus of the second case study. 
179
 "Kombo warns council," The Standard, November 14, 2006 
180
 Wards are the administrative boundaries defining one neighborhood from the next. Each local 
government is divided into several wards. Nakuru has 15 wards. 
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determine projects for the FY 2008/2009 funding cycle. While each ward compiles its 
own list of priorities during the consultation meetings, the grouping of multiple wards 
into one meeting time greatly lengthens the meeting time. Such meetings lasted for 
three to four hours, versus a two hour time frame for meetings involving only one 
ward. 
Attendance at these consultation meetings vary from year to year and between 
wards. At times, no one showed up to represent a ward.
181
 At other times, anywhere 
from 3 to 150 people are present to represent one ward, with average attendance of 
approximately 24 people per ward.
182
 In the one instance where 150 people were 
present, records indicate that many of them were members of the same CBO. Since 
there can be upwards of 15,000 people per ward, it is difficult to determine how 
representative attendees were of their respective wards. 
Specific projects, rather than solutions meeting particular needs, are usually 
prioritized. Thus it is difficult to tell whether projects address the root cause of 
neighborhood problems. Sometimes there are no specific discussions about exactly 
where projects are to be implemented within a given ward. In these instances, the need 
is usually widespread. However, given the limited financial resources, many projects 
cannot be implemented in all the places they are needed at one time. However, there is 
no discussion in consultation meetings about phasing such projects.  
There were several discussions about the slow or non-implementation of 
previously prioritized projects and requests to use community contracting for the 
implementation of future projects. Council representatives often handled questions 
regarding non-implementation in the same manner—by replying that the money was 
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 In those instances, the technical committee later prioritized "a project which had been proposed but 
not captured in the past" for the ward. 
182
 The average attendance rate in Nakuru was 24 people per ward. However, this mean is right-skewed 
by the very high number of representatives from densely populated wards like Kaptembwa, where up to 
150 people attended ward meetings. 
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used to pay salaries and that "work was going on in some other areas" to implement 
the previous year's priorities. Often, people were told that money was just being 
disbursed by the central government, and as such, "projects will be implemented 
soon."
183
 While it may be true that money for each fiscal year is disbursed in three 
installments, the first of which is available around the time the consultation meetings 
take place, the Council appears to over-emphasize it, glossing over the fact that for 
many wards, projects which have been prioritized in the preceding years have still not 
been implemented, even after the local government received the funds. 
The response from each community to such statements have ranged from a 
state of resignation coupled with a plea to get the projects implemented as soon as 
possible, to vocalized anger and accusations of corruption. Some meetings have been 
suspended following heated arguments. Upon resumption, the crowd was asked to 
focus the meeting on development issues and not politicize matters.
184
 
While the absence of the town's Engineer in consultation meetings had helped 
to fuel allegations of misappropriations and claims that stated project costs were too 
high in comparison to the work done, his presence did very little. The same 
response—that money was sometimes needed to cover salaries but that work was 
ongoing in some places—was repeated at many of the meetings without much more 
explanation. At times, discussion about non-implementation of projects was answered 
with the statement that it was being covered by ongoing work at other agencies. 
However, no further details were given as to whether or how those external agency 
projects would have an impact on the residents of the ward in question.
185
 Residents 
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 MCN LASDAP Report 2006/2007 
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 Such was the case when residents of Menengai ward questioned why their proposed water project 
was yet to be implemented. They were told the Rift Valley Water Board was working on a project that 
would make their water problems "history." However, the residents were not provided with any specific 
details about the cost or how this larger regional project would solve their local problems.  
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have also protested the non-implementation of previously identified projects by not 
proposing any new projects until the old proposals are implemented. To this, the 
council responded that in some cases, money was paid to the contractors who later 
abandoned the work. 
While the selection of projects slated for implementation is supposed to be 
based on an overall assessment of council needs, reflective of comparative cost 
estimates, and connected to a broader, long-term strategic plan, this level of broad-
based planning does not occur. Individual projects are simply selected for each ward 
and allocated a certain amount of money by the Council's technical team. In instances 
where the same project has been identified as a need in multiple wards, a lump sum is 
allocated towards the projects and it is listed as one project. Only one or two projects 
have ever been phased into multiple implementation years, even when the estimated 
costs reflected an amount less than the amount allocated. In instances where projects 
received funding for a second consecutive year, it was because the community 
demanded more money to complete the projects.  
Those attending the consensus meeting generally vote to adopt the list of 
projects and their corresponding allocations as presented.
186
 However, residents do not 
gain anything by blocking the vote even if they are unsatisfied. Some of those present 
continue to express their dissatisfaction about the non-implementation of projects. 
Records show that members of the monitoring committee have repeatedly stated they 
are not getting answers regarding the status of projects once slated for implementation 
in their wards. They, along with the general public, also claim that the quality of 
construction on implemented projects is substandard. Among the information they 
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 Part of the reason why this vote goes pretty seamlessly is because the Councilors—who are more 
likely to quibble about the amount of money allocated to projects in their respective wards—still have 
another forum where they can air their views. A full council meeting (consisting of Councilors and 
senior local government officers) takes place after the consensus meeting, where the list of projects is 
formally approved and adopted by the Council. 
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have requested are records related to how much was awarded to each project, how 
much has been paid, who the contractor is, records of the bill of quantities purchased 
for each project by the contractor, and the balance owed to the contractor, if any. They 
also want records indicating how much of the money allocated to projects which are 
yet to be implemented, is still in the bank 
Invariably, the Council has not been forthcoming in providing them with this 
information. Thus, there has been a great deal of antagonism and distrust between the 
monitoring committee and the Council, continuously fueled by accusations of 
corruption and embezzlement within the Council. The monitoring committee has also 
threatened to sue the Council on occasion, especially over information showing that 
Councilors awarded themselves or close family members work contracts. While no 
lawsuits have actually been filed, there have been newspaper articles, one accusing the 
Council of "outright theft, irregular tendering procedures, unauthorized expenditures, 
and skewed procurement practices."
187
 The article cites audit reports that were unable 
to account for several millions in payment vouchers or checks. Audits also linked 
Councilors and senior local government officers to insurance firms, auto dealers, and 
construction companies used by the Council. While not personally indicted, the 
MCN's Town Clerk, Engineer, and Treasurer were 'put on the spot' in 2007 by the 
Ministry of Local Government for taking too long to discipline those involved and 
have since been transferred to other local governments. Other officers were reshuffled 
to different posts within the council. However, no other disciplinary actions took place 
and the matter was never fully resolved. These moves greatly upset the Chair of the 
monitoring committee, who claims they are one of the most active monitoring groups, 
and yet, have no recourse to see that justice is served. The best they could do was to 
                                                 
187
 "Audit Report Opens a Can of Worms at Nakuru Municipality," Kenya Times, October 24, 2005 
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organize a town-wide protest rally against the MCN and issue a letter of no confidence 
in the Council. On its part, the Ministry of Local Government continues to release 
guidelines to all the councils on how to review past performances in preparation for 
each subsequent year's LASDAP planning process. 
Assessing LASDAP's Impact  
Before getting into an analysis of the physical, social, and political impact of 
the LASDAP program in Nakuru, a snapshot of the Council's total LATF allocations 
between FY 2004/2005 and FY 2007/2008 is summarized in Table 4.1.
188
  
Table 4.1: Municipal Council of Nakuru LASDAP Receipts & Expenditures, 
FY 2004/2005 - FY 2007/2008 
Municipal Council of Nakuru
Ksh
% of 
LATF Ksh
% of 
LATF Ksh
% of 
LATF Ksh
% of 
LATF
Total LATF Allocation 73,086,209 (100%) 93,548,916 (100%) 144,705,685 (100%) 160,052,716 (100%)
Estimated Allocation for Service Delivery)*                                             
Should range from 40-60% of LATF 20,420,911 (28%) 25,536,588 (27%) 29,000,000 (20%) 50,000,000 (31%)
Actual Expenditure on Service Delivery                                                                       
Note: Mandatory minimum is 30% of LATF 8,453,596 (12%) 21,373,899 (23%) 23,043,160 (16%) 0 (0%)
FY 04/05 FY 05/06 FY 06/07 FY 07/08
 
* While 60 percent of LATF money should be allocated towards improving services, Councils estimate 
their allocations for service delivery (resource envelope) by calculating the difference between total 
revenue and recurrent expenditures. Since the upcoming year's budget is calculated before the end of 
the preceding fiscal year, council revenue from the previous year along with LATF allocations for the 
current year are used in the calculations. However, LATF allocations have increased each year. Thus, 
the actual total revenue ends up being higher than estimated. Nonetheless, actual expenditures on 
infrastructure projects have remained below initial estimates. 
During these four years, the MCN's estimated allocations for improving 
service delivery (the LASDAP portion) ranged from 20 to 31 percent of their LATF 
allocations. However, guidelines specify that this figure should comprise 40 to 60 
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 There were two reasons for selecting these four years. First, it wasn't until about 2003 that most local 
governments began involving their citizens in the participatory development process that had been 
prescribed by the central government. Prior to this time, many local governments had employed the 
services of a consultant to develop the yearly Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan that the 
central government required for disbursement of development funds. Thus the initial LASDAP reports 
(c. 1999-2003) were created more to fulfill bureaucratic requirements. They were not priorities 
expressed by the community. Second, since I was going to be interviewing residents on issues related to 
prioritized and implemented projects, it was better to limit the study to projects slated for development 
within the last 5 years so that respondents would not have too much difficulty remembering the events 
surrounding each project. 
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percent. Furthermore, the "compulsory minimum" expenditure should be at least 30 
percent of each year's LATF allocations. Yet, the highest amount the MCN actually 
spent during these four years was 23 percent (in FY 2005/2006). Thus, the MCN did 
not meet the minimum requirements for project allocations or actual expenditures 
between FY 2004/2005 and FY 2007/2008. For a more visual representation, the 
council's LASDAP receipts and expenditures are also summarized in a bar chart, 
shown in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.3: Municipal Council of Nakuru LASDAP Receipts & Expenditures, 
FY 2004/2005 – FY 2007/2008 
A note on data collection: Compiling the financial data on actual LASDAP 
expenditures was quite cumbersome, to say the least. Record keeping was done in 
piecemeal fashion, with some records stored at the Municipal Engineer's office, others 
in the Treasurer's office, while other sets of documents could be found in the 
Architect's office. Although the Council was one of a handful of councils that had 
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been selected by the MoLG for participation in an effort to develop an information and 
communication technology (ICT) system in the councils that included electronic data 
management, not all data was available electronically upon inquiry, even though it 
might have been prepared electronically at some point in the past. Besides overcoming 
the hurdle of reluctance on the part of particular local government officials in sharing 
these financial records, I also had to battle through correlating the data in an effort to 
resolve discrepancies between datasets.
189
 I also had to sign an informal statement in 
one of the departments stating that the data obtained from them would only be used for 
my research.
190
 This challenge of obtaining available data from the public sector is a 
critical one, which must be resolved in order to build adequate literature on current 
conditions and tackle areas of need. Not only is there a lack of data collection 
occurring within the public sector, but even when the data are available, in one way or 
another, they are often considered contentious if made public and thus closely guarded 
from becoming public knowledge. This attitude must change. It only serves to raise 
suspicion and create distrust. 
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 In many instances, the financial figures reported on the annual LASDAP summary reports compiled 
by the MoLG did not correspond to the figures found in other documents from the council. In other 
instances, two or more documents from the council with financial records on the same project(s) would 
have different expenditure amounts recorded. 
190
 I believe the officers drafted this statement in response to the knowledge that I had been in 
communication with some individuals who were viewed as antagonists of the council. Those 
individuals constantly demand that the council come clean with their record of expenditures and revert 
from corrupt financial practices. Thus my signing the document in exchange for the data was to ensure I 
would not share the data with these individuals. Since it took a few days to procure the documents, it is 
unclear whether the documents were newly typed up and printed just for me or whether they were from 
existing records. Either way, the records are very inaccurate. They state financial figures that do not 
match other records; attribute projects to LASDAP that can be found on the Constituency Development 
Fund (CDF) list of projects (which is another devolved fund); and list a project as completed while also 
stating it was "readvertised;" neither did it include the name of the contractor. The amount listed in 
expenditures for FY 2006/2007 is twice that found on other documents. Similarly, 14 contracts were 
noted as "awarded" for FY 2007/2008. However, I had been told by credible sources within the local 
government budget office that all project funds were diverted to operating costs to help pay for the 
welfare of those displaced to campgrounds as a result of the ethnic violence following the disputed 
December 2007 Presidential elections. 
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Physical Impact 
Tables 4.2 through 4.5 show the list of prioritized versus implemented projects 
between FY 2004/2005 and FY 2007/2008. . While this section on physical impact is 
meant to reveal the types of projects that were prioritized by each of the 15 wards 
within the council's boundaries each year, it was logical to also include the amount of 
money that was allocated to each project. As such, each table lists each year's projects, 
the amount budgeted for their implementation, and the amount actually spent.  
For FY 2004/2005, the prioritized projects included the construction of street 
lights and storm water drains, an orphanage primary school, a social hall, as well as 
sanitation improvement projects and school expansions. Table 4.2 shows that while 
ten community-identified projects were slated for implementation, only one project—a  
Table 4.2: Projects Prioritized and Implemented by the MCN for FY 2004/2005 
COMMUNITY-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Budgeted 
(Ksh)
Spent   
(Ksh)
Street Lights @ Biashara, Menengai ward 3,100,000
Storm water drain @ Rhonda, Shabab, Kaptembwo, Viwanda, 
Langalanda, Bondeni wards 6,300,000 6,200,000
Sanitation Blocks @ Lakeview (Flamingo estate) 1,100,000
Improved sanitation for Kaloleni B estate @ Kivumbini ward 1,000,000
Procure Land for market place @ Lanet/Free Area 1,000,000
Graveling of Mumias Rd @ Shauri Yako ward 750,000
Electric Meter separation @ Shauri Yako ward 250,000
Expand Schools at Mogoon & Ingobor Primary, Baruti West ward 1,000,000
Construct of Orphanage Primary School @ Baruti East ward 1,100,000
Construct Social Hall @ Hospital ward 1,400,000
COUNCIL-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Slabbing of drains in CBD 500,000
Procure Vehicle (lorry purchased) 2,500,000 655,172
Procure computer 200,000
Repair parking area @ Old Town Hall* 220,911
Equipping Ward Offices 1,085,520
Market Construction 512,904
TOTAL 20,420,911 8,453,596
 
* Project appears to have been carried out but paid for with donor money 
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set of storm water drains for 6 of the 15 wards—was actually implemented. 
Besides investment in storm sewers, the council's other capital expenditures 
were to pay for council-identified projects, including the purchase of a vehicle and 
furnishing of new ward offices. These ward offices, one of which was meant to be 
located in each ward, were meant to serve as a place where residents could go to 
discuss community issues with their ward Councilor (representative). However, only 
one of the 15 offices was officially established (more on this while discussing 
LASDAP's socioeconomic impact in the next section). 
Of the 20 million Ksh that had been budgeted, 8.5 million Ksh was spent, and 
1.5 million Ksh of those expenditures were on projects that had not been originally 
budgeted for. However, on the annual LATF expenditure report that was sent to and 
published by the central government, a total of 23.2 million Ksh in LASDAP 
expenditures is reported. A detailed expenditure analysis reveals that the reported 23.2 
million Ksh includes expenditures for the LASDAP, Roads Maintenance Levy Fund 
(RMLF), and another capital project funded through a grant.  
The projects planned for FY 2005/2006 are shown in Table 4.3. Many of them 
are projects which had been prioritized for FY 2004/2005 but had not been 
implemented (shown in italics).
191
 While the council sought to redeem itself from its 
failure to implement most of the projects from the previous LASDAP cycle, in the end 
it only made relations worse because once again, the implementation of community-
identified projects was minimal, further increasing people's distrust and animosity 
towards the council. In repeating allocations to these projects, the Council also 
neglected to recognize any of the newly identified projects for FY 2005/2006, 
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 The decision to repeat allocations to incomplete projects from the year before came about as a 
response to complaints from some young adults that old projects should be completed before new ones 
are embarked upon. Although these youths were eventually thrown out of the meeting on the context 
that they were not "genuine representatives" of their wards, none of the newly prioritized projects for 
FY 2005/2006 were listed in that year's LASDAP report or allocated funding. 
 107 
although community consultation meetings were conducted and projects prioritized 
since no money was allocated to them. Only two of the ten relisted projects—street 
lights for two of the wards and the graveling of a roadway—were completed. More 
money was also spent on the storm water drain project that had been started the year 
before. 
Table 4.3: Projects Prioritized and Implemented by the MCN for FY 2005/2006 
COMMUNITY-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Budgeted 
(Ksh)
Spent   
(Ksh)
Street Lights @ Biashara, Menengai 2,000,000 2,021,352
Storm water drain @ Rhoda, Shabab, Kaptembwo, Viwanda, 
Langalanda,  and Bondeni wards 7,900,000 6,547,268
Sanitation Blocks @ Lakeview (Flamingo Estates) 1,000,000
Improved sanitation for Kaloleni B estate @ Kivumbini 1,000,000
Procure Land for market place @ Lanet/Free Area 1,500,000
Graveling of Mumias Rd @ Shauri Yako 750,000 553,946
Expand Schools at Mogoon & Ingobor Primary @ Baruti West 1,500,000
Construct School for orphanage primary school @ Baruti East 2,000,000
Construct Social Hall @ Hospital ward 1,600,000
Informal Sector Centre @ Hospital ward 3,000,000
COUNCIL-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Rehabilitation of drains @ Biashara wholesale market 2,000,000
Box Culvert at Barut ward & Mombasa/Flamingo Rd 2,598,834
Public toilets @ Viwanda 200,000
Maternity Theatre @ Bondeni ward 276,109
Stone fencing of LangaLanga Clinic 349,100
Mayor's Office 77,520
Construction of parking shed at Town Hall 313,757
Cash office safe 719,200
Purchase of Council furniture 1,286,588
Purchase of computers & networking 1,866,813
Valuation roll (reconciling land parcels) 5,000,000
Council assets valuation 850,000
TOTAL 25,536,588 21,373,899  
Whereas funds were also allocated to two council-identified projects in the 
original budget, neither of these projects was completed. Rather, more than half of the 
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expenditures went towards ten other council-identified projects that were not initially 
in the budget. Thus like the year before, the majority of community-identified 
projects—which in this case had had been prioritized and reprioritized—were not 
completed. The fencing of a local clinic, the construction of a parking shed at the 
Town Hall, the purchase of ICT facilities, and the commissioning of consultants to 
reconcile land parcels within the council are all among the projects that were executed 
without having been initially allocated. 
The total LASDAP capital expenditure for FY 2005/2006 was 21.4 million 
Ksh. However, 30.8 million Ksh was listed as being spent in the LATF annual report. 
Once again, detailed analyses indicated that the difference—9.4 million Ksh—were 
actually expenditures made under the RMLF. Since the 9.4 million Ksh came from 
RMLF funds, those expenditures should not have been added to the total LASDAP 
expenditures. 
For FY 2006/2007, expenditures were recorded on six of the twelve 
community-identified projects, as summarized in Table 4.4. However, on at least half 
of those projects, project expenditures were equal to much less than the amount 
budgeted, indicating that either the costs were greatly overestimated or that the scale 
of implementation was smaller than initially planned.  
Conversations with local residents indicate that the answer lies towards the 
latter, as they narrated stories revealing that several projects were only initiated in the 
weeks leading up to the December presidential and local elections, with incumbent 
Councilors promising a wider scale of implementation if they were reelected.
192
 This 
was particularly the case for several street lighting projects. When consulted, the 
Council maintained it spent the amount that was available for spending at the time.  
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 Ward Councilors are elected locally every five years during the presidential elections. 
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Table 4.4: Projects Prioritized and Implemented by the MCN for FY 2006/2007 
COMMUNITY-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Budgeted 
(Ksh)
Spent   
(Ksh)
Street Light @ Nakuru East , Langalanga, Lake View, Shabab 5,900,000 1,725,205
Construction of Maternity Hospital @ Nakuru East (Lanet ward) 1,000,000 2,817,758
Repair of Council estate roofs @ Shauri Yako 1,000,000
Repair of Sanitation Blocks @Kivumbini 1,200,000 234,215
Construction of Lumumba Sanitation blocks @ Bondeni 1,600,000
Gravelling Muhoro Rd @ Menengai 2,400,000 556,800
Construction of Business Mall @ Biashara 1,500,000
Procure Land for dormitory at Moi Primary @ Hospital 1,600,000
Construct Storm Water drain @ Viwanda 2,000,000
Construct multi-story classes at Heshima Primary @ Rhonda 1,600,000
Procure Land @ Mbaruk for open-air market (Kaptembwa ward) 1,800,000 1,740,000
Construction of classroom @ Barut West & Barut East (Mogoon & 
Ingobor respectively) 2,400,000 577,164
Sanitation improvement at Flamingo Estate @ Lake View* 218,107
COUNCIL-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Maternity Extension @ Bondeni ward 1,500,000 254,558
Construction of shade @ Wakulima Market (Biashara ward) 2,417,941
Storm water drainage @ Baringo Rd, Watende Rd, Kaptembwa, 
Kariba Rd* 4,119,078
Culvert - Wareng Rd (Biashara ward) 132,790
Gravelling of Mumias Rd (Shauri Yako ward) 498,528
Purchase of computer software 1,000,000
Purchase of Revenue Vehicle(s) 2,500,000 6,732,800
Purchase of computer 882,800
Roofing of Enforcement/Bylaws offices (Old Town Hall) 135,416
TOTAL 29,000,000 23,043,160
 
* Prioritized by the community but was not originally allocated money in the budget 
Community-identified projects implemented during this period include the 
purchase of land for the construction of a maternity ward, the repair of sanitation 
facilities, the graveling of a roadway, the purchase of land for a market, and the 
addition of a classroom at an existing school. Several other projects identified by the 
council were also implemented, including the construction of shades to protect against 
the elements at a wholesale market, the graveling of another roadway, and the 
purchase of electronics and transport vehicles for the council. As in the years before, a 
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total expenditure of 25.2 million Ksh was listed in the annual LATF report. However, 
only 23 million Ksh should have been attributed to the LASDAP program. The rest 
was spent on RMLF funded projects.  
Some of the projects that were slated for implementation during FY 2007/2008 
include the continued construction of a clinic in one of the outlying wards, the 
construction of additional classrooms at two existing schools, the construction of 
additional water systems at two of the outlying wards, the construction of storm water 
drains, the purchase of a vehicle(s) for the council's use, and the reroofing of the 
council's offices. The full listing is shown in Table 4.5.  
Table 4.5: Projects Prioritized and Implemented by the MCN for FY 2007/2008 
COMMUNITY-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Budgeted 
(Ksh)
Spent   
(Ksh)
Lanet maternity @ Nakuru East 2,500,000
Dispensary @ Menengai 4,500,000
Sanitation improvement @ Kivumbini 2,000,000
Const.classroom @ Langalanga 1,500,000
Const.classroom @ Lake View 2,000,000
Modern streetlights @ Bondeni 3,000,000
Repair of sewer system  aged w.pipes @ Shauri Yako 1,500,000
Provision of  water @ Barut West 2,000,000
Provision of  water @ Barut East 2,000,000
Additional money for market fencing & office @ Kaptembwa 2,500,000
Storm water drain @ Rhonda 2,000,000
Drainage & m.sungura rd. @ Viwanda 3,000,000
Provision of  w.serv-lines @ Hospital 2,000,000
Storm water drain @ Shabab 2,000,000
Hawkers complex @ Biashara 5,000,000
COUNCIL-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Roads maintenance (counter-part funding RMLF) 2,000,000
Computer hard software (IFMS) 1,000,000
Afraha Stadium rehabilitation 500,000
Purchase of Council vehicles 1,000,000
Roof new & old Town Hall 8,000,000
TOTAL 50,000,000 0  
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Fifty million Ksh had been allocated towards 20 projects, five of which had 
been identified by the council. However, as of August 2008, none of the prioritized 
projects had been implemented. Since the fiscal year runs from July to June, FY 
2007/2008 projects should have been completed or been close to completion by 
August. When questioned, the council stated that all the funds had been spent to look 
after the welfare of residents displaced to two campgrounds in Nakuru following 
clashes between different ethnic groups in the wake of the disputed 2007 Presidential 
elections. However, when the 2007/2008 Annual LATF Report was released around 
October of 2008, it stated that the Municipal Council of Nakuru had invested over Ksh 
90 million in capital expenditures for FY 2007/2008. This statement was in complete 
contrast to both my findings and what I had been told by various council staff.  
A review of the individual line items indicated that several of the projects were 
not among those listed as priorities.
193
 Moreover, several of the projects that were 
listed as having been implemented during FY 2007/2008 were projects that had been 
implemented in previous years. They include updating the valuation roll; graveling of 
Muhoro road; street lighting projects in Menengai, Biashara, Lakeview, and 
Langalanga wards; and a sanitation improvement project in Kivumbini ward. Site 
visits to the latter two project locations did not reveal any additional work had been 
done since the months leading into the December 2007 elections, when many 
Councilors finally implemented LASDAP projects that had been slated for 
implementation during FY 2006/2007 while promising to do more if reelected. While 
several of these projects, including the road graveling, street lighting, and sanitation 
improvement project were implemented the year before using only a portion of the 
original allocation (see Table 4.4) and the latter was even relisted among the projects 
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 2007/2008 LATF Annual Report, p.251  
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for FY 2007/2008, interviews with neighboring residents and council staff had not 
revealed that any of these projects were implemented for FY 2007/2008. The 
statement also indicated that additional classrooms were constructed at four primary 
schools. However records indicate additional classrooms were constructed at two of 
the schools—Mogoon and Ingobor Primary School—as part of the implemented 
projects for FY 2006/2007.  
While it is not surprising to see the council relist or further implement a project 
from one year to the next, skepticism about which of these projects, if any, was 
actually implemented stems from the fact that in a status update of LASDAP project 
implementation dated 26
th
 June 2008, the council provided details on 14 projects at a 
cost of just over Ksh 33 million, which had been "awarded" to contractors. Many of 
these projects were the projects that had been prioritized for the fiscal year. The 
project's "awarded" status is in line with the council's statement—that projects were 
not implemented due to a lack of funding. While contractors were awarded contracts 
to do the work, project implementation was stalled due to a lack of funds to actually 
pay for those services. 
One possible but unlikely explanation for the Ksh 90 million stated as capital 
expenditures in the 2007/2008 Annual LATF Report is that although the Report 
should only state capital expenditures that are made using LATF money, both 
localities in this study (the Municipal Council of Nakuru and Gusii County Council) 
routinely added expenditures made under the RMLF program to the total expenditure 
amount. However, while some of the itemized projects are related to road maintenance 
and could have been initiated under that program, the council only received a total of 
Ksh 64 million from the RMLF program for FY 2007/2008. Furthermore, the 
implementation of "100 culverts" in Barut West ward seems unlikely, given the 
council's past implementation culture and achievements. Politically, nothing also 
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seems to happen that fast.
194
 Beyond these explanations, it is difficult to draw any 
other conclusions without conducting a financial audit.  
Summarizing the Project Prioritization and Implementation Record 
Table 4.6 provides a summary of the project planning and implementation 
record between FY 2004/2005 and FY 2007/2008. It indicates the number of projects 
that were planned versus those that were completed each year. The completed projects 
are divided between those that were originally allocated money (listed under "no. of 
completed projects") and those that were added after the budget had been finalized and 
agreed upon with the community following the consensus meeting (listed under 
"projects completed but not budgeted").  
Table 4.6: Percentage of Prioritized Projects Completed,  
FY 2004/2005 - FY 2007/2008) 
Year # (Ksh) # (million Ksh) # (million Ksh)
2004/2005 Community-identified 10 17,000,000 1 6,200,000 0 0
Council-identified 4 3,400,000 2 655,000 2 1,598,000
TOTAL 14 20,400,000 3 * 6,855,000 2 1,598,000 21%
2005/2006 Community-identified 10 22,250,000 3 9,123,000 0 0
Council-identified 2 3,287,000 0 0 10 12,251,000
TOTAL 12 25,537,000 3 9,123,000 10 12,251,000 25%
2006/2007 Community-identified 12 24,000,000 6 7,651,000 1 218,000
Council-identified 3 5,000,000 2 6,987,000 6 8,187,000
TOTAL 15 29,000,000 8 14,638,000 7 8,405,000 53%
2007/2008 Community-identified 15 37,500,000 0 0 0 0
Council-identified 5 12,500,000 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 20 50,000,000 0 0 0 0 0%
TOTAL 61 124,937,000 14 30,616,000 19 22,254,000
Average Rate of Completion over 4 Years = 25%
No. of Completed 
Projects
No. of Planned 
Projects 
Projects Completed 
but not Bugeted
Completion 
Rate of 
Planned 
Projects
 
Expenditures rounded to nearest thousand 
* One project was completed using donor funds and thus not reflected in cost summaries. 
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 Since the 2007/2008 Annual LATF Report was released following my departure from Kenya in 
2008, I was unable to conduct a more thorough analysis or schedule site visits to verify the 
implementation of the stated projects. This would have been beneficial since the listing of projects is in 
stark contrast to what I observed and was told. Unfortunately, I have not had the privilege of returning 
to Kenya since that time. Of the Ksh 90 million, Ksh 42 million was listed under "other projects." It is 
unclear whether this summation was done by the central government during the compilation of the 
Annual Report or whether it was reported as such by the Council. Of importance here is that the total 
expenditure amount is misleading. None of the possible explanations add up.  
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In particular, the table showcases the percentage of prioritized (planned) 
projects that were completed each year. These rates were computed using the ratio of 
the total number of projects that were planned to those that were completed. The 
calculations exclude projects that were completed but not originally in the budget 
since these were not reflected on the list of projects agreed upon between the Council 
and its residents. For the four year period, the municipality averaged a 25 percent 
completion rate. 
For FY 2004/2005, a total of 14 projects were slated for implementation, at the 
cost of 20.4 million Ksh. However, only three of those projects were completed. Two 
additional projects which were not originally budgeted for were also completed (listed 
under "projects implemented but not budgeted"). This equates to a completion rate of 
21 percent. For FY 2005/2006, 10 projects were prioritized by the community, while 
two projects were identified by the Council for a total of 12 planned projects. Only 
three of those ten community-identified projects were completed. However, the 
council implemented a total of ten other projects which had not been originally 
allocated money (and different from the two it had originally identified as needs); six 
of which were to improve the Town Hall's physical appearance and operations. 
Overall, the council managed a 25 percent completion rate for the year.  
For FY 2006/2007, the Council implemented a total of eight planned projects. 
Fifteen projects had been planned for implementation. This equates to a 53 percent 
implementation rate, the highest completion rate achieved by the Council during the 
four years under review. However, even though the number of implemented projects 
increased, the council spent about the same amount of money on community-
identified projects as it had during the previous two years (7.7 million Ksh in 
2006/2007, 9.1 million Ksh in 2005/2006, and 6.2 million Ksh in 2004/2005). On the 
other hand, more money was spent on council-identified projects. Those expenditures 
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also rose significantly—from 2.3 million Ksh to 12.3 million Ksh to 15.4 million Ksh 
in 2004/2005, 2005/2006, and 2006/2007 respectively. None of the prioritized projects 
was implemented during FY 2007/2008, resulting in a zero percent implementation 
rate for that year. 
In total, 14 out of 61 planned projects were implemented during this period. 
Another 19 unplanned projects—all but one of which were identified as needs by the 
council and which mostly served the needs of the council—were also completed. Less 
than half (42 percent) of the money that had been originally set aside for project 
implementation was spent (a combined total of 52,870,000 Ksh out of 124,937,000 
Ksh). However, less than 20 percent of the expenditures were spent on projects that 
had been prioritized by the communities themselves (22,974,000 Ksh out of 
124,937,000 Ksh). 
Summarizing the Type and Expenditures on Implemented Projects 
Table 4.7 summarizes the number and type of projects that were implemented 
by the MCN between FY 2004/2005 and FY 2007/2008. In total, 32 LASDAP funded 
projects were implemented.
195
 These include eight road projects (accounting for 40 
percent of the funds), three market projects (9 percent of the funds), four healthcare 
and two safety improvement projects (each accounting for 7 percent of the funds), as 
well as three sanitation improvement and one education project (each accounting for 1 
percent of the funds). Eleven projects, including the purchase of vehicles and 
computers, and the renovation of council property were also completed. These projects 
were lumped together and tallied separately to distinguish them from those identified 
by the community. These eleven council-identified projects accounted for 35 percent 
of the funds.  
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 This number differs from the total of 33 (14 planned and 19 unplanned projects) listed in Table 4.6 
because one of the projects prioritized by the community was funded using donor grants, and those not 
counted as having been implemented using LASDAP funds.  
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Table 4.7: Type of Implemented Projects, FY 2004/2005 - FY 2007/2008 
Itemized Expenditures Ksh US Dollars (%)
Roads* (8 projects) 21,207,244 305,384 40%
Council projects (11 projects) 18,318,998 263,794 35%
Markets (3 projects) 4,670,845 67,260 9%
Improved Safety (2 projects) 3,746,557 53,950 7%
Healthcare (4 projects) 3,697,525 53,244 7%
Improved Sanitation (3 projects) 652,322 9,393 1%
Education (1 project) 577,164 8,311 1%
Total 52,870,655 761,337 100%
Total LATF Allocations during Period 471,393,526 6,788,067
% Spent on Capital Investments  11%  
* including storm water drains 
In converting Kenyan Schillings to US Dollars, I used the same conversion rate (1 USD = Ksh 
69.4) for each year to simplify the calculations 
Overall, only 11 percent of the LATF allocations during the four years under 
review were actually spent to implement projects (total expenditure on projects / total 
LATF funds). The other 89 percent of 'unspent' LATF funds were said to have been 
used to meet administrative and operating costs (i.e. added to the performance 
component of the LATF).  
Although Ministry guideline states that 40 but no more than 60 percent of the 
LATF grant may be used to meet the administrative and debt repayment targets of the 
councils, councils that violate this guideline are not subject to any repercussions. Thus, 
although the MCN consistently underinvested in capital infrastructure as envisioned in 
the program's structure, they have not been subject to any repercussions. However, the 
Kenya Local Government Reform Program (KLGRP), which oversees the program, 
plans to institute financial incentives for councils that are doing well and is 
considering ways of auditing councils' LATF financial statements. The KLGRP 
admits that current monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are occurring in non-
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substantive ways.
196
 
Before moving on to the next section, Table 4.8 displays the Council's revenue 
and expenditure patterns between FY 2004/2005 and FY 2007/2008. It lists the 
amount received in central government (CG) transfers as well as the total of the 
council's own revenue. Also itemized are expenditures on personnel and operations, 
maintenance, capital investments, and loan and debt repayments.  
Table 4.8: Summary of the Council's Budget, FY 2004/2005 - FY 2007/2008 
FY 2004/2005 FY 2005/2006 FY 2006/2007 FY 2007/2008
CG Transfers* 110,295,061 109,546,209 155,648,915 224,652,752
% of Total Revenue 32% 30% 33% 39%
Council's Own Revenue 231,258,429 260,847,402 315,263,507 350,178,173
Total Revenue 341,553,490 370,393,611 470,912,422 574,830,925
Personnel & Operations 203,526,693 252,521,466 362,492,570 383,132,334
% of Own Revenue 88% 97% 115% 109%
% of Total Revenue 60% 68% 77% 67%
Maintenance 42,538,865 28,804,328 16,360,393 41,351,009
% of Total Revenue 12% 8% 3% 7%
Total Recurrent Expenditure 246,065,558 281,325,794 378,852,963 424,483,343
% of Total Revenue 72% 76% 80% 74%
Capital Investments** 23,203,679 30,801,682 25,176,814 90,040,357
(LASDAP expenditures) (8,453,596) (21,373,899) (23,043,160) (0)
Capital Investments as 
% of CG Transfers 21% 28% 16% 40%
Capital Investments as 
% of Total Revenue 7% 8% 5% 16%
Loan & Debt Repayments 0 64,000,286 78,029,459 81,070,033
Ending Balance 72,284,253 -5,734,151 -11,146,814 -20,762,808
Kenyan Schillings (Ksh)
 
Source: Government of Kenya LATF Annual Reports 
* "Central government (CG) Transfers" includes the LATF and Roads Maintenance Levy Fund 
(RMLF), a second grant received by the local government. 
** Total capital expenditure as reported in the annual LATF Reports. Actual LASDAP expenditures are 
less, as reported in Table 4.1. 
The computations reveal that while central government transfers accounted for 
approximately one-third of total revenue, only a small proportion of it was actually 
spent on capital investments, as shown by the proportion of capital investments as a 
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 Personal conversation with KLGRP staff, May 2008. 
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percentage of central government transfers (% of CG transfers). Those proportions 
range between 16 and 28 percent during the first three years under review.
197
 The table 
also reveals that a large proportion of the council's own revenue (collected from fees 
and taxes) is spent on personnel and operations. During FY 2006/2007 and FY 
2007/2008, the council spent more than the revenue it collected on personnel and 
operations alone, 115 and 109 percent respectively. The council also recorded year-
ending deficits during three of the four years. While not cited here as an excuse, the 
council's account of revenue and expenditures does help put the low capital 
expenditures in context. The government transfers appear to be merely funding the 
operation of the local government and are not being used to invest in local 
development. 
Socioeconomic Impact 
In a survey of 36 purposefully selected respondents,
198
 86 percent responded 
that community projects that had been partially or wholly implemented had an overall 
positive impact on the community. Some of the socioeconomic benefits of those 
projects include the following: the first is an increase in personal safety after dusk, due 
to the installation of street lights in some neighborhoods. The issue of security is of 
great concern for many people, as several people recounted having been mugged at 
night by thieves and street children who take advantage of the dark roadways and 
alleys at night. In the middle and low income areas, a high number of people commute 
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 An explanation disputing the reported Ksh 90 million expenditure on capital investments for FY 
2007/2008 was discussed earlier. 
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 Purposeful sampling is used in instances where the sought after information cannot be obtained as 
well from other sources unless interviews are conducted with particular people, or conducted in 
particular settings (Maxwell 2005). In this case, I interviewed persons living in the vicinity of particular 
projects, who may or may not be direct beneficiaries of the respective project. I also interviewed people 
in the town's main market, as well as a few community leaders. These 36 interviews did not include 
interviews I also conducted with Council staff and Councilors. The use of purposeful sampling here 
should not be confused for convenience sampling, which is a type of nonprobability sampling that does 
not allow for each member of the sample population to have a nonzero probability of being chosen. 
Rather, the sample is chosen based on convenience—of accessibility, cost or otherwise. 
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by foot and boda bodas (bicycle taxis) in the evenings, especially in areas not serviced 
by four-wheel public transportation. Others mentioned the sense of pride they had by 
now living in a place with street lights, while another mentioned that the lights had 
beautified their area of abode. A second benefit was that some men had the 
opportunity to be employed as community workers during the construction or 
rehabilitation phase of some projects. A third benefit was the improved sanitation 
conditions for a handful of households at one of the public housing estates where 
shared outdoor pit latrines and bath stalls are the norm. Here, four individually housed 
combination flush toilets and showers were constructed next to a handful of rental 
units. Two to four of the households closest to each facility were then given access to 
the new facility. Those households were also responsible for maintenance. Those 
select groups of households were now afforded access to an improved sanitation 
system with far fewer users per facility than the old system. They also mentioned a 
health benefit, in that this new facility reduced their risk of catching cholera—
outbreaks of which had killed several people in the past. They also mentioned an 
improvement in the odor around their homes due to better maintenance. A fifth 
socioeconomic gain originates from those whose market spaces are located under large 
protective canopies that were erected at the city's main wholesale market. This very 
large and boisterous market is one of the region's centers for agricultural trade and 
services. As such it is a very crowded and busy place. In 2007, two canopies were 
erected to help shelter vendors from the heat of the sun and pouring rains. However, 
the area the canopies covered were very small in comparison to the size of the market. 
Thus, many vendors were left unprotected. Those under the canopies appreciate the 
shelter, while some non-beneficiaries pointed out that those under the canopies also 
reap economic gains because their produce stays fresher longer and they are able to 
continue conducting business even when it rains. Such economic gains, as well as the 
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opportunity for street vendors and bicycle taxis to extend their business hours in areas 
with new street lights were also reported. While these gains are relatively minor when 
viewed on a much broader scale, many of the poor still welcome it. As one resident 
noted, the "rich don't see [the] benefit, they don‘t struggle to get [such security]." 
A small proportion of survey respondents (6 percent) concluded that some 
projects had no impact at all, typically because they felt that the scale at which 
projects had been implemented was too small and thus only benefited a minute 
number of people, or that projects could only be of benefit if they were fully 
implemented.  
These sentiments can be illustrated by several narratives about projects that 
have been implemented thus far, where the need far outweighs the provision. Even as 
people praised what had been done, several also voiced the concern that much more 
was needed to ensure better livelihoods. Many more street lights are needed, many 
people are seeking the means of earning a legitimate living, and even more are in need 
of access to decent sanitation, potable water, shelter, and healthcare. Others stressed 
that since the projects were built with money that they had paid through taxes, in 
reality, they were being shortchanged because their rate of return was very small, 
reflected through the small scale of implementation. 
A few stories come to mind to illustrate these points. The first is of a sanitation 
improvement project that consisted of building a new underground septic tank in one 
of the public housing estates. The latrines in the estate are old and thus prone to 
frequent blockage, resulting in the leakage of sewage around the estate. Whenever a 
blockage occurs, the neighbors whose latrines are blocked typically pool money 
together to pay someone to clear the blockage. The construction of a new septic tank 
was conceived to help alleviate these problems and reduce the financial burden on 
these households. Prior to my arrival in spring of 2008, the septic tank had been dug 
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and cemented, but work had halted on the project. Records indicate the project had 
been paid for since the 2006/2007 fiscal year. A few days after I visited the site and 
began to conduct interviews with residents, a construction worker was back on the job. 
Residents state that prior to my inquiries, the project had been at a standstill for quite 
some time, despite their urging of the ward's Councilor to oversee its completion. To 
the best of my knowledge, the project was still not completed before my departure. 
While the scale of this project was relatively small to begin with, its impact was 
further diminished by it not being completed.  
Another incomplete project is the Bondeni Maternity Hospital; as one official 
referred to it, "the white elephant project." After much fanfare and publicity in 2005, 
the municipality signed a memorandum of understanding with a Bishop from the 
United States who was committing to a partnership with the council that would 
transform a dilapidated maternity hospital (run by the municipal council) into "an 
ultra-modern facility…which would be the biggest in the Province if not the 
country."
199
 By 2008 however, the partnership had faltered and upgrades to the 
hospital were minimal. One small operating room had been constructed, but lacked the 
proper amenities to make it functional. Other amenities such as a commercial grade 
washer also sat idle, as there was insufficient electricity and water to operate it. 
Computer and other equipment supposedly lay locked up in a room on the hospital 
grounds. Donor funding has been pulled from the project due to disagreements on 
each partner's role. The council allocated funds to the project in FY 2006/2007, 
although upon inspection, it is difficult to quantify the work that was done with those 
funds. Upgrades have been occurring at a very slow pace. The hospital and its adjacent 
clinic currently remain open, albeit with minimal resources and staff. 
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Whether it's with LASDAP or external donor funds, many of the projects 
slated for implementation have fallen short of having the type of impact they could 
have had, either because they were not fully implemented to encompass all areas of 
need or because they were not implemented at all. Granted the need far outweighs the 
available financial resources to cover all areas of need, for most of the projects, if the 
full amount of the originally allocated funds had been constructively spent, the 
socioeconomic impact of projects would have been undoubtedly much greater over 
those four years.  
Political Impact  
The establishment of the LASDAP program in 1998 followed a period when 
the international community had lost a lot of interest and faith in Kenya. By the mid-
1990s, the end of the Cold War had eliminated geopolitical motivations for large 
inflows of aid packages.
200
 Kenya's economic performance had deteriorated, and 
economic reform efforts initiated through Structural Adjustment Program (SAPs) 
during the 1980s had weakened, resulting in a fragile relationship between Kenya and 
the donor community that was characterized by on-again-off-again loan and aid 
awards. The country was also experiencing a hardening of political lines even as a 
decade of de jure one-party rule came to an end. Created in part as an answer to these 
ongoing social, economic, and political issues, the LASDAP program was structured 
to embrace the global influence and imposition of a good-governance and 
democratization agenda which strove for both social and political change. As such, 
political transformation through the LASDAP program in terms of greater 
accountability, transparency, equity in resource distribution and decision-making 
opportunities, as well as inclusiveness in all areas of local governance was a major 
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goal for both the international and domestic populations. However, in Nakuru, 
improvements along these lines have been less than stellar. Rather, the evidence 
indicates that the norm continues to hold, and that the program has not had a 
significant positive political impact on the general public. As one resident stated, "it‘s 
a push system, not a pull. It's what's pushed to you. [there is] no system to question."  
The main reason for the program's poor level of political impact is that many 
of the Councilors (local politicians) have usurped their ability to control the planning 
and implementation phases to direct the decisions made at key junctures.
201
 These 
decisions often reflect their personal interests and incentives, to the exclusion of their 
constituents' stated priorities. Efforts were made in the participatory planning 
guidelines to discourage such occurrences but it still occurs, and in most cases without 
any retributions.  
One example of how such disempowerment of community voice occurs within 
a process set up to be participatory is the case of the Councilor who reportedly 
handpicked five people to attend a ward meeting where projects for FY 2006/2007 
were decided. While an announcement of the meeting time and location had been 
posted in the newspaper two week before, it is noteworthy that it was the only meeting 
to be held at the Town Hall, a non-neutral site; all others were held in neighborhood 
locations. Three of the five were staff at a local primary school. The other two were 
from a local NGO. Interviews with one of the invitees revealed that the Councilor had 
predetermined that the ward priority for that year would be the building of boarding 
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 As discussed earlier, each ward holds its own prioritization meeting, and the final allocation of 
funding to each project is voted upon by the local government, which the Councilors are a part of. Thus 
the Councilor representing each ward is able to direct the final course of action in each ward. 
Furthermore, each Councilor is typically left to ensure that his or her ward's project is implemented 
once the main work contracts are awarded by the council. The hiring of sub-contractors is also often left 
to the Councilor, in addition to the development of a system for monitoring and evaluating the 
outcomes. One exception to this method of implementing projects is that for road related projects such 
as the graveling of roads or the construction of storm water drains, the council Engineer is typically 
more involved and often takes the lead. 
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facilities at the said primary school. Thus, the headmaster and two school committee 
members were encouraged by a council education officer to attend the meeting in 
support of the project. Reportedly, the Councilor's interest in building the classrooms 
was because he also a contractor, specializing in construction and road rehabilitation. 
Not surprisingly, the construction of boarding facilities was listed as one of the two 
ward priorities for that year. During the consensus meeting, which was also attended 
by a representative of the primary school, the Councilor further suggested that the 
funding allocated for the completion of projects in his ward over the previous two 
years be diverted to pay for the asphalting of a thoroughfare that runs through his 
ward. In the end however, it was decided that instead of the dormitory facilities, the 
ward's top priority would be listed as the purchase of land for the construction of a 
market—the same project that had been prioritized but unimplemented the year 
before. At least one record indicates LASDAP funds were eventually used to resurface 
the road, although the expenditure does not appear on the official records. Subsequent 
minutes confirm the resurfacing was done, stating residents' displeasure at not having 
been involved in the decision to resurface the road. A visit to the site indicated it was 
recently resurfaced, but very poorly, as potholes were already forming. As one 
observer put it, the road was "degraded." 
In another instance, a former councilor admitted during an interview that he 
used his influence as a member of the council to install street lights and gravel a 
roadway, projects which he thought were important. Although the street lights only 
cover 10 percent of his ward, he is proud he "pushed for program" so that people can 
now walk freely in those newly lighted areas and that those households no longer have 
to pool money to pay for security guards. In addition to the lights, he also pushed for 
graveling of a roadway that  
"…can be completely impassable; used to leave car 3km away…Will 
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fight this time. Wanted to get money from French organization because 
[their] money can be used for roads serving refuse collection. Wanted 
to do 3km...Now since [voted] out of the council, don't know fate of 
project. New Councilor is young and might not be as influential…you 
save car repairs; people come to work early and with ease.  
"People are ignorant. Unless you as a Councilor talk to them about 
coming [they don‘t attend meetings]. But people are the ones who 
know what they want most. If left to council, [money] might only be 
used for areas where [the council] might get revenue. Happened before. 
Residents don‘t know LASDAP, they don‘t come to meetings. Only 3 
to 5 people per ward come…if people don‘t come influence of 
Councilor will matter most. Almost impossible for Councilor to attend 
as [an ordinary] individual…but not hard for me to go as individual 
because I called my people [to come] freely. We argued and 
debated…in most cases agreement reached by voting…projects usually 
have political impact otherwise slow…[now] important to attend 
consultation meetings because current Councilor may pass project not 
relevant to people…expect call for next meeting anytime…  
"As Councilor, you give people idea because you are their leader; you 
don‘t wait for their ideas…then they prioritize them. If they want 
others, they still bring them too; don‘t have to follow your ideas. As 
Councilor, [it is your] duty to supervise work, report to Engineer, 
because they might not be done well. Councilor must [also] be part of 
group inspecting." 
Meanwhile the residents of this ward had specifically stated as a priority, a 
need for the council to move ahead on longstanding plans to resolve issues concerning 
the installation of a water tank that would distribute water to the entire ward.
202
 
Most prominently, some Councilors have used the program as a means of 
coercing the public for election votes. They are said to start community projects before 
the elections and then promise to continue with the implementation once they are 
reelected.
203
 This assertion by residents is corroborated by the fact that the rate of 
implementation was highest during the months leading up to the December 2007 
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(ethnic) lines, without much reference to what the politician can be held accountable for. This tactic did 
not work too well for incumbents during the last election however, when almost all lost their seats.  
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general elections, as shown in Table 4.6. One example of a project that would seem to 
fit this profile is the combined flush toilet and shower project mentioned earlier. 
Funding for the project had been approved since FY 2004/2005. However, it was 
never completed that year, nor was it completed the following year. During FY 
2006/2007, after relisting the project for implementation for a third time, less than 
one-fifth of the money that had been allocated to the project that year was finally spent 
to essentially build a prototype of the project and there has since been no follow-up.
204
 
In my survey of residents to assess the impact of the program in Nakuru, 78 
percent of respondents did not think that the establishment of a participatory 
development program had changed the way they interacted with their Councilor or the 
local government in general. Viewpoints include the belief that no matter how the 
program is structured, Councilors have the power to change people's decisions, either 
through bribes or their elevated stature within the community. Complaints are not 
responded to, further alienating people from the decision-making process, which in 
turn makes it easier for Councilors to push their personal agendas through as ideas 
initiated and backed by the community-at-large. Once the elections are over, 
Councilors are said to 'disappear' from sight. Thus people see Councilors' activities as 
ones to seek political gain, and that once that gain is captured; neither the Councilors 
nor the local government is interested in fashioning a process that allows for systems 
of greater accountability, transparency, equity, or inclusiveness. As one Councilor 
noted, "...hard to complain to the Council because residents cannot come and question 
the officers; it's impossible. Someone else has been employed to do that—the 
Councilor." 
These circumstances have often pitted the citizen monitoring committee 
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 The Councilor who started the project has since passed away. Some respondents decried the fact that 
the new Councilor does not even live in their ward and only won because supporters were bused in to 
increase the vote count.  
 127 
(MonCom) against the local government.
205
 Since the general population is often 
reluctant and often unable to question the local government in terms of demanding 
greater accountability or transparency,
206
 the committee, led by two men, has taken it 
upon itself to raise questions with the local government. However, the approach from 
both sides is often confrontational, without yielding into a meaningful dialogue. 
Typically, the confrontation ends with one side accusing the other of being corrupt in 
its ways while the other responds that inquirers are idlers, who have nothing more 
meaningful to do with their time. 
When such disputes arise or are discussed, the local government is often quick 
to state that the development process and the resulting issues "should not be 
politicized." However, this is precisely the opposite of what several scholars argue 
need to happen in order to tackle the roots of poverty and the provision of basis 
needs.
207
 Hyatt (2001) and others argue that too often, many development programs 
step away from reflection on why and how poverty is being generated in the first place. 
In particular, they argue that the current era of participatory development tends to 
focus on the primacy of the individual rather than taking the more radical approach of 
looking beyond the individual to examine the factors that caused the individual to be 
excluded from the social, political, and economic robustness of the upper-class. In his 
work on the theory of power and participation, Gaventa (1980) also observed that the 
society's powerful figures and organizations knowingly adopt a development rhetoric 
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program outside of the yearly consensus meeting where all the projects to be implemented are 
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 For example, see Hyatt 2001, Cooke and Kothari 2001, and Hickey and Mohan 2004. 
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that focus's development activities on addressing corrective measures; careful to shield 
the overall structure or system that perpetuates the need for "development" in order to 
retain power and wealth among a few. Thus the call from leaders in the local 
government to depoliticize the development process suggests that creating an open 
dialogue which addressed the root of complaints might indeed expose the nature and 
level of inequality in the distribution and utilization of resources at the council. 
Furthermore, those dialogues would make the local government accountable to 
addressing those issues, a task which it might not be prepared or willing to face. 
Consequently, the planning process has not lead to greater accountability, 
transparency, or equity in the management of scarce resources. Accordingly, 75 
percent of respondents to the survey I conducted in Nakuru stated that the LASDAP 
participatory development process has not resulted in greater equity in the sharing of 
resources, while 72 percent stated that the participatory nature of the program has not 
impacted whether or not projects are completed. Seventy-two percent of respondents 
did not believe this participatory process had any impact on how the local council 
made decisions about budget allocations.
208
 When asked if people felt a sense of 
ownership towards completed projects, respondents were almost equally divided in 
their opinions, with 28 percent responding that they did feel a sense of ownership 
while 31 percent reported feeling no sense of ownership.
209
 The split in responses to 
the question is most likely indicative of the diverse nature of respondents; those who 
were and those who weren't direct beneficiaries of projects, since typically, those who 
are not involved in the decision-making process or those who are not beneficiaries of a 
project feel no sense of ownership towards it. At the same time, a communal sense of 
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 The remaining 42 percent of respondents omitted the question because it was not applicable to them 
or they simply did not answer it. 
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ownership is not evident for many projects, as the lack of proper maintenance is 
already apparent. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Case Study II: Gusii County Council 
Site Description 
1. Location Description 
Gusii County Council (GCC) is located in the southwest quadrant of Kenya, 
about 238 km (149 miles) slightly northwest of Nairobi. Lake Victoria is just off to its 
west. GCC is one of the oldest county councils in Kenya, having been established as 
an African District Council in 1945, before independence. Then, it encompassed ten 
districts within Nyanza Province. Today, its current boundary is a mere fraction of 
what it was in those early days; now it only has jurisdiction over parts of one district—
Kisii district.
210
 Within that district, GCC has oversight over the rural areas, as all of 
the major urban centers are governed by three other town councils and one municipal 
council. A schematic representation of the councils in the district is shown in Figure 
5.1. 
The topography of the district is rugged, with steep-sided hills, narrow valleys, 
and red laterized volcanic soils. The district lies between 3900 and 5900 feet (0.7 to 
1.1 miles) above sea level. The high level of annual rainfall in the region makes it an 
evergreen region, suitable for the cultivation of many agricultural products.
211
 The 
council is located among the Western Highlands, an area considered to be the 
agricultural heartland of Kenya due to its fertile soil and constant and reliable rainfall.  
At the turn of the 20
th
 Century, the region's high agricultural potential attracted 
colonial settlers, who established tea plantations and hired the locals to work on them. 
A communal land tenure system had been in place before the arrival of the colonizers
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Figure 5.1: Map of Area Covered by Gusii County Council  
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but it soon disappeared following European influence on agricultural practices.
212
 
The rolling hillsides of Kisii district is home to the Gusii, one of the many 
ethnic groups that make up Kenya. Gusii people are known to be very industrious, 
resilient, and business-minded. Gusii people are also known to have one of the highest 
fertility rates in the country. The average household size in the district is 4.9.
213
 The 
district has the second highest population density in the country.
214
 It is eclipsed by a 
higher rate in the Vihiga district of Western Province. The population density in each 
of these districts is 1,962 and 2,295 people per square mile respectively. A dot-density 
map of Kenya, which reflects the high population density of the region, was shown in 
Figure 3.1 (Chapter 3).  
The Kisii region is famous for its soapstone. The soapstone is used to make 
different types of carvings and household effects which are then sold to dealers in 
Nairobi. Many of these carvings can be found in markets all over the country that cater 
to tourists. Besides soapstone, granite is also mined in Kisii district. 
2. Social Profile of Kisii District 
The 1999 census lists the rural population of Kisii district—the area which 
GCC has jurisdiction over—as 303,551. The majority of this population is poor, 
despite the district's active participation in agricultural production. The poverty rate of 
rural Kisii district is estimated to be 62 percent.
215
 The district as a whole (including 
its urban area), is estimated to have an average household income of Ksh 6,367. 
However, this estimate includes household incomes in the urban areas of the district. 
                                                 
212
 Uchendu and Anthony 1975, Omoso 1998 
213
 1999 Population and Housing Census, Vol. I, Table 1, p113 
214
 1999 Population and Housing Census, Vol. I, Summary Table, p(xxxiii). Without accurate data on 
the area covered by the other four councils within Kisii district, it was not possible to perform a more 
pinpointed analysis regarding the exact population density of the area covered by GCC. Thus, this 
figure includes the entire population of the district. The population density in the rural areas—the area 
covered by GCC—will be a little lower since the population density of urban centers are usually higher. 
215
 Government of Kenya 2005, Table 5.1 
 133 
As such, it is presumed that the average household income for rural Kisii district is 
much smaller. 
There are 18 wards under the jurisdiction of the Council. They include: 
Nyakoe, Nyatieko, Bogeka, Mosocho, Kiogoro, Kegati, Mogonga, Kiamokama, 
Ikorongo, Marani, Mwamonari, Kegogi, Nge'nyi, Sensi, Keumbu, Riana, Bomokora, 
and Bomariba. While the detailed fabric of the social structure is not as apparent here 
as it is in the urban and much smaller setting of Nakuru town, the wealth of different 
wards can be assessed by the number of markets in a ward, the types of homes and 
animals present, and the number of schools, churches, institutions, or paid 
employees.
216
 The proximity of the ward's location to the central town of Kisii seems 
to influence a ward's status. Based on this crude means of assessment, along with local 
knowledge of the area from Council officials, central wards such as Mosocho, 
Nyakoe, Keumbu, Bomariba, and Kegati are relatively more well-to-do than an edge 
ward like Sensi, which does not even have a local market.
217
 Since agriculture is the 
backbone of these local economies, the presence of a well-established market is 
considered to be vital for its development. The educational attainment for the district 
is low, with less than 1 percent of the population possessing a university degree and 
less than 20 percent possessing a high school diploma.
218
 
While detailed district-wide records are not available for the structure of the 
labor market in Kisii district, the distribution of paid labor within the town of Kisii 
(the major urban center for the district) sheds light on the employment structure. 
Almost half of those with paid employment are employed in the personal services 
industry.
219
 Manufacturing comes in a distant second. As a district, only 18.5 percent 
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of those who are employed have paid employment. The majority (70.5 percent) work 
on family farms while 11 percent work in the informal market.
220
 Thus, 81.5 percent 
are self-employed. This proportion is higher than the national proportions of self-
employed workers, which is 74.7 percent. The full distribution of the activity status of 
the population is included in Appendix B.  
Agriculture is the backbone of the district's economy. Twenty years ago, 52 to 
61 percent of the district's land was used for cultivating produce and the assumption is 
that current land uses remain relatively unchanged.
221
 Much of that production 
however is through small, non-mechanized, owner-operated farms, features which 
reduce the capabilities for ensuring higher yields, and which affect the market price of 
the produce. Typically, each farm consists of a long strip of land, running from the top 
of a ridge to the valley bottom.
222
 Farm holdings average around five acres or less per 
household, although many are as small as one-quarter of an acre.
223
 While some of the 
land is used for subsistence farming, much of the produce is sold to wholesale 
distributors. The most common food crops include maize, beans, millet, and bananas. 
The main cash crops here are coffee and tea, although most of the farmers grow tea. 
Tea is one of Kenya's main export commodities, accounting for 21 percent of its total 
exports in 2008.
224
 A few residents also engage in fish farming along with the 
common practice of subsistence farming. The vast majority of farms are owner-
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operated, having been passed down to male offsprings through the generations. This 
practice has however led to the continuous fragmentation of land.
225
  
3. Service Provision 
During consultations for the International Monetary Fund's Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP), the people of Kisii district identified the need for physical 
infrastructure as their foremost need.
226
 These include better roads, transportation and 
communication networks, energy supply, water, and sanitation. However, in Kenya, 
county councils such as GCC have historically offered little, if any basic services for 
residents living within their jurisdiction. There are several reasons for this. The first is 
that they are not mandated to do so. As outlined in Chapter 2, the laws of Kenya only 
require councils to do two things in terms of service provision. One is to provide sites 
for burials and cremations. The other is to provide support for the burial of destitute 
people.
227
 Aside from these two responsibilities, councils are permitted, but not 
mandated to provide any other services. However, rural councils such as GCC tend to 
forgo even this minimal responsibility. This is due to the fact that the rural populations 
they oversee tend to live on their own land, without much restriction on what they can 
do on that land. As such, it is common practice to bury the dead on family land. Even 
those who die in the city are transported to their hometowns and laid to rest on family 
land. Thus, county councils are relieved of the only services they are mandated to 
provide. 
Households are responsible for the provision of their own water and sanitation 
services. In Kisii district, there is an abundance of natural water springs and many 
communities rely on those springs for their water supply. Access to piped water is rare 
outside the main urban centers, although a very small number of households in the 
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rural areas have gained access to piped water via gravity tanks. The gravity tanks are 
placed next to and supplied by water from natural springs. The tanks are then fitted 
with pipes leading to individual compounds in the surrounding area. However, since 
this concept relies on the presence of a hilly terrain, with no pumping mechanisms 
involved, its application has thus far been very limited.
228
 In Kisii district, 56 percent 
of the residents rely on natural springs as their main source of water. Another 30 
percent rely on streams or rivers, while only seven percent have access to piped 
water.
229
 
Due to the scarcity of piped water, pit latrines are the predominant mechanism 
for solid waste disposal. This is indicative of practices in other urban and rural areas, 
as 73 percent of the country's population uses this mode of waste disposal. The district 
has a limited supply of other amenities, including healthcare centers. There are 25 
dispensaries, 11 clinics, and three hospitals serving over half a million residents of the 
district.
230
 Almost all of these facilities are managed by the Ministry of Public Health. 
There are very few private medical clinics within the Council's jurisdictions.  
The second reason why rural councils like GCC offer little, if any basic 
services is that they simply do not have the kinds of funds it would take to effectively 
cover the cost of maintaining adequate service provision all over the district. Kisii 
district covers approximately 250 square miles. Minus the small areas covered by the 
four urban councils (shown in Figure 5.1), GCC is responsible for the vast majority of 
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this area. Table 5.1 shows the council's yearly revenue totals for FY 2004/2005 to FY 
2007/2008. With the exception of FY 2007/2008, the council's total annual revenue 
has been under USD 1 million. Much of this revenue comes from the council's LATF 
allocation, which accounts for approximately three-quarters of each year's total 
revenue.  
Table 5.1: Total Revenue Figures for Gusii County Council 
FY 2004/2005 to FY 2007/2008 
FY 2004/2005 FY 2005/2006 FY 2006/2007 FY 2007/2008
Revenue Source
LATF (100%) 26,895,907 33,244,884 49,117,325 53,879,058
($413,783) ($511,460) ($755,651) ($828,909)
Council's Own Revenue 8,389,455 10,317,152 15,681,479 18,202,470
($129,069) ($158,725) ($241,254) ($280,038)
Total Revenue* 36,573,562 46,062,036 67,107,927 73,281,528
($542,852) ($670,185) ($996,905) ($1,108,947)
% Own Revenue to Total 23% 22% 23% 25%
% LATF Revenue to Total 74% 72% 73% 74%
(Kenyan Schillings)
 
Source: Annual LATF reports 
* Total revenue reflects addition of the RMLF devolved funding 
County councils do not collect as much in taxes and fees as their counterpart 
Town and Municipal Councils do. In addition, their rental rates are lower, and many 
are not equipped to levy property tax, a source of significant revenue for town and 
municipal councils. Furthermore, Council officials complain that the designation of 
high revenue centers as separate Town Councils in recent years has all but depleted 
their main sources of revenue.
231
  
The third reason is that county councils like GCC often lack the appropriate 
manpower and technical competence to design the necessary short- and long-term 
work plans to facilitate such detailed endeavors. The council's 2007-2011 Strategic 
                                                 
231
 Along with the creation of new Town Councils, several new districts have also been carved out of 
Kisii district in recent years, resulting in bitter political feuds involving current and past Presidents, 
Members of Parliament, local Councilors, and local leaders. See "Controversy rages over new districts 
created in Kisiiland" from Kisii.com. Accessed September 11, 2008. 
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Plan—its first—identifies some of these weaknesses. They include a lack of enough 
skilled staff, poor motivation of current staff, poor internal control systems, nepotism 
and favoritism, lack of work plans, lack of [appropriate] tools, poor job classifications 
and duplication of duties, poor planning of commercial centers, inefficient 
management of human resources, lack of public utilities, and poor time management. 
As one Council official admitted,  
"People know how to work because of [their] experience [working in 
that position]. But [they] don‘t know why [they do what they do]. So if 
[they are] changed to different job responsibility, [they will] fight [it] 
because [they are] not literate." 
Another Council official noted that it is difficult for a senior official to institute 
long-lasting reform in the human resources area at the local Councils. For one, many 
people are quick to evaluate incidents along tribal lines. Thus, if for example a clerk 
were trained and repositioned to work as an accountant so that they can be better 
positioned to manage records and council affairs, others might evaluate this action as 
clanism. Some might then undermine or sidestep the person's authority by not 
reporting to them as required so that in the end, the effort at reform is "frustrated." 
Furthermore, when the senior official who initiated the reform is transferred to a 
different council as they often are after a few years of service, many of the staff revert 
back to their old ways. Thus, some senior officials have given up on making any 
attempt to reform workers' performance or responsibilities, preferring to not ruffle any 
feathers or be perceived in a negative light, and simply wait to be transferred to the 
next council. This tendency perpetuates the cycle of Councils' low performance 
standards, as the reform which must happen from within is limited or non-existent in 
many cases.  
4. Characteristics of the Council 
GCC's offices are located in the town of Kisii, the district's primary urban 
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center. The administration of the Council takes place through five departments: Town 
Clerk; Treasurer; Works and Planning; Education, Health and Social Services; and 
Markets. Unlike municipal councils, a significant source of revenue for many county 
councils (including GCC) is the fees collected at council markets; thus the need for a 
Markets Department.
232
  
The Works and Planning department oversees the provision of basic services. 
However, as of summer 2008, the department operated with only one land surveyor 
and a new engineering graduate as its sole senior officers. Neither of them has any 
junior technical staff working for them. The surveyor loosely plays the role of town 
planner, especially for land and water issues since there are no planners assigned to the 
Council.
233
 Medium and long-term planning activities are almost non-existent, and 
like the Municipal Council of Nakuru (MCN), day-to-day management activities are 
resolved as they arise using whatever personnel are available. 
The Council is divided into 18 wards, each with its own elected Councilor. 
Wards are typically divided by clan, leaving political issues vulnerable to tribal 
clashes, and vice versa, as political affiliations usually form along ethnic lines. In 
addition, there are six nominated Councilors, for a total of 24. Together, these 
Councilors serve on various committees that make up the policy arm of the Council. 
The Council has a workforce of 266 employees, making it the 30
th
 largest of Kenya's 
175 councils.
234
 
One other important characteristic about GCC is that it has been consistently 
ranked among the top 10 to 15 councils with the most outstanding debt.
235
 While the 
                                                 
232
 The market fees are for stall or land rentals. 
233
 Planners are assigned to work at the local government councils by the government. 
234
 Similar to the MCN, the majority of these workers work outside the council offices—as market 
cleaners and fee collectors for example. There are no more than 20 officers actually working in the 
offices on a day-to-day basis, excluding the Councilors, who only come to the Council offices to attend 
meetings or as needed. 
235
 Based on annual LATF reports 
 140 
council's debt only accounted for 0.8 percent of all Councils' debt for FY 2007/2008, 
GCC's debt to own-revenue ratio was 6:1.
236
 By comparison, the MCN's debt to own-
revenue ratio was slight less than one. While the annual LATF revenue substantially 
boosts the Council's total revenue (accounting for three-quarters of the total revenue as 
shown in Table 5.1), annual budget estimates regularly include large deficits—of more 
than Ksh 10 million.
237
 Needless to say, the Council is heavily reliant on the annual 
LATF transfers. 
Evaluating the Planning Process 
Gusii County Council's (GCC) yearly LASDAP planning process has taken 
place without much incident. However, this is not to say that the entire process has 
occurred without residents being discontent about particular issues. To start the 
process, each ward's prioritization meeting is scheduled to occur with others—much 
like the MCN. The wards are grouped by division (there are two to five wards in each 
division)
238
 and one consultation meeting is scheduled for each division. Under this 
scheme, the Council hosts about seven divisional meetings to cover its 18 wards. The 
meetings typically take place at a local market in the division or the division's social 
hall. Attendance rates at these meetings were higher than the rates in Nakuru, 
averaging 31 people per ward.
239
 One potential reason for this is that at times, 
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 2007/2008 Annual LATF report 
237
 Based on previous years' budget estimates obtained from the Council 
238
 Under the provincial administration system, districts are further subdivided into divisions. Several 
wards are located within each division. In GCC, these boundaries overlap; although this is not always 
the case since each unit (wards and divisions) is a subset of different administrative systems, the 
constituency and provincial administrative systems respectively. 
239
 The council stated that it typically mailed out notices to several of the 399 community-based self-
help organizations within its jurisdiction. The Council's three Community Development Assistants are 
also tasked with mobilizing people to come to meetings. Notices are also posted at schools and trading 
centers such as tea buying centers where farmers typically go to sell their produce to wholesale 
distributors. However, many of these farmers are illiterate in the reading of the English language. Thus, 
it is doubtful that these posted notices of upcoming meetings serve their intended purpose. It is 
interesting to observe that unlike in Nakuru, the average attendance rate at consultation meetings was 
relatively similar across divisions. Thus the mean was more representative of actual attendance rates 
across all wards. 
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attendees are each offered a soft drink. At times, some are offered a small allowance. 
As one council official stated, "What do you do when you call a meeting and nobody 
shows up?" Records also showed that the meetings were usually long, lasting about 
three to five hours. Like the MCN, most of those who attend are members of 
community-based organizations (CBO).  
Two rationales were given for running division-level meetings. One is to save 
costs. The other is to allow residents from one ward to objectively analyze and suggest 
solutions for problems encountered in another ward.
240
 Thus, while ward meetings 
were combined by division, it was with the understanding that projects would still be 
prioritized by ward. However, a review of the records shows that each ward has never 
generated its own list of priorities. Rather than generating ward-specific priorities, one 
list, consisting of three to five projects, is compiled for all the wards in each 
division.
241
 
This method implies that each ward has the same set of needs, which is not 
necessarily true. Moreover, like the MCN, only a list of desired projects, not needs, is 
articulated and compiled during each consultation meeting. This effectively limits any 
sense of "development planning" around a community's short- and long-term needs, as 
it focuses on the needs of one specific area without analyzing the needs on a more 
comprehensive basis.  
Following these consultation meetings, the council utilizes a rather peculiar 
method during the consensus meeting to determine what projects to prioritize and 
allocate funding to for the subsequent fiscal year. The process consists of ranking and 
re-ranking a list of generic priorities; two or three of which are then chosen and slated 
                                                 
240
 Personal conversation with Council staff, June 2008. 
241
 As might be expected, the array of proposed projects did not necessarily reflect the needs of the 
communities as a whole. Rather, they mirrored the priorities of those present at the meeting. For 
example, in cases where attendees were from CBOs focused on widows or orphans, the proposed 
projects were for the construction of orphanages or for the provision of assistance to widows. 
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for implementation in every ward.
242
  
It comes as no surprise that each year, this method of project prioritization 
elicits the most negative responses from those present at the consensus meeting. They 
state that they have continually requested for ward-specific priorities to be 
implemented in each ward rather than projects from a generic list. However, the 
Council refuses to do this, stating that residents have also stressed that there should be 
a "balance of benefits" across all wards, and that this is one way to make that happen. 
It comes as no surprise then that in my survey of residents on the impact of the 
LASDAP program, the majority of respondents stated that the LASDAP program had 
not changed the way they are able to influence their political representatives 
(Councilors) or the local government over how development funds are spent. Besides 
this issue, other comments from residents include their desire for more employment 
opportunities through the use of "community contracting" as projects are 
implemented.
243
 
For the most part however, many of the projects have been implemented with 
the use of individual contractors. Two factors that contribute to this are that 1) the 
protection of water springs—the council's main focus—requires a level of expertise 
that is greater than what ordinary residents can most likely offer, and 2) community 
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 First, a list of the top three to five projects identified in each division is compiled. Since the needs 
are common across divisions, and there is evidence that the local government officials facilitating the 
initial consultation meetings "suggest" certain types of projects (as recorded in minutes for Ikorongo 
division held on Nov. 13, 2006 for FY 2007/2008), this compilation ends up as a list of eight to ten 
types of generic priorities, such as "rehabilitation of rural roads," "protection of water springs," or 
"construction of bridges." This list—which does not reference exact project locations unit costs—is then 
handed out to ward representatives during the consensus meeting and they are told to rank them for 
each of their respective wards. As a result, many wards are left ranking projects they might not have 
even identified as a priority. Furthermore, this time-consuming exercise is negated in the next step, as 
the council's technical committee then uses a loose "statistically-based method" to derive an "overall 
priority ranking," based on tallies of how high each project had been ranked by the individual wards. In 
the end, the top two or three projects from the final list are then typically chosen as projects that will be 
funded and implemented across all wards. 
243
 In Kisii district, many residents are desperate for work as 52 percent of the population is unemployed 
or economically inactive. Another 32 percent work as unpaid workers on family farms (1999 Population 
and Housing Census, Vol. II). 
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contracting (hiring several community members to complete the job) requires 
substantial coordination and oversight by the council. Rather than being paid for their 
participation, residents are asked to contribute labor and materials by transporting 
building materials (such as stones) from the vicinity of each project site to the actual 
project location. Possibly due to the fact that women are responsible for the collection 
of water, it is the women who are usually tasked with this activity. Discussions with 
women at one particular project site indicated they did not know any details about the 
project, other than the fact that they were told to bring the materials to the site. Thus, 
while they were partakers in the implementation process, they were not true 
participants of the planning process in the terms envisioned for the program's 
structure. As a result, their ability to question, to seek accountability, transparency, or 
equity in the distribution of resources is non-existent. 
At all levels, there has been little to no monitoring or evaluation of the 
planning process at GCC. Each year one representative is chosen from each division 
during the consensus meeting to serve on the Community Project Monitoring 
Committee. However, these appointments seem to be largely ceremonial, as the 
committees have not been active. When they have convened, their activity has been 
limited to following Council members on tours of a few project sites. However, there 
is usually no follow up to seek broader information about other projects, question any 
inconsistencies, or disseminate details of their evaluations. Meanwhile, those 
interviewed say they rely on the Monitoring Committee to ensure that the planning 
process runs as planned and that projects are implemented across the wards. 
Understandably, the Committee's ability to inspect project sites is limited by the 
difficulty of traveling around the vast area covered by the Council. Many people do 
not own personal vehicles and public transit only traverses the main arterials. 
Moreover, it is often difficult to negotiate the terrain around many project sites, 
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whether by car or on foot.
244
 Thus, continuously monitoring and evaluating ongoing 
and previously implemented projects is difficult.  
The local government itself does monitor ongoing projects, but only to the 
extent that the selected contractor performed the stated scope of work. The quality of 
construction—and site visits revealed some poorly constructed bridges and poorly 
protected water springs
245—is seldom questioned, at least not to the extent that it 
necessitates full reconstruction. On their part, the Council commented that it is often 
difficult for them to discipline contractors because he/she will simply increase costs. 
Since there is no template for the quality of work that is expected, the Council is often 
at the mercy of each contractor's proficiency.  
Residents also complained that contractors often worked without allowing for 
community input on the design. In one instance, this led a man to destroy the cement 
flooring at a water spring in order to accommodate the height of a standard water keg. 
Residents complained that they had told the contractor to increase the height at which 
he placed the discharge pipes but he had failed to listen to their advice. 
Assessing LASDAP's Impact 
Table 5.2 shows Gusii County Council's LATF allocations and expenditures 
between FY 2004/2005 and FY 2007/2008. As was the case for the Municipal Council 
of Nakuru, both the estimated and actual expenditure on improvements to service 
delivery fell short of the recommended 40-60 percent range, except during FY 
2006/2007 when 58 percent of the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) was 
allocated towards improvement projects. However, by the end of that fiscal year, only 
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 Based on personal site visits and conversations with the Chair of the monitoring committee, June 
2008. 
245
 The protection/rehabilitation of water springs is an important project for the district. Many 
communities rely on natural springs for their water supply because access to potable water is rare 
outside the main urban centers. Water from the springs is safer for consumption if the springs are 
"protected." That is, redesigned to allow for a natural filtration system, and then fitted with dispensing 
pipes.  
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7 percent of the LATF (a mere 12.5 percent of the original 58 percent allocation) was 
actually spent on improvement projects.  
Table 5.2: Gusii County Council LASDAP Receipts & Expenditures, 
FY 2004/2005 - FY 2007/2008 
Gusii County Council
Ksh
% of 
LATF Ksh
% of 
LATF Ksh
% of 
LATF Ksh
% of 
LATF
Total LATF Allocation 26,895,907 (100%) 33,244,884 (100%) 49,117,325 (100%) 53,879,058 (100%)
Estimated Allocation for Service Delivery*                                       
Should range from 40-60% of LATF 8,068,772 (30%) 12,798,465 (38%) 28,355,757 (58%) 6,596,013 (12%)
Actual Expenditure on Service Delivery                                                                       
Note: Mandatory minimum is 30% of LATF 1,586,000 (6%) 3,182,995 (10%) 3,543,639 (7%) 0 (0%)
FY 04/05 FY 05/06 FY 06/07 FY 07/08
 
* Like the MCN, the upcoming year's budget is calculated before the end of the preceding fiscal year. 
As such, council revenue from the previous year and LATF allocations for the current year are used to 
calculate the 'resource envelope. Unlike the MCN however, GCC reestimates its resource envelope after 
the upcoming year's LATF allocation amounts are released by the central government. 
During the four years under review, no more than 10 percent of the council's 
LATF money was actually spent on community improvement projects. Actual 
expenditures on service delivery amounted to 6 percent, 10 percent, and 7 percent 
during FY 2004/2005, FY 2005/2006, and FY 2006/2007 respectively. For FY 
2007/2008, none of the money that had been allocated towards improvement projects 
was actually spent. For a more visual representation, the council's LASDAP receipts 
and expenditures are also summarized in a bar chart, shown in Figure 5.2. 
Accumulating the facts and figures on LASDAP expenditures for GCC took 
some ingenuity. Records were available in piecemeal fashion, the details of which 
then had to be reconciled to ascertain an accurate picture of the planning process and 
outcomes. Unlike records of the Council's water spring projects that are financed by 
the European Union (EU),
246
 there are no LASDAP records for individual projects. 
Furthermore, forms that were completed as part of the LASDAP reporting template to  
                                                 
246
 Through its Rural Poverty Reduction and Local Government Support Program (RPRLGSP), the 
European Union (EU) committed 9 million Ksh over three years to improve 92 water springs around 
Kisii district. The Council had to demonstrate their commitment to the project by making a one-time 
contribution of 1.8 million Ksh to the project. This partnership started in September 2006. For each of 
these water springs, there are forms detailing the associated costs and expenditures, making it easy to 
review the financial details concerning each project. 
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Figure 5.2: Gusii County Council LASDAP Receipts & Expenditures, 
FY 2004/2005 - FY 2007/2008 
indicate the council's project implementation plan to the central government were 
often inaccurate.
247
 
As will be seen in the tables outlining each year's prioritized projects, GCC 
drafts two copies of its estimated annual budget. The first is done about 9 months 
before the beginning of the corresponding fiscal year (which starts in July); just before 
community consultation meetings are held. Based on this budget, the community is 
told how much money will most likely be available for implementing projects during 
the upcoming fiscal year (the amount of the resource envelope). This initial budget 
(Budget I) is then revised after the central government releases the actual LATF 
allocations figures for each council, prompting project and allocation changes to the 
original LASDAP plans. These revised project allocations are listed under Budget II. 
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 For example, Form 8.4 in the FY 2007/2008 report notes that over 2 million Ksh had been spend on 
the construction and protection of water springs in 2006. However, after reconciling the records, only 
123,175 Ksh of LASDAP allocations had actually been spent on water springs. 
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In almost all cases, the projects that are added to the list are projects that are meant to 
help the Council increase its revenue base. However, during the four years under 
review, only once did any of those additional projects get implemented. Rather than a 
project that would directly increase council revenue—and perhaps people's livelihoods 
at the same time—a more indirect route to increasing revenue was taken. The council 
purchased a vehicle to help ease the collection of market dues and other taxes.  
Physical Impact 
Tables 5.3 through 5.6 show the prioritized versus implemented projects for 
GCC between FY 2004/2005 to FY 2007/2008.
248
 For each of the tables, the initial 
and subsequent budget estimates are listed (Budget I and II respectively), along with 
the list of actual expenditures, as stated in the end-of-year report. The data reveals that 
GCC has mainly focused on the rehabilitation of water springs around the district, as 
well as the construction of a few bridges.  
Table 5.3 shows that for FY 2004/2005, a total of just over 4 million Ksh was 
initially allocated towards capital projects. This money was to implement three 
projects: the construction of bridges, the protection of water springs, and the 
rehabilitation of rural roads. The revised budget was increased by 4 million Ksh, to 
invest in projects that the Council felt would help boost its revenue base in subsequent 
years. 
This included the rehabilitation of council-owned homes (some of which are 
rented out and some of which are inhabited by council staff), improvements in the 
main markets, and an update of its land valuation roll. Renovation of council-owned 
houses was planned so that the Council could increase their rental charges after the 
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 For some of the years, GCC's records differed on what was slated for implementation. The facts and 
figures shown here are those indicated in the annual estimates of expenditures (from the Council's 
annual LASDAP reports) and the end-of-year actual expenditures (which are forwarded to the central 
government as the official numbers).  
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Table 5.3: Projects Prioritized and Implemented by GCC for FY 2004/2005 
COMMUNITY-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Budget I 
(Ksh)
Budget II 
(Ksh)
Spent   
(Ksh)
Construction of bridges 2,030,000 2,030,000 55,000
Rehabilitation and protection of water springs 1,350,000 1,350,000 1,531,000
Rehabilitation of rural access roads 670,000 670,000
COUNCIL-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Construction of 17 Councilors offices in wards 1,300,000
Rehabilitation of council houses 1,000,000
Valuation roll 550,000
Market improvements 1,000,000
Purchase of office equipment 168,772
TOTAL 4,050,000 8,068,772 1,586,000
 
properties were upgraded. While also requested by traders, an expansion of previously 
implemented market improvements—including the addition of sanitation facilities and 
fences around the markets' boundaries—was envisioned to help spur the traders to 
more readily pay their market dues (for stall or space rentals), a major source of 
revenue for the Council. By having a more up-to-date record of land ownership, the 
Council would be in a better position to assess property taxes, a tax which it has not 
assessed for at least the past 10 years. The Council focused on improving its revenue 
collection because in the years prior, the Council had undergone periods where it was 
not able to pay its workers their full salaries. The payment of partial salaries went on 
for several months, despite introduction of the LATF program in 1999, which included 
funds for improving local government operations.  
Despite these revisions, at the end of the year, GCC had only implemented two 
of the eight projects on the list, for a total expenditure of just under 1.6 million Ksh. 
This is equivalent to one-fifth of what the council had committed to spending.  
Table 5.4 lists the project allocations for FY 2005/2006. Approximately 2.7 
million was originally budgeted for capital improvements, going towards the 
protection of water springs, the construction of bridges, and the rehabilitation of rural 
roads. That budget was later revised to 12.8 million Ksh.  
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Table 5.4: Projects Prioritized and Implemented by GCC for FY 2005/2006 
COMMUNITY-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Budget I 
(Ksh)
Budget II 
(Ksh)
Spent   
(Ksh)
Water spring protection 1,500,000 2,825,000 3,167,875
Construction of bridges 469,879 15,120
Rehabilitation or opening of Rural Access Roads 700,000 2,500,000
COUNCIL-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Market improvements 3,250,000
Planning of market and valuation roll 2,823,465
County Hall improvements 400,000
Repair of council grader 1,000,000
TOTAL 2,669,879 12,798,465 3,182,995
 
Having failed to make market improvement or update the valuation roll the 
previous year, in the revised budget, the Council once again made allocations to 
undertake these two projects. In fact, allocations for market improvements have been 
present in annual budgets dating back to at least 2001/2002. However, little if any 
progress is made each year. Money was also set aside to fix the council's road grader. 
This project had also appeared repeatedly in previous annual budgets. However, as of 
June 2008 the grader was still in a state of disrepair. The Council had hoped to fix the 
grader so that they could generate income by renting it out to road construction crews.  
At the end of the year, only 3.2 of the 12.8 million Ksh (one-quarter of the 
money) that was budgeted for capital improvements had been spent to do so. Most of 
those expenditures went towards the protection of water springs. 
For FY 2006/2007, 5.5 million Ksh was initially allocated towards LASDAP 
development projects. Under the revised budget, project allocations were increased to 
Ksh 28.4 million. The projects are itemized in Table 5.5. Once again, the main project 
was the protection of water springs, which received forty percent of the funds.
249
 The 
Ksh 28.4 million in allocations was the largest the council had allocated towards 
project implementation in recent years.  
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 While the Council's ongoing partnership with the EU to protect many of its water springs might help 
explain its continued focus on protecting water springs, it is also clear that access to clean water is one 
of residents' top priorities. 
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Table 5.5: Projects Prioritized and Implemented by GCC for FY 2006/2007 
COMMUNITY-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Budget I 
(Ksh)
Budget II 
(Ksh)
Spent   
(Ksh)
Water spring protection 2,953,160 11,511,800 123,175
Rehab of rural roads 2,500,000 1,288,200
COUNCIL-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Market Improvements 3,000,000
Rehabilitation of Council shovel 2,000,000
Renovation of Council houses 1,000,000
Renovation of County Hall 500,000
Valuation Roll 2,800,000
Purchase of tractor trailer 2,000,000
Purchase of civic car 2,400,000 2,500,000
Purchase of computers 655,757 520,464
Preparation of 2007-2011 strategic plan by consultants 1,200,000 400,000
TOTAL 5,453,160 28,355,757 3,543,639
 
The allocation amount was almost equal to its entire LASDAP allocation for 
the year (60 percent of the LATF). While seemingly laudable (that is how the program 
was designed to take place but many councils do not do so), more than half of the 
money was allocated towards projects that the council itself deemed necessary, not 
those identified by the residents. This included the renovation of council property and 
the purchase of vehicles and electronics for the council offices. While residents had 
also prioritized projects such as the building of orphanage homes, a fund to offer 
assistance to widows, and the construction of bridges and boreholes, none of these 
projects were allocated funds under the expanded budget allocations. 
Similar to previous years, the council only managed to spend a mere fraction 
(one-eighth) of the allocations on project implementation. Moreover, only 123,175 
Ksh of the 3.5 million Ksh that was spent went towards community-identified needs 
during this year.
250
 The rest went towards the council's purchase of a vehicle, 
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 The central government's annual LASDAP report indicates that a total of 10.6 million Ksh was spent 
on projects during FY 2006/2007. However, that amount included the 5.7 million Ksh that was received 
from the EU to finance the first phase of protecting a total of 92 water springs around the district. It also 
included 1.5 million Ksh from the RMLF fund that supports road rehabilitation projects. 
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computers, and payment of consultancy fees.
251
  
Table 5.6 shows the list of itemized allocations for FY 2007/2008. The Council 
initially estimated that 6.6 million Ksh would be spent to fund three community-
identified priorities.
252
 The revised budget altered these initial allocations, removing 
the funding for the digging of wells and only allocating money for the building of 
gravity tanks in 8 of the 18 wards. The council also allocated money towards the 
construction of market stalls, the renovation of a training center and council houses, as 
well as the purchase of computers and networking technology for the council offices. 
Table 5.6: Projects Prioritized and Implemented by GCC for FY 2007/2008 
COMMUNITY-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Budget I 
(Ksh)
Budget II 
(Ksh)
Spent   
(Ksh)
Construction of bridges (later decided as 150,000 Ksh each to 16 
wards) 3,000,000 2,400,000
Digging of wells - all wards 1,596,013
Building of gravity tanks - all wards 2,000,000
Construction of 8 gravity tanks & protection of 2 water springs @ 
300,000 Ksh each 3,000,000
Construction of market stalls in 4 market centers: Nyakeo, 
Keumbu, Rioma, & Marani 4,000,000
COUNCIL-IDENTIFIED PROJECTS
Renovation of the community training center 4,000,000
Computer hardware and networking 1,512,833
Renovation of council rental houses @ Kanga & Nyanchwa 3,000,000
TOTAL 6,596,013 17,912,833 0
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 The consultancy fees were to pay for the services of a consultant for drafting the council's 2007-2011 
Strategic Plan. However, the document is more a statement of what is known—such as the council's 
strengths, weaknesses, and potential revenue sources—not a plan of action for the Council's future. The 
implementation framework, meant to "drive the aspirations of the council and its residents going into 
the future" does not even provide existing baseline data (quantitative or otherwise), nor does it articulate 
specifically what is needed in core areas such as service delivery, debt management, institutional 
capacity, or ICT development. It also does not include the current state of affairs in any of the sectors it 
describes. Rather, it provides a list of general objectives, followed by a handful of issues that need to be 
addressed, along with very simplified, overtly general statements on what inputs, outputs, and time 
frames that can be expected when addressing those issues. 
252
 During consultation and consensus meetings, residents had once again expressed the need to fund 
different projects in different wards depending on their stated priorities. Thus, each ward had generated 
its own list of priorities during consultation meetings. However, during the consensus meeting, the 
Council once again generated one "overall priority" list for all the wards. While the construction of 
bridges was one of the top priorities, the digging of boreholes had been ranked 5
th
 and the building of 
gravity tanks ranked 8
th
 out of 9 projects. No clear rationale was given as to why these last two projects 
were then prioritized for all the wards. 
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In all, 17.9 million Ksh was allocated towards development projects. However, 
as of June 2008, none of the projects planned for the fiscal year had been 
implemented. Council representatives noted that the implementation of all projects 
was halted due to the post-election violence. However, there is no indication that any 
projects had been started prior to the violence that erupted after the elections in 
December 2007. One official revealed that revenue collection was hindered for about 
three months following the post-election violence period. This meant that LATF 
monies were the only source of incoming revenue during this time. Even taking into 
consideration that the central government was late in disbursing funds for the fiscal 
year,
253
 none of the planned projects had been implemented and nor were any slated 
for implementation as of June 2008, the end of the fiscal year.
254
 
Summarizing the Project Prioritization and Implementation Record 
Table 5.7 summarizes the number of projects that were planned versus the 
number that was completed each year between FY 2004/2005 and FY 2007/2008. 
Similar to Table 4.6, the project completion rates were computed using the ratio of the 
number of projects that were planned (projects allocated money during the planning 
process) to those that were completed from that list.  
Over the four years, the Council averaged a 20 percent completion rate. The 
calculations exclude projects that were completed but not listed in the final budget. 
Thus, the one project that was implemented outside the budget during FY 2005/2006  
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 LATF funds are disbursed in three installments; in September, January, and April of the respective 
fiscal year. For FY 2007/2008, the first and third installments arrived a couple of months late (Per 
official interviewed). 
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 The 2007/2008 Annual LATF report does however indicate that three projects—the construction of 
dispensaries, the renovation of the County Hall, and the protection of water springs—were completed 
for a total of 5.1 million Ksh. While the latter two projects may have indeed been completed following 
my departure, the reported LASDAP capital expenditure is false because the dispensaries were funded 
by a separate grant from the EU. By my estimates, it is highly doubtful that even the latter two projects 
were implemented in time to attribute them to the 2007/2008 fiscal year because reports of completed 
projects during each fiscal year are due to the central government shortly after the fiscal year ends in 
order to compile the annual LATF report, which lists the capital projects completed by each council. 
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Table 5.7: Percentage of Prioritized Projects Completed, 
FY 2004/2005 - FY 2007/2008) 
Year # (Ksh) # (million Ksh) # (million Ksh)
2004/2005 Community-identified 3 4,050,000 2 1,586,000 0 0
Council-identified 5 4,019,000 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 8 8,069,000 2 1,586,000 0 0 25%
2005/2006 Community-identified 3 8,575,000 1 3,168,000 1 15,000
Council-identified 3 4,223,000 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 6 12,798,000 1 3,168,000 1 15,000 17%
2006/2007 Community-identified 2 12,800,000 1 123,000 0 0
Council-identified 9 15,556,000 3 3,420,000 0 0
TOTAL 11 28,356,000 4 3,543,000 0 0 36%
2007/2008 Community-identified 3 9,400,000 0 0 0 0
Council-identified 3 8,513,000 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 6 17,913,000 0 0 0 0 0%
TOTAL 31 67,136,000 7 8,297,000 1 15,000
Average Rate of Completion over 4 Years = 20%
No. of Projects 
Planned
No. of Projects 
Completed
Projects 
Implemented but 
not Bugeted
Completion 
Rate of 
Planned 
Projects
 
Expenditures rounded to nearest thousand 
was not included in the computation of that year's completion rates. 
The number of community-identified projects is far fewer than those for the 
MCN because each year, only a few projects are selected by the Council for 
implementation in all wards. While listed as one line item, each project, when 
implemented as planned, was to occur in multiple locations around the district. At 
GCC, one lump sum is allocated to each type of project. For example, projects are 
simply listed as "rehab of rural roads" or "water spring protection" without stating 
exactly which roads or water springs were to be improved. 
For FY 2004/2005, three community-identified projects were planned at the 
cost of just over 4 million Ksh. Money was also allocated to five council-identified 
projects. Of these eight projects, only two were completed, and on a much smaller 
scale than originally planned.
255
 They were however, community-identified projects. 
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 One of the "completed" projects was the construction of foot bridges around the district. While the 
project had been allocated 2 million Ksh, only 55,000 Ksh was spent. Instead of building several foot 
bridges across the district, only a few were built. Without any means of transportation and the need to 
get farm produce to trading centers and markets, many farmers move their produce on foot, using a 
wheelbarrow, or place it on their head. As such, routes that offer a shortcut to their destination are of 
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The implementation of two out of eight projects equates to a completion rate of 25 
percent. For FY 2005/2006, a total of six projects were planned at a cost of 12.8 
million Ksh. Three were identified by the community while the other three were 
identified by the council. Only one of these six projects—the protection of water 
springs—was implemented. A small bridge project was also implemented at the cost 
of 15,000 Ksh, although it was not originally slated for implementation. Thus, the 
project completion rate for FY 2005/2006 was only 17 percent.  
For FY 2006/2007, a total of 11 projects were listed for implementation. Of 
these, only two were community-identified projects. The other nine projects were 
selected by the council to meet council needs. Three of those nine projects were 
completed while one of the two community-identified projects was implemented. For 
that one project, 11.5 million Ksh had been allocated but only 123,000 Ksh was 
spent.
256
 Since four of the 11 projects were implemented in some fashion, the council 
recorded a 36 percent completion rate for the year. For FY 2007/2008 six projects 
were planned, totaling 17.9 million Ksh. Since none of the projects had been 
implemented as of June 2008, the completion rate for FY 2007/2008 is zero. 
In all, seven of 31 planned projects were implemented over the four years. One 
unplanned project was also implemented. While the council averaged a completion 
rate of 20 percent over the four years, an even smaller proportion—12 percent—of the 
project allocations was spent (8.3 million Ksh out of 67.1 million Ksh). When 
questioned, the Council's defense against their low completion rate is that once 
projects take off, people start to interfere, disrupting the flow of completion.
257
 
                                                                                                                                            
outmost importance. Foot bridges across streams and natural springs help create these shortcuts. 
256
 It was not possible to determine the rationale behind the allocation and expenditure on projects 
during this time because both the Treasurer and Town Clerk who were instrumental in determining 
those amounts have since been relocated to other councils and were unreachable for interviews. The 
fact that only these two senior officers were involved in the decision-making reveals the extent to which 
decisions are still largely made by individuals, despite a structure for joint decision-making. 
257
 I should note that while I have interchangeably used the words "implemented" and "completed" in 
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Summarizing the Type and Expenditures on Implemented Projects 
Table 5.8 summarizes the number and type of projects that were implemented 
by the GCC between FY 2004/2005 and FY 2007/2008. In total, eight projects were 
implemented with LASDAP funds.  
Table 5.8: Type of Implemented Projects, FY 2004/2005 - FY 2007/2008 
Itemized Expenditures Ksh US Dollars (%)
Improved Water (3 projects) 4,822,050 69,438 58%
Council needs (3 projects) 3,420,464 49,255 41%
Bridges (2 projects) 70,120 1,010 1%
Total 8,312,634 119,702 100%
Total LATF Allocations during Period 163,137,174 2,349,175
% Spent on Capital Investments  5%  
In converting Kenyan Schillings to US Dollars, I used the same conversion rate (1 USD = Ksh 69.4) 
for each year to simplify the calculations. 
Like the MCN, more than one-third (in this case 41 percent) of the 8.3 million 
Ksh that was spent went towards Council needs. Less than two-thirds of the expenses 
went towards community-identified projects; 58 percent went towards the protection 
of water springs and 1 percent was spent on the construction of footbridges.  
Similarly, GCC has also chronically underinvested in the creation of capital 
infrastructure for its residents, at least as envisioned by the program's creators. The 
program guidelines recommended that each council spend at least 60 percent of the 
LATF funds on development projects. A clause in the directives lowers that target to a 
minimum of 30 percent of a council's annual LATF allocation. Over the four years 
                                                                                                                                            
the narrative above, I have done so with the realization that technically, they offer different meanings. I 
have classified a project as completed if the council implemented it in at least one location. While 
important, I did not place any weight on the project's level of sophistication or breadth of coverage 
because these elements are difficult to quantify. Moreover, there was no official documentation from 
the council regarding how many locations it planned to implement any given project, such as the 
protection of water springs. Thus, if the project was implemented in at least one location, it was 
categorized as "completed." However, marking the project as complete does not imply that there is no 
further need to expand the scale or scope of the project in the future. Indeed, many of the council's 
projects are repeated year after year because the scale of implementation has not matched the level of 
need. 
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under review in this study, only five percent of all GCC's yearly LATF allocations 
were spent on capital projects (total expenditure on projects / total LATF allocations to 
the council). The rest of the monies were said to have been spent on personnel and 
operations. While this is a violation of the guidelines, none of the councils have been 
subject to any repercussions. 
Socioeconomic Impact 
As might be expected, all the projects that were implemented by the council 
during the four years under review have had a positive impact on the community. 
While some respondents noted that the level of impact for some projects was "small," 
the majority of respondents cited most projects as having a "large" or "very large" 
impact on their community. In a region with high poverty rates, high unemployment, 
and poor access to all basic amenities, it comes as no surprise that any 
improvements—especially those initiated without requiring direct financial 
contributions from community members—are viewed positively. Residents noted 
several socioeconomic benefits from the few community-identified projects that were 
implemented. In no particular order, the first is improved access to potable water. 
With 56 percent of the population reliant on water springs for their daily water needs, 
the refurbishment of several natural springs to create a cleaner filtration system, as 
well as the construction of more accessible paths to get to the springs have been very 
well received by the community. Whereas in the past water flowing out from the 
natural spring would simply run off on the vegetation that surrounded it and people 
would have to collect it by scooping up the runoff, after a spring is protected, the 
source is fitted with pipes that dispense the water. Thus, people are able to collect 
potable water.
258
 Several school children, women, and even a few men were observed 
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 According to those interviewed, only 50 percent of the people boil the water before use because the 
perception is that the water is clean. 
 157 
using the refurbished springs. In addition to domestic uses, the water is also collected 
for use at local dispensaries and schools. Several of the women noted the time savings 
they now enjoy, as it does not take as long to fetch water. Some of the users, including 
an elderly man at one of the water springs, also profit from the project by collecting 
and selling the water to other households. A related socioeconomic benefit is that 
residents felt they experienced better health due to improvements in the water quality.  
Road and bridge projects are the source of the third benefit, which is an 
improvement in the means and cost of transportation. For the small segment of the 
population to which it applies, road rehabilitation projects have provided employment 
opportunities, as several local residents are hired to manually remove growing 
vegetation along dirt roads and right-of-ways. Both men and women are hired for this 
task. Clearing of the dirt roads has encouraged public transportation vehicles (matatus) 
to ply these routes, offering the farmers, for example tea growers, a faster and less 
stressful means of reaching wholesale buying centers. However, these dirt roads can 
become impassable during the rainy season, leading some residents to rate such 
projects as having a small impact. Likewise, the construction of a few foot bridges has 
provided pedestrian shortcuts for school children and farmers alike, leading to travel 
time savings. However, residents complained that the bridges are not wide enough and 
that they were not consulted in the design.
259
 
Besides the minute scale at which projects are implemented, some of the 
current limitations to the amount of socioeconomic benefits include the lack of 
community ownership of projects and individuals' fear of losing their land to a public 
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 The area Councilor was responsible for implementing these foot bridges. Site visits revealed the 
bridges were indeed very narrow and poorly constructed. Residents also say many footbridges need to 
be expanded for vehicular access to hospitals and markets. Another point to note is that many of the 
road projects are small scale (1-2 km) and since their "construction" simply consists of manually 
removing vegetation along a path, within a few years many of those routes are in a state where they 
have almost reverted back to footpaths, especially if not they are not heavily traversed routes. 
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good. In terms of taking ownership, on more than one occasion, projects implemented 
by the council had fallen into a state of disrepair without the primary beneficiaries 
making any effort to repair it. This was particularly the case for water-related projects. 
Anticipating that such might occur, the council carefully crafted a plan of "handing 
over" maintenance responsibilities to each community. While the plan had not gone 
into effect as of June 2008, it was to involve a high profile meeting where it would be 
announced that each community was now in charge of maintaining its protected water 
spring. Leadership would be taken by each project's committee—which residents 
claim are only known by the area Councilor who selected them. Currently, the 
committees are responsible for maintaining the site, including the removal of weeds 
and debris. However, for some of the sites visited, there was no evidence of any 
ongoing site management.  
When residents around a poorly protected and recently vandalized water spring 
from which they were now no longer able to draw potable water were questioned, they 
complained fiercely about the fact that the contractor who was given the initial work 
subcontracted the work to lay people who didn‘t have the right technical knowledge to 
do the work well.
260
 However, in the six months since the spring had been vandalized, 
neither the project committee, the primary beneficiaries from the immediate 
surroundings, nor the land owner on whose land the spring was located had attempted 
to take ownership for getting the spring back into its free-flowing form again. Rather, 
the crowd got very hostile with council representatives at the scene, upset that the 
council had contracted the work to an irresponsible party from the onset. 
Another example was of a gravity tank that had stopped working because the 
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 Such complaints are common in the discourse over community involvement with improvements to 
service delivery. Mansuri and Rao (2004) are among many who have noted that community members 
cannot be relied upon to serve as a technical resource pool due to their lack of adequate technical 
expertise, which results in poor construction quality and reduces the quality of maintenance.  
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motor that pumped water into it from an adjacent spring had stopped working. 
Residents thought it was because the council stopped paying the associated electricity 
bill. Needless to say, neither the project committee nor the households connected to 
the smaller tanks downstream that were feed by the main tank had taken ownership of 
organizing a solution to the problem.
261
 
A second limitation is some individual's fear that if they allow the Council to 
protect the water spring on their land, it will increase the flow of human traffic on their 
land and could potentially lead to other parts of their land being taken over for public 
use—more than the path leading up to or the area immediately surrounding the water 
spring. In one instance, the son of a deceased resident dug up the protected water 
spring on his newly inherited land in order to minimize public access to the land. Area 
residents said he was afraid people might take over his land since he was based in 
Nairobi, the capital city. In a country where land ownership helps determine wealth 
and community status, it is no surprise that such newly acquired land would be closely 
guarded, especially in the absence of daily interaction on the land. 
Political Impact 
In addition to social transformation, the LASDAP program was established 
with the vision of also stimulating political transformation, as already described under 
the political impact section of the case study on Nakuru. Much like the Municipal 
Council of Nakuru, this vision has yet to materialize in Gusii County Council. One of 
the core reasons—which is clearly illustrated in the case of GCC—is that the structure 
that has been set up to achieve the goal of increased grassroots voice and oversight is 
insufficient at fostering the types of localized positive political change envisioned by 
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 In the preceding narrative, I have insinuated that "community" exists between people of a defined 
geographical boundary. While such assumptions are often based on ideology rather than grounded or 
critical theory, in this instance, I would argue that the nature of the project and its setting, including its 
rural aspect, does indeed create a loose community of users defined by geographical boundaries.  
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the program's organizers. These envisioned changes include greater accountability of 
actions taken by representative leaders, greater transparency of all decision-making 
activities, equity in the distribution of resources, as well as greater inclusiveness in all 
areas of local governance. The structure of the program demands that first and 
foremost, all members of society actively participate in all aspects of the development 
planning process. People have to follow the details of each project, questioning any 
actors that usurp control of the planning process in-lieu of joint decision-making, and 
work in a coordinated fashion such that there are knowledgeable people following the 
various phases of the planning process. To be sure, such an approach takes time and a 
concerted effort on the part of the public. However, in my survey of residents to assess 
the impact of the program in GCC, 89 percent of the applicable respondents admitted 
that although they were aware of the LASDAP program, they had not attended any 
community meetings or actively participated in any other aspects of the development 
planning process. The majority (92 percent) cited unawareness of what the program 
was really about and the fact that they were "not invited," and thus had no knowledge 
of meeting times.
262
 At the same time, when asked whether people's participation in 
the decision-making process had an impact on the local government's level of 
accountability and transparency, budget allocations, equity in the distribution of 
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 As stated in the evaluation of the planning process, most of those who attend consultation meetings 
are there as representatives of CBOs, including women's, widows, and youth groups. Most of them also 
represent the senior leadership within their respective organizations. Searching through the attendance 
lists, one would be hard-pressed to find individuals who were there on their own. While the council 
states that they post announcements of the meeting in strategic places, personal invitations are also sent 
to select CBOs. Thus, it is not surprising that since people are not really aware of the program's purpose 
or structure, they felt they needed an invitation to become engaged. Nonetheless, I would argue that the 
"success" of the program is not simply a matter of increasing attendance rates (currently at an average 
of 31 people per ward or 0.2 percent of the population) since there are several other social and 
institutional dynamics that also have an impact on the program's outcomes. Moreover, people's 
participation must go beyond attending meetings, to include active engagement in the implementation, 
evaluation, and monitoring aspects. However, as articulated in the case study on Nakuru, such 
engagement necessitates that residents have time to commit, the desire to participate, up-to-date 
knowledge of project details, as well as other related council affairs. 
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resources, or project completion rates, only 12 to 18 percent of respondents answered 
in the affirmative. The majority of respondents thought otherwise. Given these 
perceptions, it is not surprising then that people don't make it a priority to participate 
and be informed about the program.  
Another aspect that has limited people's engagement with the planning process 
and by extension limited the program's political impact is that community consultation 
meetings are usually held annually, right before the LASDAP reports are due to the 
Ministry of Local Government. Rather than a forum for promoting continuous 
dialogue about community needs and the plans for implementing them, these meetings 
are treated like tasks that need to be marked off a checklist of the local government's 
to-do list. Furthermore, using wards as the unit of decision-making greatly reduces the 
Councils' ability to engage in truly democratic decision-making. In a rural council like 
GCC, where the population is spread out over a large area, often with vast differences 
between the levels of development within each ward, and where the cumulative cost of 
everyday communication and transportation is prohibitively high for many, it is a tall 
order for residents to be actively engaged in the development process of their ward, let 
alone others. A model consisting of smaller units of decision-making groups, clustered 
by appropriate neighborhood boundaries, which meet more frequently to discuss 
progress updates would be more likely, although not guaranteed, to develop the types 
of political change embedded within the rhetoric of the participatory approach. 
These suggestions face the challenge of a third factor that has affected the 
political impact of the program at GCC, which is that the existing authoritative powers 
have not always been willing to allow such popular participation in the decision-
making process. Popular participation displaces their authority within the existing 
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structure of representative democracy. The loss of power equates to a loss of wealth,
263
 
thus the tension spoken of in the literature between representative forms of democracy 
and popular participation remains.
264
 Five percent of the GCC's Councilors are 
opposed to participatory development practices.
265
 
Similar to the case of Nakuru, GCC's local government officials still make 
many of the development decisions, even as the MoLG's annual Circular emphasizes 
that Councils engage in participatory decision-making.
266
 As noted in the evaluation of 
GCC's planning process, the Council makes the final determination regarding which 
projects it will finance with the annual LASDAP funding, even as residents identify 
and call for ward specific projects. In like manner, local Chiefs and Councilors often 
make the decision regarding specific project locations, such as where footbridges will 
be built or which water springs will be protected. The Council, not the public, can veto 
the Chief or Councilor's decision if they do not agree with it.
267
 Furthermore, residents 
claim that several of the Councilors elect themselves as project supervisors, thereby 
controlling the decisions and flow of information about each project, making it 
difficult for ordinary residents to obtain any information that would provide them with 
any leverage for holding the Councilor or Council accountable.
268
 At the same time, 
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 Here, I think it is important to define wealth broadly, to include not only material wealth but also 
each person's standing within their community. 
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 For example, see Devas and Grant 2003, Brown 2004 
265
 Based on the results from my survey of the Council's Councilors. 
266
 Ministry of Local Government Circular 2002, 2003, 2008 
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 While not done directly, the Council can veto a Chief or Councilor's decision by delaying the 
tendering process (per interview with Council representative, June 2008). On the contrary, discussion 
with the Council's Chairman suggested that the selection process was more democratic, with the 
Provincial location committee determining project locations. However, further discussion with some 
residents and other Council officials suggest otherwise. The Town Clerk (the most senior civil servant 
at the council) can also indirectly veto a project by failing to co-sign the check to release project funds 
in a timely manner. 
268
 Moreover, none of the 18 elected Councilors have designated offices where residents can go to meet 
with them and discuss community issues. Some of those interviewed stated that when they tried to call 
upon the Councilor at his place of residence, they were chased away. At the same time, one of the 
Councilors I interviewed stated that "as a Councilor you have no forum to tell people things except 
maybe during [a] funeral." While it is true that by law Councilors cannot call meetings (the central 
government views that as a potential avenue for Councilors to advance political movements against it), 
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such norms are also upheld because Kenya as a society places value on leadership 
from its community elders and "opinion leaders."
269
 In some ways, this complicates 
the popular participation approach, pitting traditional values against the more 
modern
270
 approach of democratic voice. 
Rather than a tool for empowering ordinary people in a manner that would 
foster political transformation, the LASDAP program has often been used as a 
political tool. In one instance, when residents asked that a particular water spring be 
protected, the area Councilor first asked that he be provided with a list of potential 
users. While harmless and even appropriate on the face of it, the list also provides the 
Councilor with persons he can get to potentially support him for re-election. Another 
is the story is of a gentleman who was allegedly vying for a Councilor's position in the 
last round of local elections. One of his strategies for attacking and defaming the 
incumbent Councilor was to reportedly mobilize young men to destroy the work done 
to protect water springs in the ward. Three water springs had supposedly been 
destroyed as a result. His alleged motive was that the incumbent was using the 
protected water springs as a campaign strategy; destroying them would give the 
incumbent less to boast about. 
It is commonplace to hear that Councilors often use the completion of projects 
                                                                                                                                            
this statement also reveals the "telling" and not "listening" culture of local politicians in Kenya. They 
see themselves as "directors," by virtue of their elected posts, not necessarily bound to listen to their 
constituents. 
269
 Opinion leaders are people who are considered leaders within their community. For example, they 
include school head teachers, Pastors, and Chairpersons of certain self-help groups. Cleaver (2004) 
notes that the ideas of moral behavior in Kenya and other similar societies—such as respect for one's 
elders, those in power, and avoiding open conflict—are not compatible with the notion of "active 
citizenship" as posited by Mohan and Hickey (2004). The latter had hypothesized that radical political 
citizenship—individual sociopolitical practices that allow people to extend their status and rights as 
members of particular political communities, and thus increase their control of society's socioeconomic 
resources—is necessary in order to increase the livelihoods of the poor and marginalized. Thus "full" 
citizenship—the ability to be a part of the economic structure, must be claimed from below.  
270
 Using the term "modern" here does not equate to "better." Rather, I use the terms "traditional" and 
"modern" to juxtapose how the two approaches are often referenced in the literature. 
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within their ward as evidence of their political accomplishments and as a symbol of 
more good things to come should they be reelect.
271
 As such, the project outcomes 
from the LASDAP program are often framed in terms of Councilor's personal 
accomplishments, rather than a community-wide effort at participatory development. 
Some Councilors go as far as having their names inscribed at the project site to 
indicate they were responsible for its implementation. Thus, It is common to hear 
residents say that "politics is for their [Councilor's] own gain." 
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 While used prevalently, this approach did not work in the last election as only one of the Council's 
18 elected Councilors was reelected in 2007. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion 
In Africa, the practice of participatory development has been ongoing for many 
decades. However, since the early 1990s, the practice has gained significant 
prominence as the foremost approach for solving many societal shortcomings, 
including slow social and economic progress, underdeveloped institutional capacities, 
and gross inequity in the distribution of capital and natural resources. The dominance 
and reliance on participatory development has been so extreme that until recently, the 
discourse of participatory development had been on which participatory development 
method was used, not the efficacy of the process.
272
 This study set out to fill that void, 
by examining the impact of a participatory development program in Kenya.  
Although efficacy is referenced above, it should not to be confused with formal 
concepts of efficiency, such as Pareto efficiency in economics or cost-benefit 
assessments. Furthermore, where efficacy is referenced, the goal was not to measure 
levels of efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, transparency, or other claims of the 
participatory process. Instead, the goal of this research was to focus on narrating the 
local reality of Kenya's Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP) and 
what that reality means for the future of social development in Kenya.
273
  
To accomplish this, a mixed-method case study approach was employed, 
focusing on the communities of two local governments: the Municipal Council of 
Nakuru (MCN) and Gusii County Council (GCC). For each of these cases, the 
physical, socioeconomic, and political impact of the LASDAP program was 
documented. This concluding chapter summarizes those findings and suggests avenues 
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 Cleaver 2001 
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 Kenya's LASDAP program was structured to address three goals: reduce local governments' debt 
burden, improve their service delivery mechanisms, and in the process, alleviate poverty. This study 
assessed one of those goals—improving service delivery through collective decision-making. 
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for addressing the many shortcomings of the program and the "system" within which it 
operates. 
Summary of Findings 
In assessing the physical, socioeconomic, and political impact of the LASDAP 
program in Kenya, this study examined several facets, including the factors shaping 
the setting of priorities and the construction of projects, who participates in the 
development process and in what capacity, how various interests and incentives 
influence the program's outcomes, and how the program's own organizational structure 
influences the outcomes. The study also examined how the program has reorganized 
access to social infrastructure—in terms of where the projects have occurred—as well 
as projects' type, quantity, level of sophistication, and breadth of coverage. The 
findings can be summarized in four parts.  
First, very little of the money that had been set aside by the central government 
to improve services was actually spent on doing so. Whereas at least 60 percent of the 
annual intergovernmental transfer fund should have been devoted to capital 
expenditures, only 11 percent and 5 percent of those funds was spent to do so at the 
MCN and GCC, respectively. Furthermore, the scale of projects that were completed 
was very small, with both councils only managing to complete one-quarter or less of 
the projects to which they had originally allocated funds.
274
  
Second, there is limited community participation in the planning process. The 
ratio of residents who attend meetings in any given ward is relatively small. On 
average, 24 people were present to represent each ward in Nakuru while the average 
for GCC was 31. Based on the population served in each of the two local 
governments, this equates to approximately 0.2 percent of the population in both 
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 While this analysis only covered four years (FY 2004/2005 to FY 2007/2008), site visits and 
subsequent interviews reveal that the observed outcomes can be somewhat generalized to account for 
the previous years' performances. 
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locations. By contrast, council officers were under the perception that "at least 40 
percent" of the people took part in LASDAP proceedings. Aside from participation in 
consultation meetings, residents also play a limited role in project implementation, 
which is usually overseen by the council Engineer or ward Councilors. While it would 
be utopian to expect a 100 percent participation rate, the current rates (0.2 percent in 
both locations) suggest that there is little "participation" going on. Very few local 
voices are a part of the decision-making process. Furthermore, the business 
community has only participated marginally, mainly because they have no incentive to 
participate. Many of the local businesses are small enterprises, without enough extra 
revenue to justify taking time off to participate in the process. Moreover, they have 
nothing to gain business-wise for their participation.  
Interviews and informal discussions with residents identified three main 
reasons for their lack of attendance at community meetings and participation in the 
decision-making process in general. 
 First, there is widespread unawareness about when and where meetings 
take place.  
 The second reason was lack of affordability. Residents stated that they 
needed to work in order to obtain a day's wages, without which they would 
not be able to provide enough sustenance for their families.  
 The third reason is that residents did not feel that their attendance would 
necessarily influence the outcome, alleging that Councilors and other local 
leaders often control the process of selecting projects.  
The third finding is that Kenya's local governments organize poorly,
275
 are 
underequipped, and are feeble development partners.
276
 Their capabilities are further 
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weakened by the uncoordinated and competing structure of multiple administrative 
arms (the Provincial, Constituency, sector-based ministries, and local government). 
However, Kenya was among the 172 governments who pledged to position local 
governments as the coordinators of local development during the 1992 Earth 
Summit.
277
 Unfortunately, their poor performance in the LASDAP program and in 
general—manifested through inadequate water and sanitation services, overcrowded 
and underequipped schools, as well as unfurnished and underfunded healthcare 
centers—has led to the general perception that local governments are not responsive to 
their citizens. Residents, in turn, have developed an attitude of resignation rather than 
of participation.  
The fourth finding is that while much of the domestic and international 
demands for greater democratic governance have focused on expanding the circle of 
who participates in the decision-making process
278—emphasizing the need to increase 
the presence of civil society, particularly local residents—this study shows that more 
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 In 1992, the UN hosted a conference on Environment and Development (otherwise referred to as the 
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 While democratic decentralization to the local level is currently believed and favored to foster such 
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included in the decision-making process (Emmett 2000, DFID 2002, Oyugi and Kibua 2006). Oyugi 
(2000) contends that it is almost a myth to expect that everyone will be included in the decision-making 
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lower socioeconomic class, whom they thought to have the highest level of authoritarian personalities. 
They fear that such tendencies will lead to reduced chances of reaching a consensus on normative issues 
and thus decline (emphasis added) the democratic process. Gaventa (1980) however argues that access 
to decision-making processes provides a better guarantee that one‘s interests will be advanced and thus 
he advocates for more inclusive measures in decision-making processes. 
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emphasis needs to be placed on how people participate.
279
 That is, it is not enough to 
simply focus on the widening of decision-making spaces to theoretically include more 
categories of participants. Ensuring that those "new-comers" are actually able to 
meaningfully participate in the decision-making process is also critically important.
280
 
Kenya's LASDAP program is "participatory." Yet, the process is largely 
controlled by Councilors, a fact that is reflected in the type and location of projects, as 
well as the level of projects' sophistication. Such elite capture of the process not only 
results in an unequal distribution of resources, but also continues to reinforce the 
norm—exclusion of ordinary residents from the decision-making process, variation in 
the distribution of resources, and consequently, variation in the distribution of 
benefits—whereby local politicians gain disproportionately more benefits from 
existing resources and implemented projects than the average resident. Councilors, 
who are also members of the local government councils, have significant sway in 
controlling local processes, a pre-existing norm that did not change with the 
introduction of a participatory decision-making process. Kenya and other countries' 
experiences illustrate that it is not enough to simply state that decisions should be 
made in a participatory manner because that hasn‘t deterred elite capture.281 Thus, in 
practice, the participatory ideology must undergo constant scrutiny to determine how 
different groups participate within that established process and the extent to which 
their participation or nonparticipation alters social, economic, or political norms. 
Understandably, it will be a near-impossible feat to structure a process that could 
facilitate such constant oversight. Kenya's Local Government Reform Program 
(KLGRP), which oversees the LASDAP program, is barely able to keep up with the 
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minimal monitoring and evaluation measures currently in place. 
Moving Forward: Identifying both Technical and Sociopolitical Barriers 
Achieving long-lasting solutions to many of the issues pointed out in the 
summary of findings will require both technical and structural changes. Admittedly, 
many of the technical changes recommended here are simply extensions or 
enhancements to what the original program was already intended to do. However, the 
non-binding nature of the envisioned participatory development program has resulted 
in a situation whereby the development process has been subjugated by the politics of 
local power dynamics and interpersonal relationships, which have largely excluded 
ordinary residents from the decision-making process. This is all very ironic, because 
the impetus behind participatory development policies such as the LASDAP is for 
these very persons to be included in the decision-making processes at the local level.  
Recommendations for Technical Changes 
As outlined in Table 1.1, community participation as a means of improving 
development efficiency does not address any structural changes that might be needed 
in the system of operation. Thus, what follows are technical suggestions to effect 
better participatory methods and improve operational barriers in the LASDAP 
program. While it will require more than these simple technical changes to effect 
grassroots social change—including less inequality, greater transparency and 
accountability, and more inclusive decision-making processes, these recommendations 
nonetheless form a part of the solution. It is recommended that local governments: 
i. Create smaller units of decision-making groups - Due to the sheer size of each 
ward, using wards as the unit of decision-making greatly reduces the Councils' 
ability to engage in truly democratic decision-making. Furthermore, there are often 
vast differences between the levels of development within each ward, complicating 
the prioritization of need. Thus, smaller units of decision-making groups would be 
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more appropriate.
282
  
ii. Increase the frequency of community meetings - More frequent meetings would 
help the local governments stay in tune with each community instead of stepping 
in and out once a year. Frequent meetings, free of elite capture, would also help 
foster a sense of communal decision-making and potentially increase opportunities 
for ensuring greater transparency of the process and greater accountability of the 
local government leaders. Currently, community consultation meetings are held 
once a year, usually right before the LASDAP reports are due to the Ministry of 
Local Government. Consequently, rather than a forum for promoting continuous 
dialogue about community needs and the plans for implementing them, these 
meetings are treated like tasks that need to be marked off a checklist of to-do 
items. 
iii. Commit to securing appropriate staff - The two local governments studied do 
not have staff dedicated to managing and monitoring the LASDAP planning 
process from start to finish. In preparations for fulfilling the LASDAP report 
requirements, accounting and administrative Clerks are often tasked with playing 
whatever role is necessary in order to complete the annual report. Once the report 
is submitted (which is mainly comprised of minutes from each community meeting 
along with attendance records), their responsibilities are over. Both Councils also 
lack adequate technical expertise to properly manage development planning 
activities within their jurisdictions. The MCN only operates with one Engineer, 
two Architects, a senior Public Works officer, and some junior officers in its 
Engineering department. GCC's Works and Planning department operates with 
only one land surveyor and a new engineering graduate as its sole senior officers. 
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Planners and other technical experts are needed to develop and execute concrete 
urban and rural planning systems for each local government. 
iv. Commit towards greater maintenance and capital expenditures - For FY 
2007/2008, 63 percent of all local governments' expenditures went towards 
personnel and operations. The remaining 38 percent of revenue was shared 
between maintenance, loan repayments, debt repayments, and capital 
expenditures.
283
 The split in proportion of these national averages are in line with 
expenditure proportions for both GCC and the MCN. To increase their 
commitments towards maintenance and capital expenditures, both councils will 
have to generate more revenue and possibly restructure their current organizational 
layout in order to ensure cost effective use of funds. In 2005, a report 
commissioned by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that as a 
continent, Africa needed to invest an additional USD 20 billion a year on 
maintenance as well as the construction of new infrastructure projects in order to 
sustain an acceptable growth rate.
284
 More recently, the World Bank estimated that 
there needs to be an investment of at least USD 90 billion a year (more than twice 
the current expenditures).
285
 While important, these reports lay emphasis on 
bringing in more money. However, this study has shown that there is a problem 
with how available funds are spent. Local governments must restructure 
themselves to ensure that they are making adequate investments in local 
infrastructure and maintenance.  
v. Improve access to project details - Unequal power structures have limited 
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residents' access to information regarding the status of project implementation. 
This has greatly diminished residents' ability to hold their Councilors and local 
government officials accountable, thereby reducing the level of accountability and 
transparency said to be inherent in the process. This also limits the potential for 
community monitoring and evaluation. 
vi. Improve monitoring and evaluation (M+E) oversight – Currently, M+E is 
structured to occur at three different levels: community, local government, and the 
central government. As alluded to at various times, community monitoring 
committees are either non-existent or restricted in their ability to function 
effectively. Moreover, many members are hand-picked, promoting patronage and 
clientelism. Local government oversight amounts to self-policing, and central 
government oversight teams have been accused of rent-seeking and only basing 
their evaluations on a monetary framework.
286
 In recent years, some efforts were 
made to inspect a few of the implemented projects, but little or no information is 
gathered about the details of the participatory process or the project's impact. 
 
In addition to these program changes, some technical changes also need to be 
effected at the national level. They include: 
i. The coordination of administrative systems – There are five channels for the 
delivery of public services in Kenya. They include the district, constituency, and 
local government system, as well as the sector ministries and civil society groups. 
While each system conducts its own set of core programs and largely operates as a 
semi-autonomous body, complications arise when multiple systems lay claim to 
having funded the same project. In other instances, projects are duplicated in one 
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community while other communities within that same jurisdiction go without. 
Rivalry and competition between local leaders and organizations within each of 
these systems have also led to circumstances which ultimately reduce service 
delivery standards. Due to the uncoordinated efforts between each of these 
systems, funds and technical capabilities are often stretched thin, leading to small-
scale, sub-standard, unsustainable, or incomplete projects. This structure of 
uncoordinated systems also leads some community members to regard other 
systems as superior to the local government system.
287
 While each system has its 
pros and cons, such biased or in some cases justified perceptions will not advance 
even genuine development efforts from the local government.  
ii. Clear definitions of who is responsible for service provision – Currently, there 
is no clear definition of roles when it come to who is responsible for ensuring 
service delivery at the local level. As shown in Table C.1 (Appendix C) and 
discussed in Chapter 2, generally, local governments are only mandated to provide 
burial sites and bury the destitute. Town planning responsibilities, as well as the 
provision of core services such as water, sanitation, and refuse collection are at the 
discretion of each local council. However, it is generally assumed that local 
councils would nonetheless provide these services. Many of them do, but only to 
the extent that they are managing infrastructure which have been in place since 
long before independence. In most cases, provisions are not made for the ever 
expanding population base, leading to overuse and accelerated deterioration. The 
situation is further compounded with low levels of maintenance. More recently 
however, through the LASDAP program, local governments have been 
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unofficially tasked as the leaders of local development,
288
 although the current 
results are not promising. Furthermore, there is no real confidence in local 
governments to perform the tasks. While the 2002-2008 National Development 
Plan stated that "operation and development activities will be decentralized to 
other actors, including local authorities, the private sector, and…communities," in 
the same report, local authorities were cited as deficient in their ability to manage 
development activities. 
"However, [the] Local Government administration system had been in 
a state of neglect and has suffered loss of integrity in the eyes of both 
the Government and the general public because of gross 
mismanagement. 
"…Local Authority will require greater autonomy and strengthening of 
their capacity to be able to provide good local governance and ensure 
effective delivery of services.
289
 
The 2002-2008 Plan further stated that  
"The expansion of Local Authorities coupled with urban population 
increases and budgetary constraints, has resulted in local authorities not 
being able to maintain and effectively manage existing services. 
Consequently the Government has shifted towards privatization, 
commercialization and stakeholder participation in traditional local 
service delivery."
290
 
The current 2008-2012 Plan also states that  
"Local authorities lack an adequate capacity to plan and manage urban 
development."
291
 
Despite these known deficiencies however, the only response thus far has been to 
implement the LASDAP participatory development program. Aside from signing a 
yearly "Performance Contract" with each council and requiring the councils to 
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send quarterly finance reports to the Ministry of Local Government, as well as 
ranking the councils based on certain indicators, nothing concrete has been done to 
address the inadequacy of basic services. Without first defining and incorporating 
the role of local governments into the national agenda, there can be no significant 
progress in developing the necessary resource base to propel Kenya forward. 
Recent efforts, such as establishing the local governments as the lead partner for 
the LASDAP development program, are a step in the right direction. However, 
local governments must be duly empowered, structured, and reorganized in order 
to take that lead. Participatory development policies such as the LASDAP require 
strong institutional capacity in order to operate optimally. Yet the program was 
established to create that same institutional capacity. Thus, unsurprisingly, the 
findings suggest that the LASDAP has done little to provide the two local 
governments with the capacity or expertise they need. Moreover, the LASDAP 
program needs to be recognized and supported outside the Ministry of Local 
Government. Neither of the two most recent national plans makes any reference to 
the LASDAP, even though it is one of the main local development programs, and 
the only avenue through which many of the local governments are investing in 
capital infrastructure. Rather, the 2002-2008 Plan called for the revamping of the 
District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) program as the springboard upon 
which to adopt a participatory approach to development. Unlike the LASDAP 
program which is controlled by locals, the DFRD program is directed by the 
Office of the President, under the Provincial Administration system. Failure to 
definitively plan for local service needs, defining the role of each government 
entity, as well as private actors, will only result in more of the same in the years to 
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come.
292
  
Moving Beyond Technical Recommendations…to Sociopolitical Change 
Implementation of the technical changes that are suggested above can go as far 
as (i) improving the types and increasing the number of projects that are constructed 
(ii) creating an improved system for local development planning and (iii) improving 
the relationship between the local authorities and their residents in these two 
communities. However, limiting the conclusion of this dissertation to those 
recommendations, or further discussing the nuances of the most effective means of 
implementing a "productive" development planning system in Kenya would be akin to 
discussing which make and model of a mop is most effective for cleaning up a water 
soaked floor without addressing why the leak is occurring in the first place.  
Implementation of a more productive planning system in Kenya would be 
commendable, and would undoubtedly go a long way towards improving the day-to-
day functioning of millions of people. Nearly every human activity is positively 
impacted by the ready availability of water and electricity. Nevertheless, such 
solutions are merely technical. They do not address the underlying sociopolitical 
realities of unequal power and access to assets that continue to leave millions of 
people in Kenya and elsewhere without access to everyday basic needs in the first 
place. Thus, the circumstances demand that one not look at what is happening in 
Kenya as a solitary development issue. As discussed in Chapter Two, one must look at 
the larger context, to understand the global forces influencing the conditions and 
decisions that are made in Kenya. That is, an inside-out analysis. Under such a lens, it 
is clear to see that the participatory approach to development is part of the neoliberal 
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agenda, a political ideology that is structured to empower the market and set tighter 
controls on state social expenditure, while advocating for greater democratization.
293
 
As Olpadwala (unpublished) suggests, resistance to critically examining the 
system and structure within which development takes place inevitably results in a 
recycling of the same development policies every few decades. This seems to be the 
case in Kenya, where policies have oscillated between area and multi-sector based 
rural development, urban-regional development, and participatory governance without 
addressing the underlying reasons for the cases of poverty and underdevelopment that 
the policies seek to address. As a result, almost fifty years after gaining independence 
[and securing the freedom to extend community upgrading services beyond the white 
highlands and other British settlements around the country], Kenya has yet to secure 
potable water, adequate healthcare, electricity, housing, or the guarantee of a 
secondary school education for a significant proportion of its population.
294
  
The problem with the neoliberal agenda is that it reproduces poverty, and is 
thus unable to deliver the "freedoms" that it espouses.
295
 These freedoms include 
economic and political freedoms such as the ability to avoid starvation and 
undernourishment, escape morbidity and premature mortality, be literate and 
numerate, and enjoy political participation and uncensored speech. Sen (2000) and 
other critics argue that achieving these freedoms requires the removal of elements 
which hinder such progress: poverty, neglect of public facilities, poor economic 
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opportunities, social deprivation, tyranny, and the intolerance of repressive states. On 
the contrary however, neoliberal policies—which champion the notion of free 
markets, deregulation of business, privatization, and reduction in public 
expenditures—result amongst other things, in the reduction of economic mobility and 
a tendency to exploit workers in order for the owners of existing capital to reap the 
maximum gain on investments. Inevitably, inequality increases. Informal employment 
also tends to increase.
296
 Thus, there is a disconnection between the normative 
outcomes of neoliberal policies and the ideological fervor that often accompanies it. 
In Kenya, where neoliberal policies have been a part of the governance 
structure for the last several decades, the rate of poverty increased significantly during 
the 1990s, going from 40 percent to 52 percent by 1997.
297
 By the mid-2000s, the rate 
had reduced to 47 percent—lower than its 1997 levels, but higher than the poverty 
level during the early 1990s. Moreover, concentration of wealth in the hands of the 
highest income group is on the rise following a drop in the early 1990s. As shown in 
Table 6.1, in 2005, approximately 54 percent of the annual share of income was held 
by the highest 20 percent. In the mid-1990s, the share was lower. Likewise, the 
percentage share of income held by the lowest 20 percent is on the decline after rising 
slightly in the mid-1990s. 
Table 6.1: Percentage Share of Income Held by Population Quintiles 
Year Highest 20% Lowest 20%
1992 61.8 3.4
1994 48.1 5.6
1997 49 6
2005 53.8 4.7  
Source: 2005 World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
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Furthermore, Kenya's urban unemployment rate nearly trebled from 6.7 
percent in 1978 to 19.9 percent in 2006.
298
 Even more revealing is that approximately 
three-quarters of the employed are self-employed.
299
 Only one-quarter of the active 
population (ages 5+) has paid employment. Moreover, the expected employment rate 
of growth in the formal sector was much slower than that of the informal sector.
300
 
Since the main reason for informal sector growth is to at least maintain survival 
livelihoods for the most economically disadvantaged, one can reasonably conclude 
that even if neoliberalism is not the cause of increased poverty levels, neither does it 
seem to be the cure for it and many other societal ills faced by residents of the two 
case study communities.  
Rethinking the means of addressing many of these social ills will require both 
a technical and sociopolitical approach. That is, the development process will have to 
be politicized, much to the chagrin of many.
301
 One of the first steps in politicizing the 
development process is rethinking of the role of the state in development. Under the 
current capitalist system, the state is largely separated from guaranteeing that its 
citizens have access to the assets that can provide for their basic needs. The state is 
only engaged in the provision of those needs to the extent that doing so helps it 
establish the necessary foundation for capital to grow. Since that growth in capital is 
then harnessed by a small, select group of individuals, and used as the means of 
obtaining everyday needs, society is separated into the "have" and "have nots." As 
noted elsewhere in this report, Hyatt, Cooke and Kothari, Hickey and Mohan all 
concur that by focusing on poverty alleviation and the provision of basic needs, many 
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development programs fail to reflect of how and why poverty is generated in the first 
place. Rather, focus is on the primacy of the individual.
302
  
In order to address the underlying inequality that forms the basis of many of 
Kenya's societal ills, the state will have to reinvent itself as a more socially democratic 
one. As Judt (2010) writes, at stake is not how wealthy a country is but how unequal it 
is. "Inequality is corrosive. It rots societies from within." Such an argument is not 
popular in the non-European West, where social policies have been dismantled in the 
name of efficiency and "less government." However, the popularity and success of the 
welfare state at limiting inequality in Europe holds hope for its ability to redefine a 
more benevolent state in Kenya—one that is structured to ensure that the basic needs 
of its most vulnerable members are addressed.  
One of the arguments against social democracy is that it harms civil liberties. 
However, many societies, including Kenya, are already dependent on the state for 
protection without having their civil liberties diminished.
303
 The Kenyan state protects 
its people against terrorists, pirates, and other criminals. Protection in the form of 
agricultural subsidies is prevalent. Literacy in the form of primary education is also 
provided. Moving forward, Kenya must approach this task of nation building with the 
same drive and intensity it took to resolve the disputed 2007 Presidential elections, 
when it invested heavily to form an expanded coalition government.  
One of the goals slated for 2012 in the First Medium Term Plan (2008-2012) 
for achieving Vision 2030 is to develop "a utility sector that is modern, customer-
oriented, and technologically-enabled to provide efficient, cost-effective, quality 
services to all citizens."
304
 Another was to "accelerate ongoing infrastructure 
development, focusing on quality, aesthetics, and functionality of the infrastructure 
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services developed." Based on the findings of this study, these visions are far from 
becoming a reality by 2012. In order to make the statements go beyond merely being 
words on a page, the government must restructure its social development agenda to 
align with its vision. Socially democratic policies are key to achieving these tasks. A 
merely technical approach of popular participation will not suffice. 
Setting the Limits of Participatory Development 
This story of democratic decentralization is not just a Kenyan story. It is a 
story that applies to many of Africa's 53 countries,
305
 where the popularity of 
decentralization is unparalleled. Dubbed as a "bottom-up" strategy, 80 percent of 
countries have enacted participatory development policies in one form or another.
306
 
However, while there are reports of policies that have resulted in very positive 
outcomes for some countries, there are also reports that have stated that participatory 
development policies failed to achieve the desired goals.
307
 Unfortunately, several of 
those failed attempts are linked to African countries.  
Writing about participatory development practices in South Africa, Emmett 
(2000) notes that while there is much support for participatory development, the 
practice is fraught with conceptual and technical difficulties, limiting what 
participation can do for development. Yet, international development agencies, 
international financial institutions, scholars, and central governments continue to 
conceptualize development in participatory terms, as illustrated through the 
methodological approach often favored by the United Nations, OECD Development 
Assistance Committee, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and others. Not 
only is the participatory approach favored, it is often a requirement for many loans and 
grants. 
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In places like West Bengal (India), Porto Alegre (Brazil), Rufisque (Senegal), 
and some of the Andean communities in Bolivia, participatory development policies 
have improved female and minority representation on municipal councils and other 
decision-making boards.
308
 Participatory development has also been credited with 
improving institutional responsiveness to the poor, although only on rare occasions, 
and those occasions are largely determined by the politics of local-center relations.
309
 
The key component is that unless a national government or party has a strong 
commitment towards promoting the interests of the poor, it is rare to find participatory 
policies that have resulted in positive outcomes.
310
 Such is the case of the oft cited 
positive cases of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre and the Panchayati Raj
311
 
system of decentralized local government in India. As in Kenya, constitutional change 
in Brazil led to the transfer of development funds from the central government to the 
local governments. However, it was the long-running social justice campaign and 
focus of the ruling Workers' Party that enabled sociopolitical change at the grassroots 
level.
312
  
In most cases, participatory development has not led to improved systems of 
accountability, or been effective at reducing the rate of poverty—goals which the 
practice of participatory development is often targeted to achieve. The practice has 
also generally not attracted the participation of the poor, even though that is the target 
population. Much of that has to do with the disconnection between participation as a 
process and the effect it can have in society. So often, participatory development is 
spoken of using the language of "transformation" that not only includes social 
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changes, but economic and political changes. In this context, the intent of people's 
participation moves from a purely instrumental purpose of social transformation to one 
that also seeks to achieve systemic changes to the current economic and political value 
systems of society. Yet, such change is more prone to occur when there is an internal, 
self-initiated mobilization for social change, not one directed "from above" as is often 
the case with participatory development programs initiated by the government or 
advocated for by international development agencies.  
Theorists of agency emphasize the transformatory and emancipatory potential 
of individual and collective agency.
313
 However, as noted throughout this report, 
underlying processes of development can strip away people's agency, as agency is not 
exercised in a vacuum.
314
 In this case, those underlying processes include "community 
oversight" of non-binding "development agreements" that are reached via "consensus" 
decision-making. Agency is shaped by the minutiae of social life and relationships, 
which is difficult to transform.
315
 In Kenyan society, that includes showing respect for 
anyone who is older than oneself, is in a higher position, or who is considered a 
"community leader." Thus, the very exercise of agency can also serve to reinforce 
inequality.
316
 
There is no doubt that community participation has a place within the 
development process. However, findings from this report on Kenya suggest that there 
are limits as to what participatory development can do. One is that community 
members cannot replace technical experts in the construction of infrastructure, 
although it is possible that they could be guided by them. In instances where this 
substitution was made in the cases studied here, community members complained of 
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shoddy workmanship and poor construction quality.
317
 Even when contractors are 
hired, they must be contractors who are specialized in the area of need. Another 
limitation is that participatory development practices cannot replace traditional 
approaches to urban and regional planning. If, in the case of Kenya, the ultimate goal 
is to create well-planned infrastructure systems that will improve service delivery 
mechanisms, an approach focused on participatory decision-making processes alone is 
not enough. The expertise and time commitment required is simply too scarce a 
resource to be effectively or continuously sustained by civil society. Thus to address 
one of the tyrannies identified by Cooke and Kothari (2001), there must be a 
discussion of alternative methods for cultivating development.  
Most importantly, agencies and specialists in the field of development must 
face the reality that participatory development is not the panacea that will solve the 
many instances of social injustice that are occurring in Kenya and elsewhere around 
the world. This study serves as one more addition to the list of evidences to that effect. 
Local power dynamics are simply too strong, too complicated, and too intertwined to 
be inconsequential during local development processes. In their response to the 
labeling of participation as tyranny by Cooke et al. (2001), Hickey et al. (2004) largely 
fail to address this issue. They only go as far as saying that institutions and nations 
need to rethink development within a broader project of social justice. For Kenya, this 
study suggests the reinvention of the state as a more socially democratic one, which 
gives priority to ensuring that the basic needs of its most vulnerable populations are 
met. Currently, the state is devoted to creating wealth, which is largely concentrated in 
the hands of a few. 
Without acknowledging the limitations of participation and recognizing the 
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conflation that is often made between the means and the desired end of participation, 
the practice of participatory development will only be a superficial cover for the 
underlying issues of social injustice, regardless of the rhetoric used to promote it. As 
Cleaver (2004) writes, 
"Recognizing the limits of the makeability of social life is as important 
to achieving something in development as over-optimistic faith in the 
possibilities of participatory politics."
318
 
That said, these conclusions do not mean that there is no place for participatory 
development in Kenya. Local input is valuable in any development process. However, 
the international community and national proponents cannot rely on participatory 
development to fix underlying sociopolitical problems of social injustice and unequal 
power structures. 
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APPENDIX A 
Research Methodology 
While the incorporation of participatory approaches into the delivery of urban 
infrastructure has increased dramatically over the last two decades, there is still no 
standard conceptual framework for incorporating community participation into local 
development.
319
 However, new strategies and methodological approaches for 
community participation are constantly being formulated by development agencies, 
scholars, and practitioners of participatory research and development.  
Over the last decade, Kenya has developed its own methodological approach to 
go along with a national program of participatory development. This study examined 
that program, its accompanying methodology, and its outcomes over the last 5 
years.
320
 The aim was to determine if and how the participatory process works. The 
assessment included two parts. The first was an assessment of the process; who was 
involved and how. The second was an assessment of the projects that were initiated as 
a result of the program—what type of projects were implemented and where they 
occurred. Thus, a lot of the focus was on the issue of process—and inevitably, power, 
as the outcomes of any process is determined by the unfolding of the power dynamics 
involved. 
This evaluation was necessary for two reasons. First, it is one of the only 
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studies that provide a detailed account of the outcomes from Kenya's Local Authority 
Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP). Since its inception more than 10 years ago, 
Kenya's LASDAP program has been the main avenue through which its central 
government is making capital investment in local infrastructure. As such, an 
evaluation of its success and potential to serve as a long-term vessel for growth and 
development is justified. Second, it expands the depth and geographic diversity of the 
literature on participation and development, and provides the opportunity to create a 
richer and more nuanced grounded theory of community participation in local 
development. Such grounded theory is crucial for developing place-based ideological 
expectations of participation, as opposed to the current universal expectations.  
Technique Employed 
This study employed a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods to 
explore the effects of the LASDAP program in local communities using a case study 
approach. A mixed-method approach allows for the triangulation of various sources of 
evidence.
321
 A case study approach was selected because case studies seek to "explain 
a phenomenon within its real-life context." Furthermore, case studies are useful for 
determining how or why questions about contemporary events,
322
 which was the goal 
of the research. The approach illuminates the results of a decision or set of decisions 
and how they were implemented.
323
 A multiple case study approach was deemed most 
appropriate for this study. 
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The original intent was to conduct an evaluation of the LASDAP program in 
three local governments.
324
 The reasoning was that by assessing three communities, I 
would provide myself the opportunity to compare and contrast multiple cases, and be 
better suited to make broader generalizations from my findings. Limiting it to three 
cases would allow me to meet budget and time constraints. However, as I prepared to 
leave for my fieldwork in January 2008, post-election violence broke out in Kenya 
following disputes over the December 2007 Presidential elections. I was forced to 
delay my trip for several months, diminishing part of the seven and a half months I 
had allotted for collecting research data in Kenya. As a result, I revised my data 
collection efforts to only focus on two case studies, one in an urban area, and another 
in a rural area. It was envisaged that the findings from these two case studies, 
combined with those from a handful of other small studies that had been conducted 
during the last few years would be sufficient enough to draw meaningful conclusions 
about the impact of the LASDAP program in Kenya. The data collection effort began 
in the capital city of Nairobi, followed by visits to the two case study sites: the 
Municipal Council of Nakuru (MCN) and Gusii County Council (GCC). 
Criteria Used for Site Selection 
A purposeful sampling technique (also known as purposeful selection) was 
used to select the two case study sites. This technique involves the deliberate selection 
of particular places, persons, or activities to provide information that cannot be 
obtained (or can only be obtained in limited form) from other choices.
325
 Purposeful 
sampling is the most commonly used form of non-probabilistic (non-random) 
sampling.
326
 If the sites were selected randomly, a large sample size would have to be 
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employed in order to ensure that the samples are "good" representatives, such that the 
conclusions drawn from the samples represent the average members of the population 
in a given place. Due to limitations in the amount of time and financial capital that was 
available for the study, a large sample size was infeasible. 
As documented by Maxwell (2005), a purposeful selection approach allowed 
me to: (i) select sites that were representative of the program's setting, individuals, and 
activities. The selection of one urban and one rural local government was in line with 
the distribution of Kenya's local authorities; 62 percent of which govern urban areas, 
while 38 percent govern rural areas. Furthermore, the organizational structure of both 
the Municipal Council of Nakuru and Gusii County Council is representative of the 
structure of many other local governments in Kenya
327
 In addition, both sites are areas 
with significant and increasing population, and are situated along the west to southeast 
diagonal (see Figure 3.1) that is home to the majority of Kenya's population (ii) 
establish particular comparisons to illustrate differences between the setting, 
individuals, and capabilities of an urban versus a rural local government (iii) 
adequately capture the heterogeneity of the population, so that the entire range of 
variation, rather than the average subset of the range are captured. Thus, while the 
urban population of Nakuru town features people from various ethnic backgrounds, 
the mostly indigenous people of Kisii district represent many of the rural areas, which 
are made up of one major ethnic group and (iv) examine cases that are critical to the 
theory being evaluated, or that were developed during the course of evaluation. For 
example, participatory development theory infers that the more civic education people 
have, the more likely they are to take part in deliberative processes where they can 
have their voices heard and their opinions counted. In light of this, the population of 
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Nakuru municipality is ideal because Nakuru has attracted a fair share of civic 
workshops in the past, including ones on participatory development. Furthermore, 
various community needs, such as low-cost housing, water and sewage facilities as 
well as mechanisms for refuse disposal have been implemented as a result of 
participatory processes. Thus, at least some of the population has experience with 
participatory processes. Furthermore, some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
have even carried out workshops specifically targeted at improving the level of civic 
education concerning the LASDAP program. Choosing Nakuru as a case study site 
allowed me to examine whether this past history had any effect on people's awareness 
and participation in the LASDAP process. Moreover, one of the theories that have 
surfaced in the last decade or so in Kenya is that if each town had a Strategic Structure 
Plan (SSP) that outlined its development needs, the SSP would have an impact on its 
development planning process. Nakuru was the first to development an SSP in the 
1990s thus selecting it as a case study site helped evaluate this theory. Gusii County 
Council is currently involved in a development partnership with the European Union's 
Rural Poverty Reduction and Local Government Support Program (RPRLGSP). The 
existence of this partnership, which is centered on the rehabilitation of natural water 
springs within the district, makes Gusii County Council a more likely candidate for 
success with the LASDAP program. This is because the program for rehabilitation of 
water springs by the EU has been very successful, and the presumption is that the 
successful methods of the EU program would be transferred over to the LASDAP 
program.  
It is also reasonable to conclude that given their prior experiences with 
development programs—Nakuru with Localizing Agenda 21 and Gusii County 
Council with the RPRLGSP—these two cases represent cases that are more likely to 
succeed with materializing the vision of the LASDAP program as a key avenue for 
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development planning in Kenya. Thus, if the program at these two locations turned out 
to not be successful, the evidence would be even more compelling. In selecting the 
sites, the feasibility of access and data collection was also considered. 
Source of Data 
The primary sources for the data used in this study include interviews and on-
site project assessments. Newspaper articles, agency publications, and the knowledge 
gained from an extensive literature review on the research topic served as secondary 
data sources. While the majority of the data used in this study is qualitative in nature, 
some basic quantitative analyses were also conducted.
328
 The value of such a mixed-
method approach is that it provides a means of triangulating the data to ensure 
accuracy between various data sources.  
1. Interviews 
The interviews were designed to encompass three groups: those who 
formulated the national development policy, those who spearhead its implementation 
locally, and those who live in the communities where projects are implemented. The 
interview process began in the capital city of Nairobi. This is where all the 
government ministries (civil service officials) are located. In order to gain a clearer 
understanding of why and how the LASDAP policy was crafted into its current 
structure, it was important to interview the appropriate central government officials 
who played a role in the policy's formulation. As such, I administered two sets of 
questionnaires targeted at current and former members of the LASDAP management 
committee. In all, I conducted six formal interviews with this group of respondents, as 
well as one informal telephone discussion with another person (this telephone 
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discussion was not tallied into the final count of interviews). These interviews gave 
me a good understanding of the circumstances and discussions surrounding the 
program's creation, a necessary component for contextualizing the ideology behind its 
institution and corresponding expectations. Furthermore, in speaking with officials 
currently in charge of administering the program, I was able to get a good sense of 
their current operations, challenges, and achievements. Table A.1 shows the total 
number of interviews by category of respondents. In all, 98 interviews were 
conducted. 
Table A.1: Interviews Conducted for this Study, by Category 
  NAIROBI GCC MCN 
Central Government  6 - - 
Local Government    11 11 
Civil Society Organizations 5 1 11 
Research Institutes
329
 3 - - 
Community Residents   17 (34 ppl) 33 (41 ppl) 
   
N=98 
Interviewees were selected using a purposive sampling technique (expert and 
snowball sampling).
330
 Although I was not able to interview everyone,
331
 it was clear 
that I had conducted a rigorous sampling and reached a saturation point when I was 
told to talk to people I had already talked to and the same information kept being 
revealed during interviews. This line of questioning started in Nairobi, to get a good 
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sense of the program's goals from those responsible for its formulation at the national 
level. I then traveled to my two case study locations to examine the reality of the 
envisioned development process locally. Besides getting first-hand knowledge of the 
program's outcomes, the in-depth analyses at these two sites were also meant to help 
me articulate whether, indeed, a better process to participation is what is needed, as 
some have argued, or whether the approach itself is plagued with enough 
shortcomings that a new approach to development should be taken.
332
  
Gusii County Council 
I interviewed Gusii County Council officials to gain an understanding of how 
they handled their LASDAP development process. Eleven interviews were conducted 
with this group of respondents.
333
 Since I was seeking to understand how the 
development process was organized locally, I interviewed officials at the local 
government office knowledgeable about the development process. Similar to other 
questionnaires, the questionnaire for local government officials featured a set of open-
ended questions. While several respondents answered many of the same questions, the 
questions asked were not completely standardized across all respondents in order to 
focus on each person's area of expertise. Interviews typically lasted 60-120 minutes 
and each respondent was provided with a consent form before the interview began. 
Since a new set of elections had just taken place a few months prior to my arrival in 
Kenya, I also conducted a survey of local Councilors (locally elected representatives 
who are part of the local government decision-making body). This survey was focused 
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on assessing the new Councilors' level of awareness and personal opinions towards the 
LASDAP program.
334
  
Gusii County Council covers more than 200 square miles of rural, rugged 
terrain. As such, it was quite an arduous task traveling around to conduct interviews 
and inspect project locations. Even with a four-wheel drive truck, the roads proved to 
be very treacherous in many places. However, effort was made to visit several of the 
community projects that had been implemented over the four year study period—
which were mainly improvements to natural water springs. Working with research 
assistants to help with translation to the local dialect, at each site I visited, I conducted 
interviews focused on assessing the physical, social, economic, and political impact of 
the projects. Respondents were chosen using a stratified random sampling 
technique.
335
 Although only a few questionnaires were completed at each project site 
(sometimes with two or more people in one interview), it only took a couple of 
respondents to reveal the significant aspects of project's impact to the surrounding 
community. In this rural setting, many of the beneficiaries knew each other and were 
keenly aware of each project's impact on the larger community, even if they were not 
direct beneficiaries of a particular project. Overall, the same types of impacts were 
reported in several of the project sites visited.
336
 Most of these interviews lasted 30 
minutes or less.  
Municipal Council of Nakuru 
The same methodology was repeated with interviews in the town of Nakuru, 
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where I reviewed the work of the Municipal Council of Nakuru. This council covered 
the urban center of Nakuru and its immediate surroundings. The tabulation of 
interviews is shown in Table A.1. It was much easier to maneuver around the town of 
Nakuru. Public transport was readily available to travel to most project locations. 
While the higher number of interviews conducted with civic society organizations 
reflects this ease of access, it should also be noted that due to its urban nature, Nakuru 
has a high concentration of civil society organizations. 
2. On-site Project Assessments 
Observational visits to individual project sites were a crucial part of this study. 
While it was not possible to visit all project locations (more so in rural Kisii district), I 
was able to inspection a number of sites and document various aspects of each one. 
These include information on project type, current condition, level of sophistication, 
and immediate beneficiaries. The results were then categorized into basic needs 
groups such as water, sanitation, health, and education to determine the nature of their 
contribution to the infrastructure landscape.
337
 Categorization in such a manner allows 
for easy quantizizing (counting) and tabulation of the data.
338
  
3. Secondary Data 
While conducting the fieldwork, several texts were obtained from various 
agencies and the two local governments in this study. These included past studies on 
the LASDAP program (focused on other local governments not included in this study), 
as well as several documents pertaining to organizational structure, expenditure, and 
the history of project implementation. Other texts were obtained from the library of 
the Urban Development Department at the Ministry of Local Government. I also meet 
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a couple of other doctoral students conducting research on similar topics, leading us to 
share various qualitative and quantitative data sets. 
Fortunately, the Cornell Libraries had an extensive stock of literature on 
Kenya, including topics on politics, economics, demographics, and development 
agendas. Texts on popular participation and development were also utilized. 
Electronic copies of several articles related to this research topic were also available 
through the Cornell library catalogues. Many of these texts were used to help gain a 
better understanding of the research, and compose the content of several chapters in 
relation to the institution of the LASDAP program.  
4. Newspaper Articles 
While living in Kenya, I read daily, weekly, and monthly newspapers such as 
the Daily Nation, The Standard, Kenya Times, and The Link for pertinent news on the 
LATF/LASDAP program, as well as issues related to national politics, democracy, or 
the redistribution of resources. While there was not much information in the news 
about the LASDAP program and I was already aware of some of what was reported, 
the articles did serve as a way of triangulating my data. However, news related to the 
sociopolitical aspects of Kenya were very helpful in gaining a more nuanced 
understanding of redistributive programs like the LATF and its related development 
planning goals, as well as gaining a better understanding of Kenya in general. Since 
the country was still recovering from the political disputes over the 2007 Presidential 
elections, there was an endless supply of sociopolitical news, however much of it was 
directed as opinions related to the election results. 
Quantitative Data Analyses 
Simple quantitative analyses were undertaken in various parts of the study to 
enhance the research findings. These range from calculations of the proportion of the 
Kenyan population living in urban versus rural areas to the proportion of local 
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government revenue spent on project implementation and maintenance. Census and 
other data were combined to create brief data profiles of the two communities in 
which the case studies were conducted. These profiles include population figures, the 
number of wards, the yearly LATF/LASDAP allocations for fiscal years (FY) 
2004/2005 through FY 2007/2008, and the estimated funding set aside for improving 
services versus the proportion of those funds actually spent on implementing projects. 
These descriptive statistics were then used to report the findings.  
Qualitative Data Analyses 
Almost all of the interviews I conducted were recorded. I also took diligent 
notes during the interviews. However, due to the cost of transcribing all the 
interviews, I did not automatically transcribe all of them. I did however transcribe all 
of my notes into electronic form to ease the sorting and coding of themes that emerged 
from the interviews. When necessary, I then transcribed the audio of a particular 
section(s) from interviews that I wanted to quote verbatim. Each respondent was 
coded by random numbering to protect their identity.  
 I coded the themes that emerged from the interviews by noting some of the 
major topics respondents referred to during the interviews. I also noted the frequency 
of its being mentioned by all respondents. The themes that were chosen for discussion 
in the dissertation were the themes most often discussed in formal and informal 
conversations with people. However, I also chose themes based on common sense. 
These themes were then combined with project outcomes at both sites to form the 
basis of the theoretical assessment of the use of the participatory method in developing 
Kenya's infrastructure base.  
Schematic Mapping 
Geographic Information System (GIS) files and census socioeconomic data 
were combined to create schematic maps to facilitate a visual communication of facts 
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about Kenya and the study locations. The GIS files came from a number of sources, 
including the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), the World Resource 
Institute (WRI), the Municipal Council of Nakuru (MCN), the United Nations 
University Data Exchange Platform for the Horn of Africa (DEPHA). and the 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), one of the world's leaders of GIS 
mapping software and datasets. Other demographic and socioeconomic data came 
from the 1999 decennial census data collected by Kenya's National Bureau of 
Statistics (KNBS). The most recent data available from all these sources were based 
on the 1999 census and administrative boundaries.  
This included maps illustrating various administrative boundaries, population 
density, poverty density, and the per capita expenditure of LASDAP funds. Due to the 
limited nature of available GIS files for Kenya, some of the analyses was limited to 
levels at which the data was available, although effort was made to piece together data 
whenever possible to create more detailed assessments. This was not always possible 
however. For example, since local government boundaries are subdivided into 
electoral wards (neighborhood boundaries) and LASDAP funds are often subdivided 
between these wards, it would have been useful to visually show and state the 
socioeconomic differences between wards. However, despite extensive searches, I was 
unable to locate all of the information and files to illustrate this type of information.  
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APPENDIX B 
Selected Socioeconomic Data on Kenya 
Table B.1: Percentage Distribution of Households by Main Source of Water 
Location Piped*
Borehole/ 
Tank/Well
Water 
Spring Lake/River Pond/Dam
Kenya 30.5 22.3 11.8 28.7 6.7
Urban Kenya** 74.7 10.8 1.9 5.5 1.4
Rural Kenya** 14.9 24.4 15.1 36.0 6.1
Select Areas
Nairobi 92.7 3.0 0.4 0.6 3.3
Mombasa 79.3
Kisumu 58.3
Nakuru 91.6
Kisii Central*** 7.1 5.3 56.3 30.5 0.9
Province
Central 30.4 24.1 3.1 38.4 3.9
Coast 53.1 18.5 2.1 11.3 15.0
Eastern 27.3 26.1 9.2 31.6 5.8
North Eastern 7.2 58.7 0.7 14.6 18.8
Nyanza 8.6 17.7 24.3 40.5 8.8
Rift Valley 23.9 25.1 7.9 36.0 7.2
Western 9.9 28.6 38.4 21.6 1.6
data unavailable
 
Source: Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics, 1999 Census, Vol. II Table 7; Vol. X Table 5.1 
* While the data shows high percentages with access to piped water in some of the selected cities, the 
actual availability of water can be limited, especially in low income neighborhoods. 
** Data provided in Census does not add up to 100 percent 
*** The data for Kisii Central district is provide as a proxy for the prevalence of social amenities in 
rural Kisii, the area covered by Kisii County Council. 
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Table B.2: Percentage Distribution of Households by Method of Human Waste 
Disposal 
Location Main Sewer Pit Latrine
Septic 
Tank/ Cess Bush Other
Kenya 7.7 72.1 2.8 16.4 1
Urban Kenya 27.4 60.5 8.4 2.1 1.6
Rural Kenya 1 76.1 0.9 21.3 0.7
Select Areas
Nairobi 48.2 42.1 6.7 1.1 2
Mombasa 8.2 69.5
Kisumu 16.2 75.1
Nakuru 29.6 64.3
Province
Central 4.3 91.6 3.2 0.4 0.4
Coast 3.6 56.7 8.6 29.6 1.5
Eastern 2.2 80.4 1.3 15.4 0.7
North Eastern 1.2 17.6 0.6 77.2 3.4
Nyanza 2.4 77 0.9 18.5 1.3
Rift Valley 4.2 66 2 27.2 0.6
Western 1.6 92.3 0.7 4.9 0.5
data unavailable
 
  Source: Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics, 1999 Census, Vol. X Table 5.3 & 5.4 
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Active Population
66.1% (All)
64.2% (Nat‘l-Urban)
Employed
91.9% (All)
80.2% (Nat‘l-Urban)
Unemployed
8.1% (All)
19.8% (Nat‘l-Urban)
Inactive Population
33.9% (All)
35.9% (Nat‘l-Urban)
Fulltime Students
Retirees
Homemakers
Incapacitated
Other reasons 
Paid Employment
25.3% (All)
63.9% (Nat‘l-Urban)
Self-Employment
74.7% (All)
36.1% (Nat‘l-Urban)
 
Source:  
Figure B.1: The Activity Status of the Population Aged 5 Years and Above, 1999 
 
 
Active Population
61.3% (Nakuru)
47.6% (Kisii District)*
Employed
82.7% (Nakuru)
95.2% (Kisii District)
Unemployed
17.3% (Nakuru)
4.8% (Kisii District)
Inactive Population
38.9% (Nakuru)
50.1% (Kisii District)*
Fulltime Students
Retirees
Homemakers
Incapacitated
Other reasons 
Paid Employment
60.7% (Nakuru)
18.5% (Kisii District)
Self-Employment
39.3% (Nakuru)
81.5% (Kisii District)
 
Figure B.2: The Activity Status of the Population Aged 5 Years and Above, 1999 
Nakuru Town and Kisii District 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C.1: Distribution of Service Delivery Responsibilities in Kenya 
Services
Central 
Govt. District
Local 
Govt. Note
General Administration
Fire protection ◊
Statistical office 
Electoral register 
Education
Pre-school ◊
Primary  ◊ Seven councils only
Secondary  ◊ Seven councils only
Vocational and technical 
Higher education District responsible for oversight and monitoring
Adult education  ◊
Social Welfare
Kindergarten and nursery ◊
Family welfare services ◊
Welfare homes 
Social security  
Public Health
Primary care  ◊ Provided by a limited number of councils
Hospitals  ◊ Nairobi only
Health protection  ◊
Housing and Town Planning
Housing ◊ Primarily through housing related services
Town planning ◊
Regional planning 
Transport
Roads  ◊ Some funded by Kenya Roads Board
Urban roads  ◊
Water and Sanitation
Water and Sanitation ◊
Refuse collection and disposal ◊
Cemeteries and crematoria ◊
Slaughterhouses ◊ Primarily in rural areas
Environmental protection ◊
Culture, Leisure, and Sports
Museums and libraries ◊
Parks and open spaces ◊
Sports and leisure ◊
Utilities
Water supply  ◊
Electricity ◊ Larger urban councils only
Economic Development
Trade and industry ◊
Tourism Trade licensing 
          ◊ = discretionary service by the local authority
Source: Kenya Country Profile, Commonwealth Local Government Handbook 2004
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